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ABSTRACT 
The phenomenon of terrorism has been a permanent fixture in human history. The atrocities however, 
of September 11 illustrated the impact of such attacks on the international system of law and triggered 
questions as to the existence of a legal framework capable of addressing international terrorism. The 
present thesis examines the existence of particular international counter-terrorism models to deal With 
such a multifaceted phenomenm. 
I have identified the following counter-terrorist models in the field of international law and relations: 
unilateral internal; inter-State co-operation suppressionist; unilateral external and; centralised 
Secufity Council model. The first is prevalent M the absence of a particular treaty and where relevant 
insft=ents provide legislative and enforcement authority to incumbent States. The second has been 
predicated on bilateral and multilateral treaties entailing co-operation at various levels between States, 
but it has been also necessitated de facto in the context of recent Security Council resolutions. The 
unilateral external model has been predominantly invoked by the USA to justify the use of force 
against terrorist targets. Finally, the centrallsed Security Council model has come about as a result of 
the 9/11 attacks and through which the Council adopted particular resolutions that have given it 
authority to address in binding manner specific facets of anti-terrorist policy at the international and 
domestic level. 
The events of September II posed questions as to whether new international norms are needed in order 
to cope with terrorism. It is my belief that what is needed is the effective and consistent application of 
existing norrns rather then anythmg else. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the events of 9/11 the topic of terrorism was not on the top of domestic and international 
agendas. While not being a peripheral matter, it certainly did not call for a reappraisal of the existing 
norms of international law. It was regulated in thematic fashion on the basis of treaty law dealing with 
the particular manifestations of terrorist activity. The biggest challenge for pre-9/1 I political theorists 
and international lawyers was to make a fine distinction between terrorist violence and other forms of 
politico- ideological violence, particularly struggles of self-determination, as well as to come up with a 
universally acceptable definition of terrorism at the international level. While these issues are still 
relevant, the post-9/11 agenda has evolved to encompass other concerns, especially the availability of 
responses to terrorism, whether through recourse to the use of armed force, obligatory mechanisms 
related to domestic banking and financial institutions, sharing of intelligence information and other 
binding forms of inter-State co-operation. Following the attacks of 9/11 there was a multiplication of 
efforts to develop responses to terrorism at the global and regional level, with the United Nations 
assuming a leading role in the fight against terrorism. 
My focal point in this thesis are responses to international terrorism; whether unilateral, multilateral, or 
on the basis of Security Council resolutions. My overarching aim is to identify previous responses and 
assess the various conflicting claims as to the prevailing international counter-terrorism model. 
Contemporary terrorist threats challenge the current international law framework in many respects and 
trigger questions as to the whether the prevailing attitude towards terrorism has changed. Is the 
unilateral external model of the use of force against terrorism a new counter-terrorism model? The 
controversial application of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles of international law have 
acquired particular importance since the September 11 atrocities' against the US and the subsequent 
On September 11,2001, hijacked aircrafts were flown into the World Trade Centre in New York, killing 3000 
people. Large scale terrorist operations followed: On October 12,2002 a bombing in Bali caused the death of 202 
responses that followed. There are currently two opposing schools of thought with regards to the 
prevailing counter-terrorism model, both related to the ftindamental question as to how terrorism 
should be characterised. According to the first school of thought terrorism constitutes a criminal 
enterprise calling for a 'law enforcement' approach, while the other perceives contemporary terrorism 
as 'acts of war', bringMg into play the law of war, with both its branches: thejus ad bellum and thejus 
in bello. It has been argued that September 11 was a crucial date, which called for a reconstructing of 
international law. Although the scale of the atrocities and the military responses that followed indicate 
that September 11 was indeed a crucial date, with my thesis I argue that the events of September II 
and the subsequent responses more than anything else triggered a new determination to ensure the 
universal application of existing counter-terrorism norms. In this respect they led to the development of 
the centralised Security Council counter-terrorism model. By deconstructing the contemporary counter- 
terrorism models my aim is to reaffirm the relevance of international co-operation in suppressing 
terrorism. 
The scale and effects of the attacks of September II illustrated the ability of non-state actors to cross 
national borders and cause mass casualties. Certainly the realisation of the real threat posed by 
contemporary international terrorism changed the prevailing attitude at least of the most powerful 
states 2. Although terrorism (including transborder terrorism) is not a new phenomenon, large-scale 
international terrorism, in the context of highly complex and increasingly global networks, constitutes 
an entirely new challenge to the system of collective security as represented by the United Nations 
organization. By its very nature, transborder terrorism cannot exclusively be dealt with within the 
people, on March 11,2004 in Madnd, 200 people died from bombs exploded, in London on the 7th of July 2005, 
42 people were the victims of terrorist attacks. See: New York Times, (Oct. 4 2004), p. 8. 
See: Rostow, N., Before and after: the changed UN response to terrorism since September 11,35 Cornell 
Intel-national Law Journal r-002), p. 475. 
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framework of an international order defined by the nation-state. Naturally, effective strategies cannot 
be developed by states in isolation from each other. 
My hypothesis from the outset was that the contemporary counter-terrorism model is a suppressive 
(reactive) rather than a proactive one based on iriter-state co-operation. I use the term model to discuss 
the international responses to terrorism and the various forms of co-operation adopted by the majority 
of states. Where, therefore, a State alone, apart from all other or the majority of States, applies either 
preventive or suppressionist action in a particular case, this is not to be regarded as a model, as in order 
to establish a model significant consensus is required. I must explain that the suppressionist model is 
not simply exhausted by an immediate reaction to a terrorist attack. Rather, its contemporary existence 
is predicated also on substantial preventive action because of the way domestic as well as international 
criminal justice works. Thus police investigation and cooperation where a crime is in the stage of being 
planned would fall within the suppressionist model, whereas In cases where a State is suspected of 
accumulating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) under the vague speculation that it might use it 
against another State, any action taken in that regard would be preventive. Similarly, where States 
agree to set down binding banking/financial institution regulations in order to avoid the end result 
brought about by terrorist financing in general, and not in connection to a specific terrorist group, this 
would also fall with preventive action. However, this should not be regarded as a concrete preventive 
approach to terrorism. A concrete preventive approach would be one that attacks the root causes of the 
phenomenon and prevents it from occurring in the first place. 
The thesis runs as follows: Chapter one offers an introduction to the phenomenon of terrorism and the 
resulting 'war on terror'. The chapter is divided into three main sections. My aim in part one is to 
conceptuallse terrorism as a phenomenon before I examine in part two the gradual evolution of 
international efforts to understand, categorise, criminalize and counter terrorism. Through a brief 
historical introduction to the phenomenon of terrorism my aim is to demonstrate the different varieties 
of terrorism. The multifaces of the phenomenon will later explain the impossibility of reaching a 
general consensus on the definition of the term. In the second part of the chapter I proceed to an 
examination of the existing international counter-terrorism measures to fight international terrorism. 
Despite the fact that terrorism operates both at the national and international law the chapter is limited 
to an examination of international instruments, whi wi 1 in 1 ich deal ith terrorism having an i temational 
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dimension. Since the early twentieth century acts of terrorism by non-state actors called for the 
attention of the international community to adopt instrument towards eliminating international 
terrorism. From the 1960's onwards, terrorism took on a new international element through the 
perpetration of cross-border civil aviation offences (hijacking, etc). Such an internationalisation of 
terrorism led to the adoption of international measures to combat it. The subsequent treaties that 
followed criminalized in thematic style the various offences contained therein and elevated them to 
crimes of international relevance. The model of that era could best be described as an inter-state 
cooperation suppressionist model as the thematic treaties of that era were premised on a suppressionist 
approach, which was also endorsed by General Assembly resolutions of the time. This was a 
suppressionist model because it made provision only for immediate post-terrorist countermeasures, 
such as the delineating jurisdictional competences, extradition and mutual legal assistance procedures, 
political offence exceptions, etc. No doubt, the inclusion of a duty in these States upon States to 
criminalize the acts described therein could be characterised as preventive, but this is hardly evidence 
of a concrete preventive approach. I argue from the perspective of State practice that the prevailing 
model of that era is best described in terms of suppression, notwithstanding the fact that there is a 
strong bilateral treaty system relating to extradition and mutual legal assistance. Nonetheless, this 
bilateralism, only serves to illustrate that inter-state co-operation matures only at the stage where the 
alleged offender has been apprehended. The adoption of specific anti-terrorism conventions was 
evidence of the unwillingness of states to deal with terrorism as a phenomenon largely because of the 
'political offence' exception. Such unwillingness seems to have gradually been abandoned by the 
adoption of the more recent UN anti-terrorism conventions, the Convention on Terrorism Bombing and 
the Terrorist Financing Convention. However, both conventions do not really depart from the 
previously existing model. Instead they represent a more effective rendition of the suppressive counter- 
terrorism model based on mter-state co-operation. 
Following the events of September 11 however, it became obvious that terrorism appears to have a 
much more lethal face as it has become widespread, institutionalised, technologically advanced and 
global in its consequences. The changing face of terrorism has given rise to the question as to whether 
responses to it should be viewed within a warfare framework. In the last part of the chapter I introduce 
the so-called 'war on terror' doctrine launched in the aftermath of the events of 9/11 and its legal 
implications for international law. My aim in that last part of the chapter is to indicate the 
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consequences of treating the fight against terrorism under the 6war on terror' doctrine. To accept the 
4war on terror' doctrine as a war on law carries the real risk of creating classes of enemies who are 
actual or potential threat and opens the way to military action against broadly defined enemieS3 . 
Terrorism is a phenomenon that has taken many different forms throughout history. Moreover, the term 
terrorism is such a broad term that has not been used consistently by states. Such facts explain the 
impossibility of reaching a universal definition of terrorism. The absence of an accepted international 
law definition is perceived by some commentators as the main reason for the inadequacy of 
international law's ability to combat terrorism 4. The lack of an international definition of terrorism is 
the subject matter of my second chapter. The most important questions with regards to the lack of a 
generally accepted definition of terrorism is whether the lack of definition means that states can act as 
they wish on a subjective notion of terrorism and whether such a lack of an accepted definition 
becomes a matter of operational concern for the international legal order. Has the failure to conclude on 
a definition serious consequences in practice? 
My argument is that the lack of a generally accepted definition of terrorism does not result to the 
paralysis of legal developments. Although the term terrorism has strong political significance, the 
absence of a definition did not prevent the adoption of specific counter-terrorism conventions 
ad&essing particular (as well as non-particular) manifestations of the phenomenon. All these 
mstruments provide the legal tools to address conduct that we might refer to as acts of terrorism. The 
situation however is different With regards to domestic definitions of terrorism as a domestic anti- 
terrorism statute must provide a precise definition of terrorism. The lack of precise definitions of 
terrorism in the domestic level explains more than anything else the poor enforcement of existing 
norms. 
3 See: Lowe, V., Clear and present danger: responses to terrorism, 54 ICLQ (2005), p. p. 185-196. 
Nanda, V., The role of international law in combating terrorism, 10 Mich. St, U DCL Int. L (2001), p. 603. 
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Following the atrocities of September 11, and the military action against Afghanistan a new model of 
counter-terrorism seems to emerge. The horrendous attacks of 9/11 demonstrated to the world the 
immense destruction that armed groups of private individuals are capable of causing. This brought to 
the forefront an important question regarding the unilateral use of force against non-state actors: when 
is it lawful for states to exercise their right of self-defence in response to attacks by private actors 
operating from abroad? Is the unilateral external model an emerging new counter-terrorism model? 
This is the question addressed by means of the third chapter, with the aim to support ftirther the inter- 
state suppressionist model for which I am advocating at the present thesis. 
More specifically, in chapter three I examine the application of Articles 2(4) and 51 UN Charter to 
terrorism, and whether the latter can ever be equated with an 'armed attack'. Certainly, such a position 
would have been untenable prior to 9/11, but following Security Council Resolution 1368, a day after 
9/11, it became evident that the Council was determined to describe extreme terrorist attacks as 
manifestations of 'armed attack'. The lack of a theoretical basis, however, underpinning such a notion 
is problematic in many respects, particularly since it does not answer the question whether a non-State 
entity is, and in what way, capable of launching an armed attack. If it can, who will be the object of the 
victim state's countermeasures, which in all probability will involve substantial use of armed force? 
Are states now permitted to use force in response to terrorism committed by non-state actors? Looking 
at the reaction of states to the events of September II and the military action against the Taleban and 
Al -Qeada it seems that there is a paradigmatic shift in the international community's understanding of 
the law of self-defence. Can terrorism post-September II be an 'armed attack' under the ius ad bellum 
so as to trigger applicability of the lus in bello? If so, to what extent is anticipatory self-defence 
applicable in the case of a qualifying terrorist attack? All these concerns have forced the ICJ in its 
Advisory Opinion in the Palestinian Wall case to argue (14 votes to 1M favour) that Article 51 UN 
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Charter concerns only inter-State instances of armed force and is thus inapplicable to terrorist attacks 5. 
Moreover, given the fact that resolution 1368 is a context specific instrument - i. e. adopted in relation 
to 9/11 alone -I can ascertain that although the link between the UN Charter's use of force provisions 
and terrorism is a new and real approach it is wholly unclear whether other terrorist acts can ever be 
quantified as constitutMg armed attacks. 
The US, and Israel before it, is arguing that it has the right to employ armed force in a pre-emptive 
capacity, and to a large degree this is what took place with the Iraq invasion of 2003.1 argue that the 
pre-emptive position finds no support in international practice and although it may be implied in 
Security Council language contained in post 9/11 resolutions, it is in fact wholly rejected by the 
international community. Indeed the unilateral external model invoked by the USA to justify pre- 
emptive strikes against alleged terrorist targets has not met with any degree of consensus by the 
international community. The emerging model M the sphere of terrorist-related use of force is 
suppressionist, as is use of force in general under Article 51 UN Charter irrespective of particular 
deviations. 
Additionally, chapter three briefly considers the question of whether a terrorist act can cross the 
threshold of severity so as to trigger the application of Protocol 11 to the Geneva Convention. Following 
the conclusions reached in my third chapter and the overall argument of the thesis, the question as to 
whether a terrorist act can bring about an internal armed conflict is considered only as a residual 
possibility. 
Having ascertained in my previous chapter the current legal position according to which the 'war on 
terrorism' is not a war in the legal sense, I proceed in my last chapter to a discussion of recent regional 
and international developments in relation to terrorism, which further support my argument that the 
Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (9 
July 2004), para. 139. 
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contemporary counter-terrorism model is a suppressionist one based on inter-state co-operation. I rely 
heavily on recent LN action against terrorism in order to demonstrate that the Centralised Security 
Council suppressi . oni . st model is the one currently accepted by the international community of states. 
Such a model is advocated by recent Security Council resolutions, the creation of mechanisms and 
bodies such as the Counter-terrorism Committee and regional efforts to deal with terrorism. Terrorist 
financing encompasses a significant array of measures, some of which were adopted prior to the events 
of 9/11, particularly through the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention, but which were really 
consolidated and made universal by Security Council Resolution 1373, immediately folloWing 9/11. 
All such counter-terrorism measures reaffirm the view that international terrorism should be best 
addressed through international co-operation. 
Counter-terrorism measures whether they are perceived as 'war' or as 'law enforcement' measures 
have direct implications for human rights. The human rights implications of terrorism and especially of 
terrorist attacks such as the September 11 go far beyond the scope of my thesis to include the violence 
and discrimination witnessed in the aftermath of September 11, as well as the ciVil liberties 
implications of potential security measures. However, in the last chapter I highlight and discuss the 
human rights implications arising from the enforcement of the contemporary counter-terrorism model. 
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CHAPTER1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHENOMENON OF 
TERRORISM: FROM THE EARLY INTER-STATE 
SUPPRESIONIST MODEL TO THEWAR ON TERROR' 
INTRODUCTION 
Depending one one's interest and academic training, there are many perspectives to a single 
phenomenon, whether social, natural, or other. The same is true of violence. Violence itself is further 
distinguished and categorized on the basis of victims and perpetrators, domestic, political, ethnic, 
religious and other forms of violence spring to mind'. All such emanations of violence establish a 
variety of interesting prisms; sociological, criminological, political/intemational relations, legal and, 
with the plethora of current scientific and social methods, many others. When the law, domestic or 
international, attempts to regulate social phenomena, such as violence, it does so because: a) it is 
deemed that the existing de-regulation regime exposes persons and property to risk, and; b) there is 
consensus on the existence of both the risk and available enforcement measures. In the international 
arena, at least, foreseability for the regulation of risk is lacking, and thus all responses are premised on 
re-action rather than pro-action. A good example is the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offences and 
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft2, which was hastily adopted only after a multitude of 
incidents endangering civil aviation were perpetrated, and which were often greeted with amusement 
by the press and the public, and with national authorities not quite certain If they should prosecute and, 
if so, under what laws. Since the Second World War hostage taking of international protected persons 
1 See: Wilkinson, P., Terrorism versus democracy, the liberal state response, (Frank Cass 2000), p. p. 20-2 1. 
ILM ( 1963), 1042. 
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has developed to an issue of major concern. A proliferation of incidents, such as the Entebbe raid 3 and 
the American hostage-taking in Iran', led the international community to adopt binding instruments 
condemning and crimMalizMg hostage taking5 . The adoption of the specific anti-terrorism conventions 
following particular incidents of major concern for the international community is indeed evidence of 
the preferable suppressionist approach. Such a suppressionist counter-terrorism model of inter-state co- 
operation was the dominant model before September 11. 
The present chapter is divided into three main sections. After conceptualizing terrorism, I proceed in 
part two of the chapter to an examination of the gradual evolution of international efforts to counter- 
terrorism. Indeed prior to the events of September 11, the General Assembly of the United Nations 
through the work of the Sixth Legal Committee developed treaties that encouraged states to criminalize 
some of the acts that are commonly carried out by terrorist. Most of the conventions do not refer to 
terrorism explicitly. In general terms the international conventions seek to utilize domestic criminal law 
to elimmate intemational terrorism rather than to establish mtemational crimes themselves. The 
adoption of the two more recent UN conventions on terrorism, the Bombing Convention and Financing 
of Terrorism Convention indicate a paradigmatic shift of the international community's attitude 
towards terrorism. In contrast to the earlier treaties dealing with specific targets both the Terrorist 
Bombing and the Financing of Terrorism conventions demonstrate a will to declare the Illegitimacy of 
terrorism in all circumstances. However, both conventions do not really depart from the suppressionist 
approach but indicate a more effective rendition of the suppressionist model of inter-state co-operation. 
3 See: Harris, D. J., Cases and material on international law, 5 th edition, (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1998), p. p. 
909-911. 
4 US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case, United States of Americav Iran, 1CJ Reports, 1980, see: ibid, 
P. ) -5 
8. 3 
5 See: Rehman, J., International human rights. - a practical approach, (Pearson Education Limited, 2003), p. 452. 
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In September 2001 the United Nations Security Council declared that acts of international terrorism 
constitute on of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the 2 Is' centur - Thus, 
the events of September II converted terrorism from an issue of on-going concern for the General 
Assembly to an issue threatening international peace and security. They also gave rise to the 'war on 
terror' doctrine. The last part of the chapter introduces the idea of a 'war on terror', which is fiirther 
discussed in chapter three. 
S. C. Res. 1377, Annex, U. N. Doc. S/RES/1377,12 November 2001. 
II 
PART ONE 
1. THE CONCEPT OF TERRORISM: HISTORICAL 
DIMENSIONS 
The phenomenon of political violence has been a permanent fixture in human history as a method 
employed by emperors, kings, relig, OUS7 and ethnic leaders as well as revolutionaries, seeking to make 
political protest to, or to secure certam political behaviour by States. Some of the earliest recorded 
examples are the secret brotherhoods 8, autonomist movements such as the IRA9, or the Arnienian 
movement against the Turks after the genocide this ethnic group suffered in 1915-1710. Although there 
are great differences as far as the character and the tactics of terrorist operations are concerned, the 
basic issue remains the same: violence reappears as the 'natural' answer to social injustice, oppression 
and social discrimination. 
It is perhaps helpful from the outset to define what I mean by the term 'terrorist organization'. An 
organization is termed terrorist on the basis of both objective and subjective factors. As far as the 
former is concerned, a typical terrorist organization advocates in favour of and is committed to a shared 
7 Rapoport, D., The morality of terror. - religious and secularjustifications, (Pergamon, 1982) 
8 Examples of prototypical terrorist movements are the following: The Sicarii, an extreme group of a Jewish Zealot 
sect which waged a campaign of terrorism between AD 63-73; the Assassin sect; Shi'ite Ismaili brotherhood 
emerged at the end of the II th century; the Red Spears in China; the Thugs, an Indian sect; and the Ku Klux Klan 
in the USA. For an extensive discussion on secret and religious brotherhoods, see Laqueur, W., The age of 
terrorism, (Little Brown, 1987), pp. 13-15. See also, Rapoport, D., Fear and trembling: terrorism in three religious 
traditions, 78 American Political Science Review (1984), p. 658. See also: Gupta, H., A Critical study of the Thugs 
and their activities, 38 Journal of Indian History (1959), p. 167, and Horsley, R., The Sicarii: Ancient Jewish 
'terrorists', 59 Journal of Religion ( 1979), p. 435. 
9 Sec: Kelley, K. J., The longest war, Northern Ireland and the IRA, (Lawrence Hill & Co., 1988), p. p. 29-40. 
10 O'Sullivan, N., Terrorism, ideology and revolution: the origins of modern political violence, (Westview Press, 
1986), p. p. 115-132. 
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I. political value' , is secret, small in size so as to ensure adaptability and flexibility, does not engage 'in 
large offensive operations, but rather perpetrates small-scale clandestine violent acts. Whereas these 
elements are more or less common to all terror organizations, their alms differ substantially. Hence, the 
PKK and Hamas' 2 demand through violence the creation of independent States, and as a result are 
larger in size than all other organizations. The subjective factor is much more complex. It is predicated 
on the designation by a particular country13' or a group thereof through the United NationS14' of a 
specific group as a terrorist organization. Whereas such designation may rest on the objective criteria 
identified above, it is usually arbitrary on the basis of national self-interests, and thus varies from 
country to country. This further explains the irnpossibility of reaching a global consensus regarding a 
15 single definition 
Based on their underlYing political motivation or ideological cause 16 , terrorist can 
be categorized in 
those seeking political self-determination' 7, ideological terrorists 18, Single-issue terrorist'9, and religio- 
11 Post, J., Sprinzak, E., and Denny, L., The terrorists in their own words: Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle 
Eastern terrorists, 15 (1) Terrorism and Political Violence (2003), p. p. 171-184. 
12 See: Asser, A., Who are Hamas? BBC News 6 June 2003, www. Neaws. bbc. co. uk/l/hiu/world/middle east/ 
13 E. g. the 1996 US Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 18 USC § 2339B. The AEDPA 
authorises the Secretary of State to designate a foreign organisation or group as a terrorist organisation. The same 
is also true of sec. 3 of the UK 2000 Terrorism Act, which gives the Secretary of State authority to designate a 
proscribed' organisation. 
" In this case through the combined work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, established through SC Res. 1373 
(28 Sep. 2001) and the Security Council itself 
15 For the impossibility of reaching a generally accepted definition of terrorism see chapter 2 of the thesis. 
16 See relatively: Schmid, A., and Jong-man, A. J., Political terrorism. - a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, 
databases, theories and literature, (North Holland Publishing Company, 1988), p. p. 39-56. 
17 Examples include the IRA and the ETA organisations. See: Townshend, C., Political violence in Northern 
lreland, (Gill and Macmillan, 1981). Also: Whittaker, D. J., The terrorism reader, (Routledge, 2003), p. p. 101- 
110. Also see: supra note 9, p. p. 29-40. 
" Ideological groups are those seeking to change the political status quo to an extreme right or left model. Some 
indicativc examples are: the Red An-ny faction and the Red Brigades. See relatively: supra note 1, p. 20. Also: 
Hoffi-nan, B., Right wing terrorism in Europe, (RAND Corp., 1983), p. p. 16-27. 
'9 This is employed by groups obsessed with the desire to change a specific policy, or practice within the target 
society, rather than with the aim of political revolution. See relatively: Sperling, S., Animal liberators: research 
and morality, (University of California Press, 1988 
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political terroriStS20 . The profound differences between the aforementioned groups of terrorists were in 
the past clearly recognized. However, this is less true today with the important changes that have taken 
place M the character of terrorism. Indeed the model of political violence that emerged from the socio- 
political era of the 1960's and 1970's has now largely faded away, or has been eradicated in Western 
Europe and most of Latin America. Since the attacks of 9/11 the world has witnessed the maturity of a 
new phase of terrorist activity, the so-calledfihad era of violent religious fundamentalism, spawned by 
the Iranian Revolution of 1979, as well as by the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan shortly thereafter. The 
powerful attraction of religious and spiritual movements has overshadowed the nationalist or leftist 
revolutionary ethos of earlier terrorist phases (though many of those struggles continue), and it has 
become the central characteristic of a growing international trend. It is perhaps ironic that, as Rapoport 
observes, the forces of history seem to be driving international terrorism back to a much earlier time, 
with echoes of the behaviour of 'sacred' terrorists, such as the Zealots- Sicarii, clearly apparent M the 
terrorist activities of organizations such as al-Qaeda and its associated groups. Internationally, the main 
targets of such terrorists are the United States and the US-led global system. Like other eras of modem 
terrorism, this latest trend has deep roots and given the relevant historical patterns, it is likely to last at 
least a generation, if not longer. The jihad era is animated by widespread alienation combined with 
elements of religious identity and doctrine a dangerous mix of forces that resonate deep M the 
human psyche. 
). Also: Davidson, G. S., Combating terrorism, (Routledge, 1990), p. 7; see also Militant Activism and the Issue of 
A nimal Rights, Commentary No. 2 1, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS, 1992. Also: Bragg, R., Abortion 
clinic hit by two bombs, New York Times, (January 30,1998); see also Woman gets twenty year sentence in 
attacks on abortion clinics, New York Times, (September 9,1995); Cleninden, D., Abortion clinic bombings have 
caused disruption for many, New York Times, (January 23,1985). For an examination on the validity of labelling 
such groups as terrorists, see: Monaghan, R., Terrorism in the name of animal rights, II Terrorism and Political 
Violenct, ( 1999), p. 1. 
20 Most cited groups are the Harnas and Hezbollah. On the activity of both groups see relatively: Gus, M., 
Understanding terrorism., challenges, perspectives and issues, (Sage Publications, 2003). 
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Post 1990's terrorist violence, which has given birth to a more pervasive and accepted suppressionist 
inter-State approach, is different from ante-1990's terrorism in the following respects: a) the violent 
acts raise fear within the population; b) the levels of violence exceed by far that witriessed in previous 
eras; c) there is so much public support within like-minded populations or like-mMded States that 
terrorist violence can afford to be indiscriminate and atrocious in nature, and; d) post-1990's terrorists 
operate army-style training camps and because they can recruit a limitless number of persons to their 
cause, they are able to operate in large numbers across a multitude of international frontiers. Thus, 
terrorism performance of violent acts acquires an international dimension. In an era of globalisation 
and increasing interdependence almost every significant terrorist campaign has an international 
dimension, even when it is challenging a specific government Within its own territory-". For example 
the IRA raises funds in the United States, while the ETA has used French territory to plan terrorist 
attackS22 . Also Al-Qaeda which is generally demands the withdrawal of western financial and military 
interests from Muslim countries, activates in both Western and Muslim States. In contrast with older 
approaches modem-day terrorism is widespread, institutionallsed, technologically advanced and global 
in its consequenceS23 . The 
brief history to the phenomenon of terrorism indicates the impossibility of 
reaching a generally accepted definition of terrorism. Any attempt to produce a definition is doomed 
because every terrorism is different. It's different according to history, to tradition and political culture. 
The historical events demonstrate that terrorism appears in various forms. The reftisal to differentiate 
between different forms of terrorism makes definitions even more difficult to formulate. The lack of a 
generally accepted definition of terrorism in international law has lead to the thematic approach evident 
from the adoption of conventions dealing with specific manifestations of the phenomenon. In the 
21 See: Wilkinson, P, supra note 1, p. 19. 
22 ibid, p. 188. 
23 Griset, P., Tcrroi4sm in perspective, (Sage Publications, 2003), p. p. 45-57. 
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following sections I discuss the gradual evolution of international counter-terronsm models developed 
to deal particular manifestations of terroriSM24. 
24 Falk, R-, Rediscovering international law after September I Ith, 16 Temple International & Comparative Law 
Journal, 
(2002), p. p. 359-69. See also: Zelman, D., Recent developments in international law: anti-terronsm legislation - 
part two: the impact and consequences, II Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, (2002), p. p. 421-441. 
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PART TWO 
1. THE UN SPECIFIC CONVENTIONS AGAINST 
TERRORISM 
The international dimension of terrorism urged many states to perceive that they have a shared interest 
in co-operating with each other in order to suppress specific manifestations of terrorism, which they 
perceived to be a common threat. Starting from the least ambitious threshold of the conventions 
regulating higlijacking in the 1960's and 1970's, the 1990's finds the international community forming 
and adopting new instruments, dealing with more specialiZed forms of terrorism with increasingly 
advanced language. The United Nations General Assembly has played an important role in addressing 
some of the more specific manifestations of international terrorism, such as airline hijacking, unlawful 
seizure of aircraft and hostage taking, by adopting resolutions and conventions that require States to 
criminalize these acts. International co-operation between States for the suppression of international 
terrorism was manifested by a series of agreements dealing with a crime that threatens not only human 
life and safety, but also the existence of every civilized socletY25 . An analysis of the subject matter of 
the international instrments dealing with terrorism reveals that they encompass different 
manifestations of violence upon civil aviation 26, civil maritime navigation and sea based platformS27 , as 
25 See: Joyner, N., Aerial hijacking as an international crime, (Oceana Publications, 1974); McWhinney, E., Aerial 
piracy and international terrorism: The illegal diversion of aircraft in international law, (Kluwer, 1987). See also: 
Evans, A., Aircraft hijacking: its causes and cure, 63 AJIL (1969), p. 695 and Aerial hijacking: what is to be done, 
66 AJIL (1972), p. 819. Also: Moore, J., Towards legal restraints on international terrorism, 67 AJIL (1973), p. 88. 
26 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 704 U,, %'TS 219; 
1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 860 UNTS 105; 1971 Montreal 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 974 UNTS 177; 1988 
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, which 
extents and supplements the Montreal Convention on Air Safety, ICAO Doc. 9518 (24 Feb. 1988). 
27 1988 Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (10 
Mar. 1988) and the Protocol of the same date for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, IMO Doc. Sua. Conf/ 15. Rev. I (1998). 
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well as attacks upon persons, including hostages, diplomats and other internationally protected 
persons 28 
Among the most notable elements of the relevant conventions is the absence of universal jurisdiction in 
respect of the offences prescribed therem. For example, the provisions of the Tokyo Convention 29 
provide for jurisdiction on a variety of bases, such as the registration of the aircraft, the nationality of 
the personnel harmed, but none of these amounts to universal jurisdiction. The Hague and the Montreal 
conventions contain explicit punishment for the potential offender and oblige member States either to 
extradite or punish. However, the present author expresses her serious doubts as to the extent that 
States are ready to comply with the 'aut detere aut judicare principle', especially since neither the 
30 Hague nor the Montreal Convention contains provisions for the application of sanction S. Moreover, 
the aut dedere principle is not ipso facto directly applicable, but requires the existence of a bilateral 
extradition treaty, or a declaration lodged in a multilateral convention containing the aut dedere 
principle with which the declaring State expressly consents to extradition regardless of the existence of 
a bilateral treaty. 
28 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, 1035 
UNTS 167; 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, UN Doc. A/Res/34/146 (1979). For a 
detailed analysis of the Convention, see: Bloomfield, L., FitzGerald, G., Crimes against internationally protected 
persons: prevention and punishment. An analysis of the UN Convention, (Praeger, 1975). See also: Rozakis, K., 
Terrorism and the internationally protected persons in the light of the ILC's Draft Articles, 23 ICLQ (1974), p. 32. 
29 In particular, the convention requires States parties to take such measures as are necessary to establish their 
jurisdiction over crimes committed on board aircraft registered by them. See Art. 3. Other provisions concern such 
matters as taking offenders into custody, restoring control of the aircraft to the commander and continuation of the 
aircraft's journey. Arts. 6-15. 
30 The ineffectiveness of the relevant international conventions in association with the numerous aerial hijacking 
instances during the 1960's, culminated in the adoption of bilateral and regional treaties See, for example, Cuba- 
US: Memorandum of Understanding on the Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and Other Offences: Exchange of 
Notes at Washington and Havana (15 February 1973), reprinted in 12 ILVf 370 (1973) Icurrently not in forceý. It 
should be noted that in its 156th Session the ICAO Council reported a sharp decline in the number of incidents of 
unlawful intcrference with international civil aviation. See Report of the Secretary General, Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, UN Doc A 54'301 (3 September 1999), p. 7. 
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The necessity to suppress acts of hostage taking led to the adoption of the 1979 Convention against the 
Taking of Hostages. The Convention recognizes the grave nature of the offence 31 and obliges member 
States to define it as an extraditable offence under their domestic laws 32 . The 
Convention makes no 
provision regarding the handling of hostage situations but requires member States to take all 
33 34 appropriate measures to ease the situation and secure the release of the hostages . It is evident that 
both in the case of civil aviation and hostage taking the emphasis is not on the protection of the victims 
once these are caught in the middle of a particular incident; rather, co-operation focuses more on the 
criminal justice dimension thus adopting a suppressionist model. The basic model followed by the 
international anti-terrorism instruments is the following: a type of terrorist activity of particular concern 
at the time is identified; states are obliged to criminalize the conduct and impose penalties. Thus, the 
pre-September 11 model was utilizing international law to declare that certain acts should be 
criminalized in the domestic law of each signatory state. 
2. THE EVOLUTION OF COUNTER- TERRORISM MODELS 
THROUGH THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
The contemporary approach to terrorism by the various organs of the General Assembly bears no 
resemblance to its examination in the early 1970s when it was dominated by the influence of 
developing countries and the semantics of self-determination. Since the early 1960s, much of the 
31 Art. 2. 
32 Art. 10(1). 
33 The current official practice of States is to refuse to yield to terrorist demands although this is not always the 
case in practicc. See: US Counter-Terrorism Policy Statement in Paust J. J., et al, International criminal law. - cases 
and materials, (Carolina Academic Press, 1996), p. 1176. 
34 Art. 3(2). 
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physical conduct comprising terrorist acts has been criminalized in numerous sectoral anti-terrorism 
treaties. Yet dealing with terrorist acts as sectoral offences fails to differentiate between privately 
motivated violence and violence committed for poll 11 in I reasons. In particular, the i ternational 
community has expressed is disapproval of 'terrorism', as such, on a number of grounds since the early 
1970s. The item was first included in the agenda of the twenty-seventh session of the Assembly in 
1972, under the title 'Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent 
human lives or jeopardises fundamental fi7eedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of 
terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, fi-ustration, grievance and despair and which cause 
35 some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes' . 
An impressive title, no doubt, especially because the Assembly identified the need to address the 
'underlying causes' of the phenomenon known as terrorism, something which may be regarded as 
irrelevant in contemporary discourse especially because of its political underpinnings in that it may be 
seen as submitting to terrorist demands. To understand, however, this attitude, one must examine the 
prevailing political circumstances at the time; the eastern bloc maintained that its social system 
provided such harmony that precluded recourse to political violence; the Group of Arab states and the 
developing world insisted that Israel and South Africa repressed the legitimate struggle of peoples to 
self-determination, thus provoking violence; the western bloc was isolated and rejected the dichotomy 
of acceptable violence as a remedy towards social, political or ethnic injustices. Resolution 3034, 
therefore, did not echo western views. In fact, while condemning terrorism in its preamble, it went on 
to reaffirm the right of self-determination and describe as 'terrorist' all acts perpetrated by colonial, 
racist and alien regimeS36 . There is no doubt that Resolution 3034 was hardly aimed at deterring the 
perpetrators of terrorist violence as much as defending violence against specific countries, although 
operative paragraph 5 invites States to become parties to then existing anti-terrorism conventions. At 
35 G.. -V Res. 3034 (XXVII) (18 Dec. 1972). 
36 Operative paras. 3 and 4 
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that session the Assembly decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, 
consisting of 35 members, which met in 1973,1977 and 1979 and reported to the General Assembly at 
its twenty-eighth, thirty-second and thirty-fourth sessions. Although the item has remained on the 
Assembly's agenda ever since 1972, the long name with the strong reference to underlying causes has 
not survived, since the last resolution that bore it was one adopted at the very end of the Cold War 37 . 
As will become apparent In my analysis, Assembly resolution 46/5 1, adopted on 9 December 199 1, not 
only shortened the name to 'Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism', but also was the precursor 
to further changes in the attitude of the Assembly, although the right to use violence in pursuit of self- 
determination was a major component of that resolution 38 - 
Between 1972 and 1991 the Assembly focused its attention on addressing these underlying causes of 
terrorism on the basis of a Report prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee, presented to the Assembly at its 
34 th session 39 . However, subsequent resolutions introduced new concepts, such as 'State- sponsored' 
terrorism 40 and international co-operation taking specific forms (e. g. bilateral extradition treaties or 
similar clauses, exchange of information, etc)41 . The former concept was used both in the contemporary 
sense, i. e. directly or indirectly assisting the perpetration of terrorist acts, but also as a weapon of 
political persuasion, primarily against the USA. Thus, Assembly resolution 39/159, entitled 
'Inadmissibility of the policy of State terrorism and any actions by States aimed at undermining the 
socio-political system in other sovereign States', demanded that States refrain from military 
37 G. A. Res. 44/29 (4 Dec. 1989). 
38 Operative paras. 6 and 15 - 
39 In 1985 Syria requested placing an item on the agenda regarding the differentiation of terrorism ftom the right to 
self-determination, UN Doc. A/42/193 (1985). This proposal was supported by the Group of Arab States, UN Doc. 
A/42/193, /'Add. 1 -33 (1985). See UNIT Doc. A/42/832 (3 Dec. 1987). 
40 G. A. Res. 34, /145 (17 Dec. 1979), operative para. 7. This terminology was not used in the resolution. See also 
G. A. Res. 38/130 (19 Dec. 1983), operative para. 4,40/61 (9 Dec. 1985), operative para. 6. 
41 Id, operatl \c para. II- 
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intervention aimed at overthrowing another government for socio-political reasons 42 . Resolution 
42/159 further called for the adoption of a generally agreed definition of terroriSM43, which was 
opposed by western States, especially since relevant resolutions distinguished between acceptable and 
non-acceptable forms of terrorist violence. 
In the period between 1989 and 1994 one may discern a distinct change in the Assembly's approach to 
politico-legal questions and their terminology. Resolution 44/29 underlines the close links between 
terrorism and drug trafficking, stressing that such types of violence 'endang[er] the constitutional order 
of States and violat[e] human rights 944 - This is a striking and radical statement for two reasons: firstly, 
the linkage to organised crime may well encompass most terrorist and national liberation groups as 
they seek to fund their struggles. Thus, the vociferous call in the past for examining underlying causes 
could become inapplicable if elements of organised crime - or arbitrary assimilations thereto - becomes 
an unacceptable element in the international legal discourse 45 . Secondly, the reference to human rights 
and their violation by terrorist/organised criminal groups is clearly alien to the theoretical and legal 
discourse on human rights, which advocates that only States can violate human rights, whereas non- 
State actors are only capable of committing criminal acts. This shifting of liability and the use of 
ten-ninology was not accidental, but rather the result of the collapse of State support (both material and 
ideological) of political or ideological groups. The change, however, was subtle. As previously 
examined resolution 46/5 1, adopted in 199 1, shortened its title, but recalled all previous resolutions, 
starting With 3034 of 1972. Similarly, it retained its support for all self-determination struggles, while 
42 G. A. Res. 39/159 (17 Dec. 1984) 
43 G. A. Res. 42/159 (7 Dec. 1987). 
44 G. A. Res. 44129 (4 Dec. 1989), operative para. 9. 
45 See: Mylonaki, E., The manipulation of organised crime by terrorists: legal and factual perspectives, 2 
International Criminal Law Review (2002), p. 213. 
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also reiterating the reference to human rights violation by non-State entities and the links to organised 
crime that were introduced by its predecessor, resolution 44/29. 
In 1993 a new item was placed on the Assembly's agenda, entitled 'Human rights and terrorism 46 . The 
first resolution, 48/122, used conflicting terminology. On the one hand, in its preamble, it Indirectly 
made the proposition that terrorism threatens the right to life as well as violates human rights, but in its 
opening operative paragraph emphasised that terrorist activities lead to the 'destruction' of human 
rights and democracy. Similarly the LN Commission on Human Rights frequently described terrorism 
7 
as aimed at the destruction of democrac , or the destabilizing of 'legitimately constituted 
Govermnents' and 'pluralistic civil societ 81 
The use of the term democracy was perhaps aimed at differentiating between the obligations of States 
in not 'violating' human rights, while at the same time introducing a new set of obligations incumbent 
on non-State actors. This unfortunate state of affairs has persistedý9 and the term 'destruction' now 
denotes the responsibility of terrorist/organised crime groups for what is otherwise the sole 
responsibility of State actorS50. Nonetheless, it should be noted that a large number of States has 
abstained from voting in these resolutions, including France, Germany, the USA and the UK" 
46 G. A. Res. 48/122 (20 Dec. 1993). In later years the Human Rights Commission appointed a Special Rapporteur 
to examine this question in more detail. 
47 UNGA Res. 48/122 (1993), 49/60 (1994), 49/185 (1994), 50/186 (1995), 52/133 (1997), 541/164 (2000), 2-3; 
UNComHR Res 1995/43,1996/47,1-2-, 1997/42,1-2; 1998/47,1999/27,2000/30,2001/37,2002/35,2003/37, 
UN SubComHR Res. 1994/18,1996/20,1997/39,2001/18,2002/24,1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, UN Doc A/CONF. 15 7/24 (Part 1), . 
48 UNGA Res. 48/122 (1993), 49/185 (1994), 50/186 (1995), 52/133 (1997), 54/164 (2000), 2-3; UNComHR Res. 




G. A. Res. 49/185 (23 Dec. 1994); Res. 50/186 (22 Dec. 1995) 
50 See: Bantekas, I., et al, Intcrnational ctiminal law, (Cavendish Publication, 2002), p. p. 46-47. 
ý' See: G. A. Res. 52 133 (12 Dec. 1997), With 57 States abstaining. 
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Resolution 49/60 did much more than produces the seminal Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International TerroriSM52. The preamble contained no reference to the series of resolutions linked to 
3 034, except for its immediately proceeding resolution, 46/51 of 199 1. The fact that resolution 49/60 is, 
moreover, silent regarding the underlying or root causes of terrorism is certainly evidence of the fact 
that the Assembly moved away from such argumentation and that its legal discourse and semantics had 
radically altered. The focus is now on enhancing international co-operation 53 and the elimination of the 
links between terrorism and organised crime. Significantly, the Declaration provided the only single 
extant definition of terrorism, as follows: 
'Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of 
persons or particular persons for political purposes, [irrespective of the considerations invoked to 
justify them, whether they be] political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or [ofl any 
other nature ý54 
The collapse of traditional alliances after the Cold War, the gradual abandonment of State-sponsored 
terrorism and the relative success of the Security Council in the Gulf War, was recognized by the 
Assembly. Resolution 50/53 underlined the role of the Council where terrorism was a threat to 
international peace and securlty, 55. It was at this time that the Council had taken action against Libya 
and Sudan regarding those countries' involvement in terrorism. All the aforementioned resolutions 
exclude any possible justification for the act and demonstrate the paradigmatic shift of the opinion of 
states 
52 G. A. 49/60 (9 Dec. 1994), Annex. 
53 The Secretary-General was entrusted with the task of collecting data on the status and implementation of all 
rele,,, ant agreements, making a compendium of national laws and instruments, and providing an analytical review 
of international legal instruments, as well as review possibilities for assisting states in combating terrorism. Id, 
Annex 111, para. 10. 
54 Id, Annex 1, para. 3. This was reiterated in all future resolutions, such as G. A. Res. 50/53 (11 Dec. 1995). 
G. A. Res. 50/53 (11 Dec. 1995), para. 7. 
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In 1996, the Assembly established one of its most successful organs, the Ad Hoc Committee, on the 
basis of resolution 51/2 10, with the aim of developing the international legal armoury against nuclear 
terrorism and terrorist bombings 56 . The Ad Hoc 
Committee has since elaborated the Terrorist 
Bombings and Terrorist Financing conventions and with its mandate having been renewed annually by 
the Assembl Y17, it is currently focusing its attention on elaborating two other elusive agreements; one 
on nuclear terrorism and a comprehensive convention on terroriSM58. Whereas the main disagreement 
regarding the nuclear terrorist treaty regards its scope and the inclusion or not of the military within its 
ambit", the comprehensive convention lacks consensus on a common definition and is problematic in 
respect of the following: a) its relationship to other sectoral conventions, primarily to ensure legal 
certainty in the application and interpretation of both the comprehensive and sectoral conventions, and; 
b) the differentiation between self-determination struggles and terrorism 60 . It should be noted that at 
present and throughout the Assembly's examination of terrorism, it was supported by specialized 
agencies, especially the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). 
It is apparent that while the Assembly was indeed making an effort to formulate a counter- terrorism 
model from the early 1970's to the early 1990's, the lack of consensus precluded any agreement. 
Competing national and political interests and the absence of a common security threat certainly 
underpinned this lack of consensus. One side was pulling towards the most purest form of a preventive 
approach (i. e. root causes), while the other was a reactionist approach against all forms of ideological 
56 G. A. Res. 51/210 (17 Dec. 1996), para. 9. 
57 Under the terrns of G. A. Res. 55/158 (12 Dec. 2000), it was decided that the Ad Hoc Committee continue its 
mandate, at least during the fifty-sixth session, within the framework of a Working Group of the Sixth Committee. 
58 For the text of the draft comprehensive convention, see: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, Sixth sess. (28 Jan. - 
I Feb. 2002), UNGAOR 57th sess., UN Doc. A/57/37/Supp. No. 37 (2002). 
59 Report of the Working Group, UN Doc. A/C. 6/57/L. 9 (16 Oct. 2002). 
60 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, Fifth sess. (12-23 Feb. 2001), U-\GAOR 56th session, UNI Doc. 
A/56/37/Supp. No. 37, Annex V, pp. 12-14. 
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violence. Although it is very difficult to expect the Assembly to come up with an approach acceptable 
to all, its usefulness for our purposes lies in the fact that it is the benchmark of recognizable State 
practice. As such, we are able to assess what is generally unacceptable and what is the lowest common 
denominator acceptable to the majority of States. For the Assembly, this common denominator seems 
to encompass a model based on mter-State cooperation, albeit mostly premised on suppression rather 
than prevention. 
Following the events of September the 11, a major question that arose within the international 
community is the efficiency of the existing anti-terrorism legal regime. The existing anti-terrorism 
conventions have been proven to be less effective than expected. Partly the reason has been their focus 
on sub-forms of terrorism, rather than the phenomenon as such thus failing to cover its more modem 
manifestations. At the same time the political offence exception contained in the treaties meant that the 
enforcement of the instruments depends on the willingness of states to support the mternational co- 
operation in crimial matters. 
3. THE THEMATIC APPROACH AS THE ONLY VIABLE 
MODEL? 
It is easy to detect why the thematic formula was accepted and implemented as the only viable counter- 
terrorist approach; precisely because to achieve consensus on a comprehensive convention would be 
impossible. The thematic approach was in all practical sense the only possible vehicle and in light of 
the fact that ideological violence until the early 1990's did not reflect the fundamentalism of our era, 
the need for a comprehensive convention then was not as pressing as it is now. 
Such ideological divisions have hampered further efforts to draft a treaty dealing with international 
terrorism. As a consequence of these differences, the most effective way of the international 
community to proceed has been the consideration of specific aspects of the subject. Thus, binding 
instrwuents have been adopted dealing with specific manifestation of the phenomenon. The ri idity 
that has characterised discussions since the early part of the twentieth century, as well as the 
absoluteness of national positions on terrorism - premised no doubt on national interests - has been 
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responsible for the so-called 'thematic' approach in international legal discourse. This essentially 
means that in the absence of a single binding international definition, the subject matter is necessarily 
severed from the whole and reconstructed using its various facets as distinct sub-units. 
4. EVIDENCE OF A MORE EFFECTIVE SUPPRESSIONIST 
MODEL 
4.1 TERRORIST BOMBING CONVENTION 
As already indicated in 1996, the Assembly established the Ad Hoc Committee, on the basis of 
resolution 51/2 10, with the aim of developing the international legal annoury against nuclear terrorism 
and terrorist bombingS61 . The Ad Hoc Committee has since elaborated the Terrorist Bombings and 
Terrorist Financing conventions and with its mandate having been renewed annually by the 
Assembly 62 , 
it is currently focusing its attention on elaborating two other elusive agreements; one on 
nuclear terrorism 63 and a comprehensive convention on terrorism 64 . Particular dimensions of 
ideological Violence such as terrorist bombings, terrorist financing 65 , traffic in arms, exchange of 
61G. A. Res. 51/210 (17 Dec. 1996), para. 9. 
62 Under the terms of G. A. Res. 55/158 (12 Dec. 2000), it was decided that the Ad Hoc Committee continue its 
mandate, at least during the fifty-sixth session, within the framework of a Working Group of the Sixth Committee. 
63 UN Doc A/C6/53/14, Annex 1,1998, Draft Article 4. 
64 For the text of the draft comprehensive convention, see Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, Sixth sess. (28 Jan. - 
I Feb. 2002), UNGAOR 57th sess., UN Doc. A/57/37/Supp. No. 37 (2002). 
65 It should be noted that the financing of terrorism has been the subject of concern for a number of international 
bodies that have a regional focus and that are concerned with economic development and the financial sector. For 
example see: Pacific Island Forum Press Statement of 28/2 03. See also: European Banking Federation, 
Recommendations for Drafting, Interpreting and Implementing Financial Sanctions (5 July 2002), available at: 
http: //212.3-246-149/1 G LPHGN LAN DAGJ B LNNOFP EB KPYDS HAPH749V6476CM HYC4TBQV6U69YB DG 
3BYWYA3BY9LTE4Q/EBF/docs/DLS/recommendations-for_drafting-2004-02113-01-E. pdf 
27 
information concerning persons or organisations suspected of terrorist-linked activities, disruption of 
global communications networks and technical co-operation in training for c ounter- terrorism, were 
subjects not covered by the twelve existing conventions on international terrorism. As these are now 
matters of crucial concern, the adoption of the recent anti-terrorism conventions express the 
determination of the international community of states to spread a campaign to shut off the potential 
taps that feed terrorism worldwide and this is no more apparent in its efforts to counter terrorist 
financIng through inter-State cooperation in the fields of govermnent, banking and other financial 
sectors 66 . The terrorist bombing convention and the financing of terrorism convention both are inter- 
state in character, they adopt a much less-consensus based approach that it's other inter-state 
counterpart. One of the innovative 67 elements of the Conventions is that they treat the offences 
prescribed therein as a non-political offence for the purpose of extradition. The legal effect of this 
provision is that a nonnal defence that would be available to a fugitive offender to plead that an act was 
committed under political motivation is denied in the case of extradition proceedings relating to a 
terrorist bombing. The provision recognises that where there is recourse to indiscriminate violence 
against civilians, then the offender is not entitled to the protection provided by the laws governing 
extradition. We can therefore detect that the main theme underlYing the Convention is the abandonment 
of particular safeguards otherwise granted to the accused under domestic law and prior anti-terrorist 
conventions. 
When the Bombing Convention was adopted in early 1998 international law-makers had not yet 
witnessed the devastating effects of the US Embassy bombings of Tanzania and Kenya, or the 9/11 
attacks, nor the later bombing sprees in Indonesia, Morocco and Spain - between 2002-03. Other 
66 After the events of September 11, the US authorities examined how a terrorist operation is financed. See 
relatively: Lonnel, D., Congressional Statement before the House Committee on Financial Senices, 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, (12 February 2002), available at: 
h ttp: //www. fbi. gov/ con gress/congress02/1 ormel 02 120 2. htm. 
67 This is the first case that the political offence exception was excluded in a coný, ention negotiated in the United 
Nations. 
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sporadic incidents, however, and particularly the failed attempt to destroy the World Trade Centre in 
1993 had given some insights to security specialists of what was to follow. Otherwise, the adoption of 
the 1998 Convention is questionable from a political perspective, since as most incidents were of 
domestic origin and effect, many countries did not wish to make applicable the international laws of 
armed conflict to bombing incidents perpetrated by separatist or other national liberation movements, 
with a view to depriving them of any claims to self-determination. This was the UK's position 
throughout the IRA campaign, where transnational elements were recognised only where UK secret 
68 agents were involved in clandestine operations to thwart bombing operations originating abroad , or 
where extradition proceedings were concerned. This policy perspective also helps explain why the 
Convention was poorly ratified up until the events of 9/11. 
The second paragraph of the 1998 Bombing Convention recognizes that terrorist bombings are 
inconsistent with State security, jeopardizing moreover friendly relations among States, while the ninth 
paragraph establishes that terrorism is a grave offence of concern to the international community and 
that all accused persons, In accordance with the provisions of the Convention, should be either 
extradited or prosecuted. It is clear, in conjunction also with Article 3 of the Convention, that the self- 
determination concerns of many States have been alleviated, by narrowing the operational ambit of the 
Convention to encompass only terrorist bombing incidents that have an international element. It is 
evident that the strong inter-State cooperation mechanisms provided in the Terrorist Bombings 
Convention will enhance the alms of the Convention over other international norms that are in parallel 
existence. 
Article 6 of the 1998 Bombing Convention allows member States to assume wide-rangmg 
extraterritorial Jurisdiction. This includes application of the principles of territorial, passive personality, 
68 týii McCann v. UK (1996), -11 EHRR 
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active personali 9 and protective principles of jurisdiction, while moreover States are permitted to 
employ any other jurisdictional basis in conformity with their domestic law 70 . There is no provision in 
the Convention that would affirm the existence of universal Jurisdiction, save for the aut dedere aut 
judicare (either prosecute or extradite prmciple)71, stipulated in Article 6(4). However, there is no 
general agreement in academic writmgs to the effect that this principle entails the application of 
universal jurisdiction 72 . From a practical point of View, universality of jurisdiction may be premised on 
the fact that Article 6(5) does not exclude any form of jurisdiction employed under domestic law - if 
there is a conflict with another State this has to be resolved - and thus a Statute asserting universal 
jurisdiction over terrorist bombings without a link to the forum is acceptable. However, the treaty is 
more likely to seek to provide wide alternative bases of jurisdiction, but does not establish universal 
jurisdiction. It is not really jurisdiction stricto sensu, because in any given case only contracting states 
would be able to exercise jurisdiction, whereas universal jurisdiction allows any state to assert 
jurisdiction over the offence. 
During the drafting of the 1998 Convention it was deemed important that if an accused fled to a State 
other than one endowed with primary jurisdiction, that State would have jurisdiction to Prosecute the 
accused 73 . The proposal was therefore that the 
Convention should declare that terrorist bombing was an 
international offence, so that any State in which an offender was found would possess jurisdiction. It 
69 Habitual residence is also prescribed. In its Advisory Opinion in the Acquisition of Polish Nationality case, the 
PCIJ stated that 'habitual residence' is the establishment of residence 'in a pen-nanent manner with the intention of 
remaining' in the State. See: PCIJ [ 1923], Series B, Advisory Opinion 7, p. 20. 
70 Art. 6(5). 
71 See: Bassiouni, C. M., Wise, E. M., Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The duty to extradite orprosecute in international 
lait,, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995). 
72 For a negative view, see: Bantekas, L, Nash, S., International criminal law, (Cavendish 2002), p. p. 156-60; 
for 
the %, Ic\\, that the various terrorist offences are subject to universal jurisdiction, see: USA v 
Yunis (No. 3), 924 F. 2d 
1086 (1991), and Principle 2(l) of the 2001 Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, available at: 
http: //wwwl. umn. edu/humanrts'instree, pnnceton. htrnl 
73 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, UN Doc. A/52/37 (1997). 
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was recognised, however, that piracy, for example, became an international offence under customary 
law only after a maturity of a few centuries. It was doubted that the same result could be brought about 
by simply making a declaration of this kind in a legal instrument. It is possible that States which 
establish universal jurisdiction over offences contained in the Terrorist Bombings Convention will 
actually exercise such jurisdiction with respect to an offender who is a national of a non-party to this 
Convention. If the non-party complains, the question would thus arise as to the effect this provision 
might have upon the rights of States, which are not parties to the Convention. As will be discussed later 
in the thesis, this matter may for all practical purposes be moot, since Security Council 1373 and Its 
application by the Council to cases of internal terrorist bombings has removed the problem of unwilling 
non-State parties. 
Articles 10 and 15 of the 1998 Terrorist Bombings Convention speak in binding language about the 
obligations owed at the inter-State level, despite the fact that many of the obligations contained thereM 
require only domestic action. Article 10(l) is instructive: 
'States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with 
investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings brought in respect of the offences set forth in 
Article 2, including assistance in obtaining evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings'. 
Since the 1998 Convention encompasses terrorist bombings with an international element, it is crucial 
that the sharing of information and other intelligence across national frontiers is paramount in 
preventing and punishing offenders. The mechanisms by which such co-operation may be facilitated 
are twofold: a) existing mutual legal assistance treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral74 , an d; b) 
through the creation of a new mechanism, supplementary to the existing structures, as described in 
74 Art. 10(2), Terronst Bombings Convention. 
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Article 15 of the Convention. States Parties shall cooperate m the prevention of the offences set forth in 
Article 2, particularly: 
(a) By taking all practicable measures, including, if necessary, adapting their domestic legislation, to 
prevent and counter preparations in their respective territories for the commission of those offences 
within or outside their territories, including measures to prohibit in their territories illegal actiVities of 
persons, groups and organizations that encourage, instigate, organize, knowingly finance or engage M 
the perpetration of offences as set forth in Article 2; 
(b) By exchanging accurate and verified information in accordance with their national law, and 
coordinating administrative and other measures taken as appropriate to prevent the commission of 
offences as set forth in Article 2; 
(c) Where appropriate, through research and development regarding methods of detection of explosives 
and other harmful substances that can cause death or bodily injury, consultations on the development of 
standards for marking explosives in order to identify their origin in post-blast investigations, exchange 
of information on preventive measures, co-operation and transfer of technology, equipment and related 
materials. 
Obviously the facilitation of co-operation is based on an inter-state co-operation model. Further 
evidence of this model is the obligation to criminalize the offence at the domestic level, in accordance 
with Article 4 of the Terrorist Bombings Convention 
75 
. 
The Convention further obliges States to render 
this an aggravating offence 76 and as such deny the perpetrators any ideological justification". This is 
the first of many provisions in the Convention, which impose obligations upon States parties regarding 
75 This provision corresponds with Art. 2 of the Hostages Convention, Art. 
2 of the Hague Convention, Art. 3 of 
the Montreal convention. 
76 Art. 4(b), Terrorist Bombings Convention. 
77 
Art. 5, ibid. 
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the suppression and punishment of the offence of terrorist bombing. It can be seen thus, that the 
enforcement of the prohibition relies on a balance of municipal action - legal and enforcement - as 
well as on inter-State co-operation. 
4.2. THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 
CONVENTION AS EVIDENCE OF LESS CONTEXT 
SPECIFIC INTER-STATE MODEL 
At the global level one of the cornerstones of the struggle against terrorism was the mternational 
convention for the suppression of the financMg of terrorism. This convention cannot be put in the same 
category as all the other UN, because it does not deal with specific manifestations of terrorism. In 
December 1999 the LN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of TerroriSM78 after negotiations that commenced in 1996 79 and which, unlike previous 
anti-terrorist conventions, does not focus on any one particular manifestation of terrorism (hijacking, 
bombing etc. ), but is instead aimed at those individuals that: 
78 39 ILM (2000), 270; see: Morris, V., Pronto, A., The work of the sixth Committee at the fifty-fourth session of 
the UN General Assembly, 94 AJIL (2000), p. 582; see also: EC Council Recommendation of 9 Dec. 1999 on Co- 
operation in Combating the Financing of Terrorist Groups (O. J. C 373,23/121999). 
79 The Convention was adopted following a French proposal. See: Working Document Submitted by France on the 
Draft International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, UN' GAOR, 54"' sess., Supp. No. 37, 
UN Doc. A/-54 /37, Annex 11 ( 1999), p. 14. 
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'By any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, [provide] or [collect] funds with the 
intention that they should be used to commit terrorist acts"O. 9 
While notionally covered by the accomplice liability provisions of the various existing 'sectoral' anti- 
terrorism treaties, the issue of the material support provided by these networks was considered to be of 
such importance in the fight against terrorism that it warranted its own treaty. The treaty, which was In 
part modelled on the Terrorist Bombings Convention, includes the now 'standard' anti-terrorism 
provisions, but also contains new provisions specific to the financing of terrorism with a view to 
providing States with the capability to counter these vast networks which commonly cross two or more 
international boundaries. For example, provision is made for the possibility of the crimMal liability of 
legal persons 81 , as well as for the freezing and seizure of funds 
82 and the prohibition of reliance on bank 
secrecy laws as a ground for declining mutual legal assistance 83 
The said Convention is particularly welcome as it recognises that the financing of terrorism is a matter 
of grave concern to the international community and requires. States to adopt regulatory measures, and 
is the only internationally significant anti-terrorist initiative focusing specifically on the financing of 
terrorism to pre-date the 9/11 events. The offence created by the Convention is that of providing or 
collecting fiinds that are to be used to carry out terrorism. Article 2 defines an act as constituting a 
specific terrorist offence if it either constitutes a specific offence within the scope of one of the nine 
UN Conventions listed in the treaty annex that addresses various types of terrorism, or any other act 
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian or to any other person not taking part in 
80 Art. 2(l). It is also an offence to participate, organise or direct, act in a common purpose (Art. 2 (5), or attempt 
(Art. 2(4) any of the offences describe in Art. 2(l). See also: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by GA 
Res. 51/210 (1996), UN GAOR 54th Session, UN Doc. A/54/37/Supp. No. 37 (5 May 1999), p. 3. 
81 Art. 5. 
82 Art. 8. 
83 Art. 12. 
34 
hostilities involving armed conflict, when the purpose of such act was to MtlMldate a population or to 
compel a government or international organisation to do or refrain from doing an act. 
Furthermore, Article 8 of the Convention requires every signatory State to take appropriate measures, 
in accordance with national laws, for the detention and freezing of any funds allocated for terrorist 
offences 84 . Article II requires States to render the offences prescribed in the Convention extraditable 
and to assume jurisdiction over such offences by making them punishable with appropriate penalties85 
Moreover, the 1999 convention removes the political offence exception by obliging contracting states 
to ensure that criminal acts within its scope are under no circumstances justifiable by considering of a 
political, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature 86 . The Convention entered into force on 
10 April 2002 after the required 21 States - out of the 129 signatories - had deposited their instruments 
of ratification with the United Nations. It should be stressed that although only a few countries, such as 
the UK, ratified the Terrorist Financing Convention prior to 9/11, the vast majority of States expressed 
no desire to do so. The UK adopted secondary legislation to implement the Convention that prohibits 
any person from making 'any funds or financial services available directly or indirectl to or for the y 
benefit of a listed terrorist or organisation controlled by terrorists 87 . Although at the tiMe of writing in 
late 2006 about 130 States had ratified the Convention, this has come as a result of the obligations 
imposed by Security Council Resolution 1373 and diplomatic pressure from the USA. Ironically, the 
USA was not itself prepared to ratify the 1999 Convention and it was only after the events of 9/11 that 
it spearheaded a campaign to enshrine terrorist financing Within an internationally binding legal 
framework. The principal reason behind the inhibition of States to ratify the Convention is obviously 
84 The UK Terrorism Act 2000 and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 provide for a comprehensive 
statutory scheme to deal with terrorist property. More specifically, sections 15(3), 15(4), 17(a), 17(b). 
85 See sec. 63 of the UK Terrorism Act 2000. 
86 Article 6. 
87 See: Sl No 3365 (Mar. 2001). UK law imposes further restrictions on terrorist financing I ism in the Anti-terror' 
Crime and Security Act 2001, amending the Terrorism Act 2000. 
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the possibility that private financial systems will be scrutinised by international bodies and sensitive 
information would have to be divulged to foreign investigative bodies. Such lack of trust and adherence 
to the unilateral internal approach did not survive long. The parallel existence of an inter-State 
suppressionist model through the adoption of the 1999 Convention failed to subdue the unilateral 
internal model - through which States dealt with terrorist financing through control of their own 
financial systems. However, as it will become clear in the last chapter, even those countries that were 
holding dearly to the unilateral model, principally the USA 88 , became the strongest advocates in favour 
of a hybrid centrallsed Security Council model that goes far beyond in terms of imposing domestic 
obligations than the 1999 Convention could go. 
By closing this section related to the development of particular counter- terrorism models, I can 
conclude that despite their diversity, the said conventions share common - although different - 
modalities of international co-operation, namely: extradition, mutual legal assistance and transfer of 
criminal proceedings. The implementation procedures of the criminal law enforcement model are 
discussed below. 
5. IMPLEMENTING ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES 
As has already been mentioned, the international aspects of terrorism infringe upon the interests of 
many States, thus bringing their criminal jurisdictional ambit into operation. For instance, the terrorist 
who has perpetrated a wrongful act in one State can seek refuge in another State and likewise the 
88 In 2002 the USA enacted the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention Implementation Act, 18 
USC § 2339C(a)(1), which implements the requirements of the 1999 Convention. 
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question of extradition is posed. International co-operation in matters of extradition and mutual 
assistance between states alms at arresting and transferring suspects, freezing assets and securing 
evidence. Thus, all co-operation is materialised following the crinimal events, is thus based on a 
suppressive model. 
Extradition is a vital ingredient in opposing terrorism and thus the majority of international treaties 
include special provisions on extradition. Extradition is the legal process whereby a fugitive offender, 
under treaty or upon the basis of reciprocity, is surrendered to the State in which an offence was 
allegedly committed in order to stand trial or serve a sentence of imprisonment. it is a process that aims 
to further international co-operation in criminal justice matters and is based primarily on the 
assumption that the requesting State is acting in good faith and that the fugitive will receive a fair trial. 
The law and practice of extradition derives from a desire of States not to allow serious crimes to go 
unpunished, as well as on the belief that the State on whose territory the offence has been committed is 
the most able to try the offence because of the availability of evidence. 
Most countries of the world today are bound to one another through extradition treaties that seek to 
balance the rights of the individual With the need to ensure that the extradition process operates 
effectively". The majority of these are based on the following internationally recognized principles: the 
requirement that the offence is an extraditable one (linked to the principle of double criminality)90, the 
1 92 rule of speciality, double jeopardy' , and the political offence exception . Since the practice of 
extradition is primarily premised on bilateralism, there does not exist an international corpus of norms 
that could be called international law of extradition. The USA continues to prefer bilateral treaties as 
89 Extradition as a tool in combating terrorism is further discussed in chapter four of the present thesis. 
90 UK Extradition Act 2003. 
91 Ne bis in id6n. For a broad application of the principle see: article 9 of the European Convention on Extradition, 
13 December 1957, ETS NO. 24 
92 See: Bantekas, I., supra note 72, p. p. 181-84. 
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the legal basis for extradition 93 , while European countries depend mostly upon multilateral regional 
treaties in their mutual dealings and bilateral extradition treaties in their dealings with non-European 
States. Likewise, international co-operation in criminal justice matters depends upon a network of 
bilateral and multilateral treaties, which very often establish different and conflicting interests. 
Furthermore, a number of existing extradition treaties are outdated and this can affect their 
effectiveness and general iMpaCO4 . However, the question whether States are obliged to follow 
extradition proceedings or whether international law establishes a moral or legal obligation 95 Still 
remains unanswered. A problem regarding extradition for criminal offences where there is not an 
extradition treaty between states is illustrated by the Lockerbie case. 
Extradition arrangements between States in close geographical proximity, which often share a common 
legal and cultural heritage, present generally no major difficulties. On the other hand, extradition 
between States that are culturally, politically and legally distant from each other poses serious problems 
for the achievement of an approach outside the bilateral formula. The approximation of criminal laws 
and policy in the EU for example facilitates the multilateral regional approach because the crime is 
defined in more or less the same terms, the same is true for the procedural guarantees and the 
mechanism itself can be checked by reliable and trustworthy institutions. Where such legal and 
institutional uniformity is missing, thus diminishing the existence of good faith, extradition is only 
possible on the basis of the bilateral approach and there is little in the horizon suggesting a radical 
transformation of legal and political cultures around the world, such that would accommodate shift 
towards a multilateral approach. However, the modem treaties generally exclude the political offence 
93 For example: UK -USA Extradition Treaty, signed on 31 March 2003. For the full document see: www. 
Statewatch. org/news/2003/Jul/UK_L, 'S_extradition. pdf 
94 See generally: Varnvoukos, A., Termination of treaties, (Oxford University Press, 1985), p. p. 212-22 1. 
95 For inforination on the UK responses to extradition requests, see: Bantekas, et al, supra note 72, at chapter 8. It 
should be noted that South American States have traditionally adopted the view that extradition is a legal 
obligation cven in the absence of a relevant treaty. See Re Alvez Novo, 19 ILR 361 (1952), Re Bachnofer, 28 ILR 
315 1963, Re Milton Goines, AD, Case No. 177 (1929-1930). 
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exception and indeed the Security Council in resolution 1373 insisted that states ensure that claims of 
political motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged 
terronst. 
Similarly to extradition, the mutual assistance treaties are signed on a bilateral or multilateral bas' s96 
which provide details of the procedure for the exchange of evidence and examples of the grounds on 
which requests can be reftised. However, several mutual assistance agreements specifically exclude co- 
operation where the requested state has substantial grounds for believing that the request for mutual 
assistance has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, 
religion, nationality or political opinion or that that persons position may be prejudiced for any of these 




The common denominator of all these forms of co-operation adopted by states is that they rely to a 
large degree on domestic law and remedies to achieve the overall purpose of the conventions. Thus, it 
is domestic law, domestic courts and domestic prosecutorial authorities that are incumbent with matters 
of legislative, judicial and enforcement jurisdiction respectively. These instruments, therefore, do not 
attempt directly to create individual liability under international law for the specific offences. It is 
worth noting that these instrments do not describe offences that are novel, as all States can be 
assumed to have pre-existing laws that prohibit acts such as hostage-taking or assaults on diplomats. 
But it is not adequate for the suppression of international terrorism that States possess pre-existing 
legislation against the described conduct, The real value of the anti-terrorist instruments is that they 
96 See: Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Strasbourg 20 April 1959, ets no. 
3. Also: Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the member states of the European Union, 
adopted on 29 May 2000. For both see: Justice, EU cooperation in criminal matters: a human rights agendas, 
August 2002. 
97 See Article 8 of the European Convention on the Suppresssion of Terrorism. 
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require State parties to actually deal with the terrorist offender and not merely a common criminal and 
they establish generally an international framework for co-operation in the suppression of such acts. 
Despite the reliance on municipal law, the enforcement of rules regarding the described offences is not 
longer a domestic matter, as States parties have now incurred an international obligation with respect to 
terrorist violence, There are benefits and drawbacks to a paradigmatic shift of this nature. On the one 
hand, the State is able to receive intelligence about terrorist activities fi7om around the world, as well as 
secure the presence of the accused through its co-operation with the enforcement authorities of other 
States. The obvious drawback for States is the sharing of national security information, although in the 
long run this can only yield positive effects for national security. The fact that the international 
community chose to adopt the inter-state suppressionist model attests to the inadequacy of the 
unilateral model and the widely shared perception of more benefits rather than many drawbacks. 
An examination of attempts to regulate terrorist behaviour through international specific treaties 
reveals that there was little hope of nations effectively coming to grips with the problem as a 
collectivity. There are two obvious reasons why this should be so. The first reason is that there is little 
chance that nations will agree on what constitutes legitimate struggle for self-determination. The 
second reason is that States appear reluctant to give up their right to grant asylum to those who commit 
politically motivated offences. This necessarily means that all the forms of co-operation existing in tl%, - he 
relevant conventions will be subject to such limitations, because these limitations are also implicit in 
the conventions by the very fact that the forms of co-operation stipulated therein are not autonomous 
(e. g. the aut dedere principle is dependent on the existence of an extradition treaty between the 
requestMg and requested States). 
All the anti-terrorism treaties dealing with specific manifestations of terrorism from attacks against 
internationally protected persons to terrorist bombing and terrorism financIng contain their own 
definitions of the acts covered by them and oblige state parties to criminalize the conduct in domestic 
law. However, those treaties are directed towards iMposing obligations on state parties, not on 
establishing criminal responsibility of individuals. Unless the state parties implement the treaty it is 
questionable whether individuals could be prosecuted on the sole basis of treaty law. Obviously in case 
of domestic implementation of the treaty no problem arises. In case international law is transformed 
into national law through the various mechanisms for the national implementati ion of 
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rules, then it becomes binding on mdividuals98 . 
National implementation of international rules becomes 
thus a matter of crucial importance. Indeed after September 11, many states passed. domestic laws to 
mcorporate treaty law. Moreover, Resolution 1373 of the Security Council called on all states to 
increase co-operation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and protocols related 
to terrorism and to ensure that terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic 
laws 99 . 
6. THE IN TERNA TIONA L CRIMINA L IZA TION OF 
TERRORISM? 
Legal counter- terrorism measures operate on both domestic and international levels. However, to 
engage the United Nations terrorism must have a significant international dimension. Terrorism is 
frequently international in character. It is international when it crosses borders (Kashmir), by the 
nationality of the participants or the victims as in (New York) or by targets (Ball). The fact that 
terrorism nowadays has acquired an international dimension does not necessary imply that all terrorist 
activity amount to international crimes. A group which engage in terrorist activity carried out within a 
state is liable under the criminal law of the relevant stateloo. The fact that other states may be bound by 
treaty obligations to co-operative in searching for and punishing the perpetrators, that Mi itself does not 
render a domestic terrorist act an international offence'01. The US military tribunal at Nuremberg 
defined an international crime as 'an act which the international community recognises as not only as a 
violation of state criminal law but one which is so serious that it must be regarded as a matter for 
98 On the issue of implementation see: Cassesse, A., International law, (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. p. 162- 
168. 
99 Duffy, H., The war on terror and theframework of international law, (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 9. 
'00 Supra note 97, p. 128. 
1011bid. 
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international concern andfor some valid reason cannot be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
102 
state that would have control over it under ordinary circumstances' . 
Likewise an offence becomes international when existMg treaties or custom consider the act as being 
an international crime and entail individual criminal responsibility for the perpetrator of the act. There 
is however, some inconsistency in the way international treaties define or prescribe offences where 
they purport to so criminaliZe specific conduct. The first category comprises those treaties such as the 
103 1948 Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide , which contain a 
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categorical provision that the forbidden act constitutes a crime under international law .A second 
category of treaties dealing with crimes of international relevance may or may not describe the 
forbidden conduct as crime but impose a duty on contracting parties to prosecute or extradite the 
alleged offender or siMply render the said conduct an offence under their national laws, without 
establishing individual criminal liability for the perpetrator of the act. As it became evident from 
previous sections the existing anti-terrorism treaties create state responsibility for parties to the treaties 
but they do not themselves provide the basis for criminal prosecution of the perpetrator of the act' 05 
Thus, they are dealing with crimes of international relevance rather than with crimes under 
international law. Although the majority of international anti-terrorism treaties require that each crime 
have an international or transnational element, which is based on the magnitude of the conduct, the 
heinous nature of the act is not the sole determination for elevating such behaviour to the status of an 
international offence 106 . Absent an internationally accepted definition of terrorism, the international 
community has required signatory states to criminalize certain acts of terrorism by enacting domestic 
102 See: Hostages Trial, US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 19 February 1948,1953,15 Ann. Dig. 632, para. 636. 
103,948 Convention against Genocide, UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment and Punishment 
10' Supra note 99. 
105 See relatively: supra note 98, p. 90. 
106 Supra note 72, p. 4 
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legislation. This approach to counter-terrorism makes the definitions of terrorism in domestic counter- 
terrorism legislation crucial to the effectiveness of international law's response. However, since the 
September II there was a paradigmatic shift as there are indications that such an approach of using 
international law to declare that certain acts should be criminalized in the domestic law of each 
signatory state should alter. And that terrorist acts should be illegal at international law. Whether this 
will be given serious consideration is unclear at present. 
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PART THREE 
1. CON TEMPORA RY THREA TS107 AND THEWAR ON 
TERROR': LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FROM THE "WAR ON 
TERROR'. 
The 'War on Terror' (WOT) doctrine was launched in the aftermath of the events of 9/11. President 
Bush and the US National Security Agency (NSA) did not define the contours, nor elaborate on the 
legal implications of this doctrine, but they did set out the parameters of intended action. The following 
excerpt is i4icative of this new policy: 
'Our war on terror begMs with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It Will not end until every terrorist 
group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. ... 
This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a 
swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops 
were used and not a single American was lost in combat. ... 
Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not 
expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic 
strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of 
funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no 
107 For an excellent discussion of how the attacks were a turning point in the evolution of international terrorism, 
see: Smith, P., Transnational terrorism and the Al Qaeda modek confronting new realities, (Parameters, 2002), 
p. 33. See also: Howard, M., What's in a name? How to fight terrorism, Foreign Affairs, (January/February 
2002), p. 8, which argues that declaring a. war on terrorism was a. terrible and irrevocable error. See: ibid, p. 8. 
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rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every 
region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this 
day forward, any nation that contMues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United 
States as a hostile regime" 08 
It is evident that WOT action necessitates radical reappraisal of the ability to employ force against non- 
State entities, as well as the ability to employ force against States that one deems to have terrorist links 
or that constitute a future danger without an armed attack having taken place. As regards the second 
radical reappraisal of international law stemming from the WOT doctrine, the ability of States to 
employ force against non-State entities and States unilaterally presumed to constitute future threats, it 
is obvious that terrorism has become a pretext for the broadening of the scope of self-defence. Chapter 
3 of the current thesis is dedicated to addressing this matter from the point of View of the legality of 
such action on the basis of the UN Charter and emerging customary international law. In this section it 
suffices to state that the War on Terrorism is not necessarily a 'war', or to be more precise, an armed 
conflict in its legal sense. Primarily, however, it involves the invocation of a unilateral right to bypass 
both the Security Council and the customary provision of Article 51 of the UN Charter, such that 
allows the invoking State to disregard the inter-State structure of Article 51 and detennine for itself 
evidence that would somehow justify a pre-emptive strike'09. Since the WOT doctrine is designed to 
attack 'terror' against the USA and its allies, every terrorist threat, large or small, may be attacked. In 
this sense, a discussion of self-defence in its traditional setting is fruitless because if every terror threat 
is relevant, the concept of 'armed attack' is of no more significance. On the other hand, if the victim 
108 President Bush Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (20 Sep. 2001), available at: 
http. //new s. find law. con i, lidocs/docs/ gw bu sh ý bushspeech2 0010920. htm I 
109 See: idid, 2003 US National Strategy on Terrorism, p. 15, where it is stated that 'We cannot wait for terrorists 
to attack and then respond'. 
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State of the WOT doctrine were to respond to such action, it is uncertain what the position of the USA 
would be with regard to self-defence under Article 51 UN Charter. 
Despite the fact that international terrorism represents an unprecedented threat, the choice between 
dealing with terrorism in the context of war has crucial consequences. If for example the Yemen 
incident 1 10 is perceived as a criminal law enforcement measure it obviously violated international 
law' ' 1. On the other hand if it is perceived as an incident in the 'war on terror' all involved were to be 
regarded as legitimate targetsl 12. Therefore if the fight against terrorism is a war in the legal sense of 
the term all terrorist enemies become automatically legitimate targets. The ambiguity of the term 
terrorism however, opens the way to creating a class of enemies based on unidentifiable status of the 
group. Such an approach is in conflict with the main approach of criminal law, which preserves the 
nghts of the innocent. 
Despite the fact that terrorist attacks may lead to an armed conflict- as was the case of Afghanistan- the 
current legal position is quite straightforward: the 'war on terror' is not an armed conflict as this is 
defined in international law. The US policy decision to adopt such a doctrine and the extent to which 
such a doctrine is adopted or rejected by the international community do not alter the law as it stands. 
Although international law is constantly evolving it seems that such a change with regards to the 
application of international humanitarian law to terrorism is likely to be slow. 
110 www. guardian. co. uk/alquida/story. 
111 Lowe, V., Clear and present danger: responses to terrorism, 54 ICLQ (2005), p. 186. 
112 [bid. Also: Hersh, S. M., The Bush administration's new strategy in the war against terrorism, The New Yorker, 
(23-30 December 2002), p. p. 66-73. 
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CONCLUSION 
Much like other social phenomena, terrorist violence has undergone a process of legal and political 
refinement. Its legal aspects are of little value without reference to Its other permeating facets, which 
shape its very raison d'&rel 13 . Those social processes that have informed the present international law 
on terrorism are characterized by a popular abhorrence towards all indiscriminate violence, whether it 
is termed political or otherwise. This has not always been the case, even in recent history, as is 
evidenced from the fact that all pre-1996 anti-terrorist conventions contained the so-called political 
offence exception. This may be explained crudely, but to a very large extent, from the fact that the 
process of decolonisation coincided with the post-1950's left-wing political violence in South America 
- which later turned to urban terrorism, spreading thereafter also to western Europe - and the PLO 
struggle against Israel - all of which were viewed sympathetically by the newly emergent developing 
countries and the Arab world. The collapse of traditional power structures M the post-Cold War period 
has exposed power vacuums, which in turn have created identity crises, thus sparking various forms of 
fundamentalism, whether religious or ethnic' 14. Unlike other types of non-permanent ideologies (such 
as those of left-wing terror groups) whose use of violence may become abhorrent to its popular base 
and eventually lose all popular credibility, religious and ethnic fundamentalism reflects the core 
ingredient of large social groups, where the portrayal of victimization of the entire group is 
manipulated by the perpetrators for justifying their violence. 
Political violence until the mid 1960's had an intemational ideological basis, it was nonetheless 
spatially limited, and as such it was dealt with on the basis of the unilateral domestic model [i. e. on a 
113 See: Report of the [Secretary-General's] Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism, UN Docs. 
A/57/273-S, 2002/875 (6 Aug. 2002), Annex, p. 8, where it is stated that in order 'to overcome the problem of 
terrorism it is necessary to understand its political nature as well as its basic criminality and psychology'. 
114 Nasr, K. B., Arab and Israeli terrorism: the causes and effects of political violence, 1936-1993, (McFarland, 




purely domestic basis in both its legal and enforcement dimensions]. From the 1960's political violence 
began manifesting itself beyond national frontiers and threatened the security of civil aviation. The 
introduction of this international element alone shifted the counter-terrorism approach from a fully 
unilateral domestic to an inter-state co-operation model. Since the early 1960s, much of the physical 
conduct comprising terrorist acts has been crimmaliZed in numerous sectoral anti-terrorism treaties. 
Each contracting party is under the duty to co-operate in and give assistance to the repression of 
terrorism, the apprehension and punishment or extradition of alleged perpetrators of terrorism acts. The 
effectiveness of specific anti-terrorism conventions is questionable since the enforcement of the 
existing instruments depends much on the political willingness of states parties to support the 
international co-operation in criminal matters. Often the exceptions provided under the political offence 
exception, have allowed terrorists to find safe heavens. However, the adoption of the Terrorist 
Bombing and Financing of Terrorism Conventions is evidence of the determination of the international 
community to deal with the phenomenon of international terrorism. 
Resolutions of the General Assembly since the 1970s, and of the Commission on Human Rights since 
the 1990SI15 , have stated that international terrorism may threaten international peace and security, 
friendly relations among States, international co-operation, State security, or UN principles and 
purposes. The preambles to the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention take a similar position, while 
various regional instruments also highlight the threat to international peace and security presented by 
terrorism' 16 . Fortunately, an obstacle sustained in the past and relating to the 'political offence' 
exception to terrorist offences, has gradually been removed from contemporary treaties, while its 
115 UNComHR Res. 1995/43,1996/47,1997/42,1998/47,1999/27,2000/30,2001/37,2002/35,2003/37, 
UNSubComHR Res. 1994/18,1996/20,1997/39, see also 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
UN Doc AXON F. 15 7/24. 
116 Inter-American Convention, Special Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Nuevo Le6n, Mexico, 13 Jan. 
2004; OAS Convention; ASEAN, Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, Brunei Darussalam, 5 Nov 
2001, OSCE, Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, 4 Dec 2001, MC(9). DECII, Decision on 
Combating Terrorism (MC(9). DEC/1); EU Commission Proposal, Explanatory Memorandum, op cit, 3,8. tý 
48 
application in the traditional anti-terrorist conventions has lost favour among signatories' 17 . The anti- 
terrorism conventions do create a very useful and strict legal regime, and post 9/11 some 80 states have 
become party to all of them. But many countries ratify these conventions without proceeding to adopt 
internal enforcement measures, without which these conventions can have no practical effect. 
Moreover, many provisions in these conventions leave much to the discretion of states in terms of 
interpretation and application, which has an impact on their effective implementation. For example, it 
is a state's discretion to decide whether an act is an extraditable offence, and if not, whether the 
offender would stand trial before the national court. 
The twenty-first century has a much different enemy to face. Contemporary terrorism is multifaceted, 
but at the same time we are aware that its principal exponents possess two new elements, missing in the 
past; a) religious fundamentalism carries with it large popular support in like-minded countries and, to 
a significant degree, religiously affiliated people across the world, and; b) as a result the infliction of 
severe casualties does not distort the image of the group vis-A-vis its popular basis, and it might in fact 
enhance it. It is impossible to speak about the modem threat of terrorism without considering the role 
of non-state actors. Many of the largest and most threatening terrorist networks, including Al Qaeda, 
operate beyond state control or sponsorship. 
Modern non-state terrorism seems to be employed by more autonomous, loosely structured 
internationalized networks. Those new trends in the emergence of non-state terrorism have riveted 
international attention on the phenomenon of international terrorism and have sparked off new 
controversy on the international implications of terrorism and what can be done about it. In the 
meantime, since the 'war on terror' was declared and the war on Al Qaeda was launched with the 
attack on Afghanistan, we witnessed the proliferation of counter-terrorism measures. In fact after the 
117 Arts. 5,9,11,1998 Terrorist Bombing Convention, 37 ILM (1998), 247; and Arts. 6,7,11,2000 Terrorist 
Financing Convention, 39 ILV (2000), 270. 
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terrorist attacks of II September 2001, the Council shifted to regarding 'any' act of international 
terrorism as a threat to peace and security" 8 -regardless of its severity or international effects-and 
abandoning its previously calibrated approach to examining the impact of specific acts. In the last 
chapter of the thesis it will become evident that the international community is now more willing than 
ever to focus on terrorism as a phenomenon irrespectively of the underlying motives. 
It became obvious in the present chapter that as a matter of treaty law state parties to the anti-terrorism 
conventions are obliged to crimmalize the conduct in domestic law. However, terrorism per se is not a 
discrete crime under treaty law, mainly because it has never been possible to formulate a generally 
accepted definition of terrorism in international law. What are the practical implications of such an 
absence of an international definition of terrorism? How the lack of a definition affects the operation of 
the international legal order? These are the main questions addressed in the next chapter. 
118 UNSC Res 1368 (2001). 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE QUESTION AND RELEVANCE OF DEFINING 
TERRORISM 
INTRODUCTION 
As I indicated in the first chapter the UN anti-terrorism treaties criminalize particular manifestations of 
terrorism, not by describing the conduct as criminal but by imposing a duty of the contracting states to 
prosecute or extradite the alleged offender and by imposing the obligation upon states to render the said 
conduct an offence under their national laws. Despite the fact that there is now universal condemnation 
of terrorism, there is not a universally accepted definition of terrorism. As Justice Steward said 'I know 
terrorism when I see it". But how adequate is this as a legal basis giving rise to state obligationS2? Can 
the international community function without an internationally agreed definition'? Are the obligations 
to suppress terrorism as they are contained in the various international legal instruments affected by the 
absence of a generic definition of international terrorism? It could be argued that a definition of 
terrorism is not significant at all as is the case in the international law of minorities. Similarly to the 
law of terrorism, the question of what constitutes a minority M terms of international law has remains 
unanswered. The main reason is that no abstract definition is fully capable of covering the broad 
variety of relevant situations in the world involving some 3000 to 5000 different groups qualified as 
minorities in existing treatieS3. Similarly terrorism has taken so many forms that it is impossible to 
1 See: Jocabilis v. Ohio US 378: 184,197 in Arend, A., and Beck, R., International law and the use offorce, (New 
York, 2001), p. 140.1 know a (national) minority where I see one. The High Commissioner Max van der Stoel has 
repeated this statement on several occasions. For example see: Van der Stoel, M., Prevention of minority conflicts, 
in Sohn, L. B., The CSCE and the turbulent new Europe, (1993), p. 148. 
2 See: Duffy, H., The war on terror and theframework of international law, (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
p. 17. 
3 Akehurst's, M., Modern introduction to international law, (Routledge, 2003), p. 105. 
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render all the different manifestations of the phenomenon into a single definition. Obviously the major 
reason is the ambit of inclusiveness and exclusiveness of certain acts within such a definition. 
In the present chapter it is not my aim to provide a definition of terrorism, but rather to discuss the 
possibility of formulating a generally accepted definition on terrorism and the relevance (usefulness) of 
such a definition. Professor Cassesse, among others, argues that there is currently a consensus with 
regards to the notion of terrorism and that terrorism amounts to a customary international law crime 4 
However, the practice of states In defining terrorism and the different approaches adopted indicate that 
there is no currently an accepted definition of terrorism. The Draft Comprehensive Convention as the 
only convention containing a definition of terrorism and the 1566 Security Council resolution are the 
only international instruments to date, which provide a definition of terrorism. The definitions 
contained therein -although of an informal character- may be used as guidance to the states when 
drafting their own national definitions. 
Given the impossibility of formulating a generally accepted definition of terrorism I further question as 
to whether there is a gap that the international community of states need to fill in. The need for a 
definition has been doubted in the literature, particularly in the legal literature. Stressing the inability of 
the international community to agree on a definition of terrorism and referring to the piecemeal 
approach the states do agree upon, authors like Levitt and Baxter 5 argue that it is possible and better to 
continue the way the states act at the moment and combat terrorism without defining the term, because 
the term does not have any legal significance. Does the absence of a generally accepted definition limit 
4 See: Cassesse, A., International criminal law, (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 120. Similar are the views of 
Paust, J., according to whom international terrorism is a recognizable international crime under customary 
international law, which confers universal jurisdiction over terrorism. See: Paust, J., Addendum: prosecution of 
Ms. Bin Laden et al for violations of international law and civil lawsuits by various victims, 77 American Journal 
Of International Law Insights, 
(21 September 200 1 ). 
Levitt, G., Is terrorism worth defining? 13 Ohio Northern Universitý, Law Review, 
(1986), p. p. 97-116. Also: Baxter, R., A sceptical look at the concept of terror'sm, 7,4rkon Law Review, (1973/74). 
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the cooperation models? I support the view that international efforts to tackle terrorism have not been 
paralysed by the absence of an internationally accepted definition. Specific conventions dealing with 
specific manifestations of the phenomenon, along with ffirther recent developments (discussed In later 
chapters) provide the legal framework to address acts of terrorism. The problem lies not with the 
absence of an internationally accepted definition of terrorism but with the vague and ambiguous 
national definitions, which result in the poor enforcement of existing norms. 
1. THE DIFFICULTIES IN DEFINING TERRORISM 
'Terrorism' is a powerfully emotive word in the contemporary lexicon 6. The emotive nature of the 
subject matter, the term's derogatory thrust and the relevant political discourse are major contributory 
factors to the complexity of the concept7. In spite of the spread of ideologically motivated violence 
throughout the world, international law still appears incapable of coming up with a universally 
accepted definition of terrorism and of controlling the violent acts this entails9. Moreover terrorism, as 
Laqueur observes, has taken so many forms that 'any explanation that attempts to account for all its 
many manifestations is bound to be either vague or altogether wrong"O. As I indicated in the first 
chapter terrorism indeed has taken so many forms throughout history that the definition of the 
6 See: Kegley, C., (ed. ), International terrorism: characteristics, causes, control, (St. Martins Press, 1990), p. p. I- 
6; for the political dimension of terrorism, see: Jenkins, B., International terrorism: the other World War, (RAND, 
1985), p. p. 27-38. See also: Antonopoulos, G. A., On the definition of terrorism, 14 Terrorism and Political 
Violence (2002), p. 156. 
7 For the difficulties involved in offering a comprehensive definition of the phenomenon of terrorism, see: Griffith, 
L. N., Organised crime in the Western Hemisphere: content, context, consequences and countermeasures, 8 Low 
Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 
(1999 ), P. 8. 
8 Despite the definitional problems involved, US sources estimated that only in 1995,440 terronst acts took place 
all around the world. According to the same sources, there is a decrease in terrorist attacks during the last decade. 
US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism (1995). 
9 See: Evans, A. E., Murphy, J. F., (eds. ), Legal aspects of international terrorism, (Lexington Books, 1978), 
p. p. 12-20; Lockwood, B. B., Preliminary thoughts towards an international convention on terrorism, 68 VIL 
( 1974), p. 69. 
10 Laqueur, W., The age of terrorism, (Little Brown, 1987), p. 17. 
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phenomenon seems a rather mission impossible. Indeed, no theory has emerged from political science, 
criminal justice, economics, philosophy or any other discipline to satisfactorily explain terrorism. The 
fact that acts of terrorism affect relations between States in one way or another, engender tensions and 
provoke conflicts, offer some explanations as to why it is so difficult to come up with a precise 
definition". Every effort to define international terrorism has met the vehement resistance of some 
governments who M absence of commonly shared values and agreed goals and means, prefer the 
ambiguity of the term 12 . Thus, the questions as to what constitutes terrorism and who is a terrorist still 
remain unanswered as a matter of a universally shared conception based on commonly held values 
among all States. The fact that no definition exists is self-explanatory. The concept itself constitutes a 
phenomenon that is so complex, multi-faceted and polymorphic that cannot readily be made subject to 
the rigid confines of a semantic definition, or distinguish itself from related concepts 13 . Apart from this, 
the term has been abused excessively from common use, especially by the mass media 14 , frequently 
utilised in a gross and flippant manner. Indeed, virtually any act of violence that is perceived as 
directed against society is often labelled 'terrorism' 15 . 
It is indeed an extremely difficult task to create a definition that could cover all the varieties of 
16 
terrorism that have appeared throughout history . Systematic terror 
has accompanied general wars, 
11 Sofaer, D. A., Terrorism and the law, 64 Foreign Affairs, (1986), p. 903. See also Cooper, H. H. A., Terrorism- 
the problem of definition revisited, 44 American Behavioral Scientist, (200 1), p. 88 1. 
12 Schmid, A., The response problem as a definitional problem, in Schmid, A, Crelinsten, D. R-, Western responses 
to terrorism, (Frank Cass, 1993), p. 7. 
13 Hoffinan, B., Inside terrorism, 
(Indigo, London, 1998), p. p. 13-15. 
14 On the symbiotic relationship between media and terrorism, see: Weimann, G., Conrad, W., The theatre of 
terror. - mass media and international tcrrorism, (Longman, 1994); Wilkinson, P., The media and terrorism: a 
reassessment, 9 Terrorism and Political Violence (1997), p. 5 1. Also, Hess, S., Kalb, M., The media and the war 
on terrorism, 80 Journalism and Mass Communications Quarterly, (2003), p. 986. 
15 Loverdos, A., On terrorism and the political offence, (Sakkoulas, 1987), jin Greeký. See also: Post, J. M., 
Terrorist on trial: the context of political crime, 28 Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, 
(2000), p. 171. 
16 Forte, D., Terror and terrorism: there is a difference, 13 Ohio NULR (1986), p. 41. 
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civil wars, and revolutionary wars, wars of national liberation and resistance movements against 
foreign occupiers. In most cases terrorism was no more than one of several strategies, and usually a 
subordinate one. The controversies associated with the definition of terrorism has been the subject of 
interest to many academics. Indeed the academic approaches to terrorism have produced a number of 
17 possible definitions , which is analogous to the analysts that have dealt With the phenomenon. The 
obvious difficulty in conjecturing one and only definition 18 confirms the existence of the various 
political tendencies involved in the effort to define political violence. A proposed definition that has 
attracted the attention of the academic community is the one proposed by Schmid. From all the 
collected definitions19 the author concluded that only 5% of academic opinion equates terrorism with 
common crime 20,30% refers to terrorism as a method of warfare 21 and 83% regard politically 
17 In his book 'Political Terrorism' he cites 109 different definitions of terrorism all of which he obtained through a 
survey of leading academics in the field. From these definitions he concluded that: 'Terrorism is an anxiety- 
inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or State actors for 
idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are 
not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of 
opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population and serve as message 
generators. Threat and violence-based communication processes between terrorist [organizations] [imperilled] 
victims and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a 
target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is 
primarily sought'. See: Schmid, A., Jongman, A., Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, 
databases, theories and literature, (North-Holland Publishing Co, 1988), p. 28. On the general validity of this 
definitional approach, see: supra note 12, p. 8. 
18 On the difficulty of defining terrorism, see: Malik, 0., Enough of the definition of terrorism! Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, RIIA, (2001); Schmid, A., Political terrorism: a research guide (Transaction Books, 1984). 
Schmid devotes more than 100 pages grappling with the question of a definition, only to conclude that none is 
universally accepted. 
19 Cooper, H., Terrorism: the problem of definition revisited in H. Kushner (Ed. ), Essential readings on political 
terrorism, (Lincoln, NE: Gordian Knot Books, 2002), p. p. 1-16. 
20 The analysts who regard terrorism as an act of violence that creates fear and cames with it the intention to 
murder a victim or destroy its property are the ones who equate terrorism with common crimes. See: Jenkins, B., 
Combating terrorism. - what works? what doesn't, Council of Foreign Relations Policy Impact Panel, Washington 
D. C. II October 1996, p. 12. 
2' Silke, A., Terrorism and the blond men's elephant, 8 Terrorism and Political Violence, (1996), p. 12. The author 
believes that the definitions that tend to compare terrorism with warfare are confusing and should be avoided due 
to the fact that they themselves avoid any examination of the causes of terrorism. For a further discussion on the 
difference between terrorism and warfare, see: Crozier, B., The rebels: a study ofpost-war insurrections, (Chatto 
and Windus, 1960), and Theory of conflict, (Scribner, 197-5); Raymond, A., Peace and war, (Wiedenfeld and 
Nickolson, 1970), p. 170. Also: Schmid, A., Frameworks for conceptualising terrorism, 16 Terrorism and Political 
Violence, (2004), p. 197. 
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motivated violence as the basic ingredient of terrorism. The key point about terrorism, on which the 
majority agrees, is that it is politically motivated. in fact, terrorism is primarily a political act: the aim 
of the activity is political when its goal is to attain political objectives, such as regime change, a change 
of people in power, or a change of social and economic policieS22. 
Other analysts also suggest that 'the major problem in the study of terrorism is the constant discussion 
on its definition' 
23 
. In fact, there are those who find the possibility of a general agreement on a 
4 definition as highly unlikely2 . In 1977 Walter Laqueur predicted accurately that 'the disputes about a 
detailed, comprehensive definition of terrorism will continue for a long tune, they will not result in a 
consensus and they will make no notable contribution towards the understanding of terrorism. ' 
Attempts to incorporate all the many manifestations of terrorism within a single definition were 
doomed from the star t25 
Allow me now to proceed to an examination of international and regional efforts to define terrorism. 
By exposing the various definitions proposed in international practice, I aim at demonstrating the lack 
of a consistent use of the term terrorism. 
22 Schmid, A., Terrorism and democracy, 4 Terrorism and Political Violence, (1992), p. 14. 
23 Poland, J., Understanding terrorism. - groups, strategies and responses, (Prentice-Hall, 1988). Also, Long, C., 
Understanding terrorism: challenges, perspectives and issues, 39.4ustralian Journal of Political Science (2004), p. 
223. 




2. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO DEFINE TERRORISM 
2.1 PRE-SEPTEMBER 11 
Despite the existence of many working definitions of terrorism, it has not yet become possible to render 
these definitions generally acceptable within an international framework that will be adopted by an 
international organisation such as the Council of Europe 26 , or the OSCE 
27 
, which would subsequently 
clad it with the required normativity. Thus, despite the fact that terrorism is addressed by many 
international and regional organisationS28 and relevant instruments providing the basis for extradition 
and prosecution of acts, which have already been deemed as terrorist at international law, there is not a 
generally accepted definition of terrorism. 
The only ever international attempt at codification of a single definition of terrorism, save the current 
negotiations within the sixth committee of the UN General Assembly, was made in 1937 through the 
26 The work of the Council of Europe has resulted in a number of recommendations and Declarations without 
defining the phenomenon. See: Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, 103rd Session, Strasbourg, (3-4 
November 1998); Parliamentary Conference: 'European Democracies Facing up to Terrorism', Committee on 
Council of Europe, Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Strasbourg (14-16 October 1998); Decision No. 
CM/710/171298, Appendix 9, (item 10.2), 653 rd meeting (16-17 December 1998); Ad Hoc Terms of Reference, 30 
June 1999, Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, 103rd session, Follow up Committee of the Second 
Summit Report, to the 103rd Session of the Committee of Ministers on the Implementation of the Action Plan and 
the Follow up to the Final Declaration Implementation of the Action Plan, Strasbourg (3-4 November 1998). 
27 Sapiro, M., The OSCE: An essential component of European security, ASIL Insight No. 15 (March 1997). 
Although terrorism is on the top of the OSCE's agenda there is no agreement on a specific definition. See, 
Concluding Document of the Madrid Follow Up Meeting, pp. 34-35; Document of the Stockholm Conference On 
Confidence and Security- Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, §. 25 (1986); Concluding Document of 
the Vienna Follow up Meeting, p. 6, paras. 8,9,10 (1989); Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the 
Conference on the Human Dimension, §6 (1990); Chapter of Paris, p. 18 (1990); Helsinki Document Declaration 
(1992); Budapest Document-a) Summit Declaration § 6, b) Decisions Part IV, Chapter 11, §6 (1994), Raporteurs' 
Report of the Warsaw Human Dimension Implementation Meeting p. 8, (1995); Lisbon Document-a) Lisbon 
Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model For Europe For the Twenty-First Century, p. 6, §2, 
-b) A Framework For Anns Control, 11, §I (FSC. DEC/8/96)-c) Development of the Agenda of the Forum For 
Security Co-operation, IV, (FSC. DEC/9/96); Istambul Summit (1999). 
28 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999, found at: www. untreaty. un. org Also: 
SAARC Regional Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Kathmandu, 4 November 1987, found at: www. 
un treaty. un. org. 
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League of Nations and the negotiations on the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism", which did not however receive the required number of ratifications and was finally 
abandoned. Under Article 1(2) of that Convention the expression 'acts of terrorism' meant criminal 
acts 'directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror m the mMds of 
particular persons, or group of persons or to the general public' 30 . The provision just cited raises the 
divergence of opinion as to the formulation of a wide or narrow definition, as well as an appropriate 
mens rea pertinent to the offence of terrorism through the creation of a state of terror. 
Following the unsuccessful effort to create a general definition of terrorism, renewed efforts were made 
in the 1950s' and the 1960s' to formulate a consensus definition of international terrorism. The UN 
General Assembly thus commenced discussions on a US draft treaty proposal for the prevention and 
suppression of certain acts of international terrorism 31. This was outvoted by developing and 
communist countries which, with the urging of Syria, demanded a treaty with a sMgle definition. 
Western States argued that a general definition would not only be impossible to obtain, but would 
augment the purposes of organizations, such as the PalestMe Liberation Organization (PLO), in their 
efforts to distinguish between terrorism and national liberation movements. The West feared that the 
large number of newly independent States would have favoured a definition distinguishing the two 
concepts, thus justifying violence against its allies. Moreover, a wide-embracing definition would have 
resulted in labelling Israel a terrorist State, with whatever implications this characterization may have 
carried 32 . Nonetheless, a compromise was reached and a Special Commission was established by the 
General Assembly between 1972-79 to examine the matter. During this time, developing nations 
argued that terrorism should be viewed from its root causes, such as racism, colonialism, occupation 
29 (1938) 19 LNOJ 23. 
30 See: Cassesse, A., The international community's letgal response to terrorism, 38 ICLQ (1989), p. 59 1. 
31 See G. A. Res. 3034 (XXVII) (18 Dec. 1972). 
32 America and Israel: The unresolved peacemaker, The Economist, (4 Oct. 2001). 
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and apartheid, and be differentiated from action undertaken by national liberation movements. Nothing 
concrete emerged from these discussions, as Western States vociferously opposed the above proposals. 
From 1979 onwards it was the Sixth (legal) Committee of the General Assembly that became the forum 
for discussions on terrorism and since 1985 the Syrian proposal has either been raised in brief or 
abandoned from the Committee's agenda. It has once more resurfaced ever since the General Assembly 
established an Ad Hoc Committee to examine the possibilities of adopting a number of subject-specific 
treaties, as well as a comprehensive convention 33 . 
The work of the Ad Hoc Committee led to the adoption initially of the 1963 Tokyo Convention on 
Offences and Certain other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft34 , and later the 1970 Hague Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft35 , and the 1971 Montreal Convention for the 
36 Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation . Similarly, the rise in kidnappings 
in the 1970s gave rise to two relevant universal treaties, and this was also true of maritime terrorism 
that does not fit the definition of terrorism, theft of nuclear materials - although not exclusively 
reserved for terrorist theft - and terrorist bombings and terrorist financing in the late 1990S37 
In December 1999 the UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression 
of the Financing of Terrorism 38 after negotiations that commenced in 1996 39 and which, unlike 
33 See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, Sixth sess. (28 Jan. -I Feb. 2002), UNGAOR 57h sess., UN Doc. 
A/57/37/Supp. No. 37 (2002). 
34 1 ILM ( 1963), 1042. 
35 860 UNTS 105; 10 ILM (1971), 133. 
36 974 UNTS 177; 10 ILM (1971), 115 1. 
37 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including 
Diplomatic Agents, New York, 14 December 1973,1035 UNTS 15410, International Convention Against the 
Taking of Hostages, New York, 18 December 1979,1316 UNTS 2193 1, Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material, Vienna, 26 October 1979,1456 UXTS 2463 1, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Rome 10 March 1988, IMO DOC SUA/CONF/l 5/REV. I For all the 
aforementioned convention dealing with specific manifestations of terrorism see: Bassiouni, M., Intenrational 
criminal law, (New York, 1999). 
38 39 ILM (2000), 270; see: Morris, V., Pronto, A.. The work of the Sixth Committee at the Fifty-Fourth session of 
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previous anti-terrorist conventions, does not focus on any one particular manifestation of terrorism 
(hijacking, bombing etc. ), but provides an indirect generic definition describing terrorism as: 
'Any act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any person not taking an 
active part in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or 
context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organisation to do 
or to abstain from doing an ace"' 
None of these instruments define terrorism, but they rather set out a general framework of state 
obligations. Likewise they contain obligations for state parties to cooperate in the process of 
investigation and suppression of terrorist activity. Moreover, they do not criminalize conduct 
themselves but impose obligations upon states to criminalize such conduct under their domestic laws. 
As it will become evidence from the following section the debate regarding a definition of terrorism 
was far from over within the work of the Committee. 
2.2 INTERNATIONAL DEBATE OVER DEFINING 
TERRORISM: POST-SEPTEMBER (INTERNATIONAL 
AND REGIONAL) 
One of the most recent attempts of the United Nations to adopt a definition of terrorism resulted 
in the 
elaboration of a proposed definition, as this is included in the Draft Comprehensive 
Convention 
the UN General Assembly, 94,4JIL (2000), p. 585; see also EC Council Recommendation of 
9 Dec. 1999 on Co- 
operation in Combating the Financing of Terrorist Groups (O. J. 
C 373,23/121999). 
39 The Convention was adopted following a French proposal. See: Working Document 
Submitted by France on the 
Draft International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, UN GAOR, 54 
th sess., Supp. No. 37, 
UN Doc. k, '54, '-' ) 7, Annex 11 (1999), p. 14. 
'o See: article 20), (b). 
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relating to terrorism. Despite this recent attempt which arguably demonstrates the determination of the 
international community to condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestationS41, the old divisions 
that lead to the thematic treaties adopted in the past continued to characterize the negotiations to the 
present clay. The following is the proposed definition of terrorism as it applies to the comprehensive 
convention on terrorism: 
'Any person commits an offence withmi the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, 
unlawfully and intentionally, causes: 
(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or 
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, includmg a place of public use, a State or government 
facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment: or 
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph I (b) of this article, 
resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or 
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Goveniment or an international organization to do 
or abstain from doing any aCt42. qi 
A close examination of the aforementioned definition demonstrates the effort of the UN to formulate a 
neutral and flexible definition that could be universally accepted. The definition falls short In terms of 
its completeness, even though it does include some important aspects ignored by other definitions. It 
includes as terrorists those who plan, facilitate, direct, and support terrorist offences. It includes acts 
against the environment and economy. It also includes threats as terrorist acts, which are some of the 
41 See: UN DOC. A/C. 6.56/L. 6 para, I of annex iv, part a, Report of the Working Group of the Sixth Committee 
on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 29 October 2001. 
42 Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, 6th Comm., 56th Sess., Agenda Item 166, U. N. 
Doc. AYC. 6/56/L. 9 
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most effective forms of terrorism. Yet it falls short in other areas as it only applies to attacks upon 
persons that cause death or serious bodily injury. Excluded altogether are acts such as kidnapping, 
hostage taking, and psychological torture. 
Despite the fact that the negotiations on the draft convention are now completed, there seems not to be 
an agreement on specific issues that prevent the adoption of the convention. An outstanding issue 
relates to the potential authors of the terrorist act. The negotiations departed from the debate around the 
qualification or not of oppressive states versus liberation movements as terrorists by treating the 
question not as part of the definition 43 . Indeed article 18 states that the convention does not apply to 
the activities of armed forces during armed conflict. Such an article was not particularly welcome by 
the majority of delegations who wanted to ensure that if state forces are excluded from the scope of the 
convention, those that they consider as freedom fighters or national liberations movements fighting 
44 
against those forces should be also excluded . Whereas the main disagreement regarding the nuclear 
terrorist treaty regards its scope and the inclusion or not of the military with. Mi its ambit, 45 the 
comprehensive convention lacks consensus on a common definition and is problematic in respect of the 
following: a) its relationship to other sectoral conventions, primarily to ensure legal certainty in the 
application and interpretation of both the comprehensive and sectoral conventions, and; b) the 
differentiation between self-determination struggles and terroriSM46. 
The fact is that despite the obvious ideological divisions between states, the intemational community 
has reiterated the urgency of adopting a comprehensive convention on international terrorism. The 
43 See: supra note 2, p. 22. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Report of the Working Group, UN Doc. A/C. 6/57, L. 9 (16 Oct. 2002). 
46 th Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, Fifth session (12-23 Feb. 2001), UNGAOR 56 session, UN Doc. 
A/56/37/Supp. No. 37, Annex V, pp. 12-14. 
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reality however, does not reflect the political will to adopt such a legal instrument as the content and 
scope still remain the issue of the present debate. 
On a regional level and despite the proliferation of regional conventions that address terrorism, it is 
only the League of Arab StateS47 and the Council of Europe 48 that provide a definition of terrorism. it 
should be stressed that prior to the September 11 attack, the thematic approach was adopted also at a 
regional level. f1however, after September II the Commission of the EU presented a proposal to the 
European Council for a framework decision on combating terrorism, intended to arrive at a common 
European definition of terrorism. The approach of the EU differs considerably from the approach of 
other regional organisations, such as the African Union 49 , and the South Asian Association for regional 
cooperation 50, which adopted convention without actually providing a general definition of terrorism. 
The Framework Decision adopted on 13 June 2002 provides: 
Terrorist offences include the following list of intentional acts, which given their nature or their 
context, may seriously damage a country or international organization where committed with the aim 
of a) seriously intimidating a population 
b) unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from 
performmg any act 
and c) seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or 
social structures of a country or international organization. 
47 See: Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, adopted in 22 April 1998. 
48 Commission proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 19 September 2001, COM, 
521. 
49 See: OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating Terrorism, 1999, see: www. untreatry. un. org 
50 SAARC Regional Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Kathmandu, 4 November 1987, 
www. untreaty. un. org. 
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Despite the fact that such a broad definitional approach demonstrates the determination to deal with all 
the dimensions of the phenomenon of terrorism it still is a model applicable solely on member states 
and it thus lacks universality. 
3. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A DISCRETE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIME UNDER CUSTOMARY 
INTERANTIONAL LAW? 
Given the absence of a generally accepted definition of terrorism under treaty law, it is questionable 
whether international state practice has been consistent in the use of the term terrorism. Such 
consistency could support the view that there is indeed a definition of terrorism in international 
customary law. However, all the international instruments mentioned above indicate that there is 
inconsistency in the way the international community of states uses the term terrorism. 
Despite the clear application of the indicated existing anti-terrorism conventions solely to international 
terrorism, meaning acts with a transnational element as opposed to domestic terrorism- there are many 
variation with regards to the elements of the offence, Le to the actus reus and mens rea of the offence. 
Indeed one of the elements which differ between international instruments relates to the clarification of 
the actus reus element of a terrorist act. If we compare for example article 2(l) of the 1999 UN 
Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism to the Draft Comprehensive Convention 
we see considerable variations with regards to description of the material element of the offence. 
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With regards to the political nature of an offence, there seem to be only two possible ways of 
addressing the problem; either by removal of all excuses and defences from a future treaty, whether 
during negotiations or as a result of an unequivocal consensus shaped through time, or; by achieving a 
definition that contains a provision explicitly describing all possible defences, such as the 1998 ICC 
Statute 51. Since 1996 the international community seems to have moved very close to the former 
option. Indeed, this is confirmed by Article 6 of the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression 
of the Financing of Terrorism 52, which prohibits justification of the relevant acts on the basis of 
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar grounds. The issue is far 
from resolved, especially at the national level and with regard to domestic terrorism, but after the 
events of September 11,200 1, this trend was definitely set. 
Despite the undeniable relationship between political crime and terrorism, since the 
political/ideological motive is the one that inspires terrorists, the majority of governments and authors 
are in favour of the de-politicizing of the acts. However, such a definitional model conceals many risks, 
for it restricts the perpetrator from claiming the application of favourable regulations provided by 
constitution, substantive penal and penal procedure law that is reserved for political offences, the most 
important of which is the political offence exception to extradition 53 . On the contrary, it is argued that 
today terrorism manifests such a gross and brutal face that is far beyond the nature of political crime 54 . 
Unlike persons accused with having committed common crimes and brought before the criminal courts, 
in which case the possible motive of the accused is irrelevant, this is not so as regards terronst-related 
offences. 
51 Part 3,37 ILM (1998), 999. 
52 39 ILM (2000) 270. See also Art 5 of the 1998 Terrorist Bombings Convention, 37 ILM (1998), 249. 
53 Loverclos, supra note 9, p. p. 114-115. 
ý4 Spinellis, D., Terrorism, 47 Revenue Hellenique de Droit International (1994), p. 447. 
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Furthermore, an element rather complicated and confusing, relates to the origins of the perpetrators. An 
example that illustrates the confusing results of the above mentioned terminology was the assassination 
of an Iraqi nuclear scientist in Greece, on 27 February 1995 55 , for which Iraqi agents were accused. In 
that case, it is far more obvious that the execution of this criminal act had no connection to terrorism 
and that it was merely another matter related to espionage against a State56 . Should the 
focus of 
international concern be individuals and other non-state organizations or should attention be directed 
towards state-sponsored terrorism? 
Likewise, a generic definition has been blocked by the inability to reach a consensus on the relationship 
between terrorism and the so-called state terrorism on the one hand and terrorism and national 
liberation movements on the other. With regards to the first question as to whether states may conduct 
acts of international terrorism the various international instruments adopt different views. The 1991 
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind included international terrorism 
within the scope of crimes that can be committed by the state, while all other treaties do not address 
state terrorism as such, the few conventions that indeed include terrorism within the scope of crimes 
that can be committed by the state. Finally the issue, which continues to block the negotiations of the 
UN convention, relates to the distinction between terrorism and acts undertaken when people exercise 
their right to self-determination. Indeed such a distinction has posed the greater obstacle on the 
negotiations towards a definition in international practice. The 1994 Declaration was thought to be a 
milestone is stating that criminal acts covered by it are in any circumstances unjustifiable whatever the 
consideration of political, philosophical, ideological, and other nature, without reference to national 
liberation movements. While numerous other instruments follow the same approach the Arab and 
African Regional conventions expressly exempt from the terrorist definition people struggling for self- 
55 Kathimenni [Newspaper], (28 February 1995), p. 1. 
5' Gardela, K., Hoffi-nan, B., The RA ND chronology of international terrorismfor 1987, (RkND 199 1). 
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determMation or national liberation movements. It is obvious that states prefer the ambiguity of the 
term, since such ambiguity may be used by some states to deny their people's rights such as freedom of 
expression and religion and collective group rights such as the right to self-determMation5'. 
4. SHIFTING IN INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AS EVIDENCE 
OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CUSTOMARY LAW POS T- 
SEPTEMBER 11? 
The events of September 11 have undoubted changed the political climate in the world community. 
Moreover, the gradual demise of wars of national liberation led to a change in the attitude towards 
terrorism. Resolution 1368 which condemned the atrocities of September II and characterised the acts 
and any other acts of international terrorism as a threat to the peace and security, seems the 
determination of the Council to regard international terrorism as an international crime. The universal 
condemnation of terrorism and the various statements and declarations adopted after September 11 
indicates the likelihood of international terrorism becoming a crime under customary international law. 
As m state practice the bases of bases of interriational criminalization appear to be that terrorism 
severely undermines: (1) individual human rights; (2) the State and the political process (3) 
international peace and security. Numerous resolutions of General Assembly since the 1970S58 and of 
57 See: Pornerance, M., Seýfldetermination in law and practice: the new doctrine in the United Nations, (The 
Hague, Nijhoff Publishers, 1982). Also: Blum, Y., Reflections on the changing concept of self-determination, 10 
Israel Law Rcvieiv, (1975), p. 509. Also: Koskenniemi, M., National self-deten-nination today: problems of legal 
theory and practice, 43 ICLQ (1994), p. 241. 
58 UNGA Res. 3034 (1972), 32/147 (1977), 34/145 (1979), 38/130 (1983), 40/61 (1985), pmbl, 42/159 (1987), 
44/29 (1989), 46/51 (1991), 48/122 (1993), 49/60 (1994), 49/185 (1994), 50/186 (1995), 51/210 (1996), annexed 
Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, pmbl; 52/133 
(1997), 54, '164 (2000), see also 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc A/CONF. 157,24 
(Part 1), ch 111, section 1, 
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the UN Commission on Human Rights since the 1990S59 , have asserted that terrorism threatens or 
destroys fundamental human rights and freedoms. The 2002 EU Framework Decision on Combating 
Terrorism, which adopted a generic definition of terrorist crimes to facilitate a common European 
arrest warrant, similarly presents terrorism as among the most serious threats to human rightS60 .A 
number of other regional anti-terrorism instruments also support the idea that terrorism gravely violates 
htiman rightS61' while the preamble to the Draft LN Comprehensive Convention against terrorism, 
under negotiation since 2000, similarly suggests that terrorism endangers human rights. The notion of 
terrorism as a particularly serious human rights violation does not, by itself, constitute a compellmg 
reason for crimmalizing terrorism. Over time the international community has agreed that 'all acts, 
methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomever 
committed' are both criminal and unjustifiable. As the Commission on Human Rights has resolved, 
'terrorism.... can never be justified as a means to promote and protect human rights 962 .A compelling 
rationale for criminalizing terrorism is the threat it presents to international peace and security. 
Resolutions of the General Assembly since the 1970s 63 , and of the Commission on Human Rights since 
59 UNComHR Resols 1995/43; 1996/47; 1997/42; 1998/47; 1999/27; 1999/30; 2000/30; 2001/37; 2002/35; 
2003/37; UNSubComHR resols 1994/18; 1996/20; 1997/39; 1998/29; 1999/26; 2001/18; 2002/24 
60 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, Brussels, 19 Sep 
2001, COM (2001) 521 Final, 2001/0217 (CNS), Explanatory Memorandum, 2-3,7. 
61 1998 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, pmbl; 1999 OIC Convention on Combating 
International Terrorism, pmbl; 1971 OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of 
Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, pmbl; 1999 OAU Convention 
on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, pmbl; OAS General Assembly, AG/RES 1840 (XXXII-0/02), 
pmbl; OAS Declaration of Lima to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism, adopted at the Inter-American 
Specialized Conference on Terrorism, 26 Apr 1996, Declaration of Quito, IX Meeting of the Rio Group, adopted 
Sep 1995; OAU Central Organ Ministerial Communique on Terrorism, adopted II Nov 2001, Central 
Organ/MEC/MIN/Ex-Ord (V) Comm, OAS General Assembly, AG/RES 1840 (XXXII-0/02), Council of Europe 
(Cttee of Ministers), Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers on human tights and the fight against terrorism, II 
Jul 2002, pmbl [a]; European Parliament Res A5-0050/2000,16 Mar 2000,41-42; OIC (Extraordinary Session of 
Foreign Ministers), 
62 Preambles to UNComHR Resols 1996/47; 1997/42,1998/47; 1999/2; 2000/30; 2001/3 1; 2002/35. 
63 UNGA resols 38/130 (1983),; 40,61 (1985), UNGA res 42/22 (1987), annexed Declaration on the Enhancement 
of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Reftaining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, 
pmbl; 421 _51) 
(1987), pmbl, 44'29 (1989), 46 51 (1991), 48/122 (1993), 49/60 (1994), pmbl, 49/185 (1994), 50/5' ) 
(1995), 50/186 (1995), 51,210 (1996), annexed Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to 
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the 1990S64 , have stated that international terrorism may threaten international peace and security, 
friendly relations among States, international co-operation, State security, or UN principles and 
purposes. The preambles to the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention and the Draft LN Comprehensive 
Convention take a similar position, while various regional instruments also highlight the threat to 
international peace and security presented by terrorism 65 . Most explicitly, from the early 1990s, the 
Security Council increasingly acknowledged in general or specific terms that acts of international 
terrorism may, or do, constitute threats to international peace and securItY66 . After the terrorist attacks 
of II September 2001, the Council shifted to regarding 'any' act of international terrorism as a threat to 
peace and secur1ty67 - regardless of its severity or international effects-and abandoning its previously 
calibrated approach to examining the impact of specific acts. In addition, the Council now involves 
itself in domestic terrorism-such as the Madrid bombing (wrongly attributed to ETA) in Spain 68 . 
Historically, the Security Council refrained from defining terrorism, and between late 2001 and late 
2004 permitted States to unilaterally define the scope of terrorist crimes in national law. In resolution 
1566 of October 2004, it finally adopted a generic definition of terrorism, combining elements from a 
1994 General Assembly Declaration (provoking a state of terror) and the 1999 Terrorist Financing 
Convention (intimidating a population, or coercing a governinent or international organization). While 
Eliminate International Terrorism, pmbl. 
64 UNComHR resols 1995/43,1996/47,1997/42,1998/47,1999/27,2000/30,2001/37,2002/35,2003/37, 
UNSubComHR resols 1994 " 18,1996/20,1997/39, see also 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
UN Doc A/CONF. 157/24 (Part 1), ch III, s 1. 
65 Inter-American Convention, pmbl; Special Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Nuevo Le6n, Mexico, 13 
Jan 2004, OAS Convention, pmbl; SAARC Convention, pmbl; NAM, XIV Final Document, Durban, 17-19 Aug 
2004,100; NAM, XIII Conference of Heads of State or Goverru-nent, Final Document, Kuala Lumpur, 25 Feb 
2003, ASEAN, Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, Brunei Darussalam, 5 Nov 2001, pmbl; OSCE, 
Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, 4 Dec 2001, MC(9). DEC/l, annex, para 1; Decision on 
Combating Terrorism (MC(9). DEC/1); EU Commission Proposal, Explanatory Memorandum, op cit, 3,8. 
66 1999); 1333 (1999), 1363 (200 1); 1390 (2002); 1455 (2003); 1526 (2004), 1535 (2004); see also 1269 (1999) 
67 74 UNSC Res. 1368 (2001), 
68 UNSC Res. 1530 (2004). 
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there are legitimacy costs in cl Ii ion context, the the usual multilateral treaty negotiati 
definition may at least constrain more draconian national definitions in fiiture. 
The fact that terrorism is now perceived as a threat to the peace by the Securl I ity Council demonstrates 
the will of the Security Council to concern itself with acts the international character of which is not so 
evident. For example Resolution 1465 of 13 February 2003 addressing the bombing of a night club in 
Bogotd., is an act which does not seem to present any link with other jurisdictions as it has been 
perpetrated on Colombian territory, by a Colombian group and resulting in the death of Colombian 
ViCtiMS69. In resolution 1464 the Council determined that any act of terrorism and not only those with 
an international dimension amounts to a threat to peace. The same was repeated in further resolutions 
such as 1530 of II March 2004 on the bombing in Madrid, as well as 1566 of 8 October 2004. In late 
2004, the Secretary General of the United Nations presented the Report of the High-Level Panel on 
ThreatS70, Challenges and Change to the General Assembly suggesting that acts of terrorism should be 
illegal at international law. Such a suggestion seems to advocate for a change in direction from the 
current approach of using international law to declare certain acts should be cruninalized in the 
domestic law of each signatory party. 
Similarly the Security Council especially after the September II has gone further and called on states 
to take broad-reaching measures against international terrorism, including criminalizlng such conduct. 
However, none of the UN General Assembly resolution and Security Council resolutions defines 
terrorism and thus they do not contribute to our understanding of the meaning of international terrorism 
in customary international law. However, all the recent resolutions illustrate shared interests in 
combating terrorism, irrespective of the fact that agreement on the text of a comprehensive convention 
69 See: Sossai, M., The internal conflict in Colombia and the fight against terrorism, UN Security Council 
Resolution 1465 and further developments, 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2005), p. p. 253-267. 
'0 See: Report of the Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN. Doc. 
A, 59/565,2 DEC. 2004. 
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could not be reached. Similarly, Resolution 1373 despite the constant reference to terrorism does not 
define the terin. 
Professor Oscar Schachter remarks that the absence of a comprehensive definition does not mean that 
international terrorism is not identifiable 71 . Moreover, Brian Jenkins suggests that although there is not 
any international agreement on the precise definition still a rough consensus on the meaning of 
terrorism is emerging 72 . Given the broad support, considerable overlap in obligations recurring themes 
in the conventions and the endorsement of the definition of terrorism in resolution 1566 a powerful 
jurisprudence exists in international law sufficient for states to draw on in forming their own definitions 
of terrorism in domestic law. 
5. DEFINING THE CRIME OF TERRORISM IN DOMESTIC 
LAW 
States have opted to encompass ideological violence in the criminal justice system, even in times when 
physical threats to the wider public could be described as accidental collateral damage, or rare isolated 
events. The criminalization of particular behaviour, besides outlawing the act itself, carries with it a 
necessary social stigma that serves to alienate whatever popular basis the terrorist group may have had. 
Thus, the early criminaliZation of terrorism served the interests of the State more than it did the social 
and welfare interests of their citizens, particularly since with hindsight we now appreciate the social 
righteousness of some politically-motivated violence of past times (e. g. post WW 11 uprisings against 
" Schacher, 0., The extraterritorial use of force against terrorist bases, II Houston Journal of International Law, 
(1989), p. 309. 
72 Schmid, A., The pt-oblems of defining tet-rofism, (Encyclopedia of World Terrorism, 1997). 
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Communism in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, some Marxist polemic against the poverty caused by 
imperialism in South America, the cause espoused by the Irish Republican Army, and others). Such 
crimmalization is easy to justify because of the existence of the element of violence, which itself is 
outlawed in common criminal law. 
The next question for policy and law-makers was whether to create a distinct terrorist offence apart 
from the underl ing crime that each terrorist act entailed. The 1 ing Yi cho'ce was between the follow' 
mutually exclusive scenarios: a) rendering of a distinct terrorist offence as an aggravating circumstance 
of the underl ing crime; b) rendering a distinct terro i111 ing Yi nst offence, albeit with mitigating or exculpati 
circumstances on the basis of the perpetrator's motive, or; c) treating the violence as a common crime. 
Since the State, against whom terrorist violence was directed, was particularly keen to alienate 
terrorism from its popular basis, the latter option was unable to serve that purpose as it fails to colour 
terrorism as the ultimate urban crime. The second formula was Prevalent between the 1960's to the 
1980's only in countries that did not experience terrorist violence and thus did not share the collective 
experience of terrorism found in other countries. This was particularly expressed through the existence 
of forums whose courts afforded terrorists the so-called political offence exception 73 , but it is not true 
to say that even in these countries the incidental killing of civilians escaped criminal culpabi lItY74. 
During this time, countries facing serious terrorist problems, such as the UK, assumed a completely 
antithetical stance, the legislature of which most typically appended aggravating circumstances to the 
distinct crime of terrorism either through the substantive or procedural criminal law. This was 
particularly expressed through stricter detention, abbreviated trial procedures, elimination of trial by 
jury and relaxation of evidentiary standards (e. g. Diplock courtS)75 . The significant contemporary threat 
73 E. g. Folkerts v Prosecutor (1978, Dutch Supreme Court), 74 ILR 498. 
-4 Re Croissant (1978, Consei I d'Etat), 74 ILR 505; Yugoslav Terrorism case (1978, FRG Federal Supreme Court), 4n, 
74 ILR 509. 
15 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978, chapter 5. 
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of terrorism has activated this latter approach throughout the world, although the terms of its 
application are more stringent in some States than they are in others76. States through the medium of 
international organisations 77 have struggled to develop a definition 78 , the cuhnination of which is the 
979 existence of many 'working definitions . While the international community has struggled to come to 
a consensus as to what constitutes terrorism, individual nations have not had the same difficulty. 
indeed, successive US administrations have produced a number of definitions8o in an effort not only to 
clarify the phenomenon but also to establish their views internationally. The first definition by the Vice 
President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism 81 views terrorism as a method of political warfare 
76 See British legislation directed primarily to the situation in Northern Ireland; Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act of 1989; see also: US Public Law No. 104 302 (1996), where a federal crime of 
terrorism is a crime 'calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to 
retaliate against government conduct' and to other crimes mentioned in US law, such as unlawful acts against the 
safety of civil aviation, crimes against internationally protected persons. According to the French Law of 1986, 
terrorist acts are crimes 'en relation avec une enterprise individuelle ou collective ayant pour but de troubler l'ordre 
public par Vintimidation ou la terreur, ' i. e. 'terrorism' refers to individual or collective acts which aim at causing 
social intimidation by terror. See also: State Reports submitted to the UN CTC: Russian Federation, UN Doc. 
S/2002/887 (3 June 2003); Finland, UN Doc. S/2004/118 (18 February 2004); Germany, UN Doc. S/2003/671 (25 
June 2003); Italy, UN Doc. S/2004/253 (29 March 2004). 
77 Although terrorism is on the top of the UN's agenda since 1972 the organisation has not agreed on a precise 
definition. See: Obote-Odora, A., Defining international terrorism, 6 Murdoch Universit Electronic Journal of Y 
Law (1999), p. p. 4-15. See also: Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, GA Res. 46/51 (9 Dec. 1991) and 
GA Res. 49/60 (17 Feb. 1995). Similarly, the Organisation of American States (OAS) has condemned terrorism 
since 1994, although without defining it. See Declaration of Lima to 'Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism' 
(Lima, Peru, April 23-26,1996). The majority of the resolutions and declarations adopted by OAS follow the same 
patterns of the Council of Europe and the EU. See OAS Resolution Approving CEITE/Res. 1/96 Framework 
Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America and Agreement, signed by Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, 
April 26,1996; Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat and Eliminate Terrorism, AG/Res. 1553 (XXVII- 
0/98), 2 June 1998, AG/ Res. 1399 (XXVI-0/96), 7 June 1996, AG/Res. 1492 (XXVII-0 197), 5 Junel 997. 
78 There are many obstacles in formulating a generally accepted definition. For example Elagab, 0., in his book 
International law documents relating to terrorism, (Cavendish, 1997, p. p. 35-40), offers some possible 
explanations. As terrorism takes many different forms, such violence is prompted by a wide range of motives and 
the criteria for defining terrorism is subjective, which complicates any definition of the term. 
79 In the USA many different working definition have been fon-nulated. For example, 'premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine State agents 
usually', Patterns of Global Terrorism 1995, US Department of State, Washington DC (1996), p. iv. For many 
more USA working definitions, see: Beres, L. R., The meaning of terrorism: jurisprudential and definitional 
clarifications, 28 Vanderbilt Journal Of Transnational Law 
(1995), p. 239. 
80 The majority of the definitions clearly demonstrate an effort to equate terrorism Nkith crime. See: Winker, C., 
Presidents held hostage: the rhetoric of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, 12 Terrorism (1989), p. 23. 
81 Terrorist Group Profiles, Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism, U. S. Government Printing 
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designed to bring about political changes. Firstly, this definition acknowledges the fact that terrorism 
has a political objective. However, it is rather vague in the use of the tenn 'political warfare', which 
itself is unclear. The same applies to the definition used by the US Foreign Office 82, where the use of 
the terms 'pre-mediated' violence 'in order to mfluence an audience' allows multiple interpretations. 
Although both definitions have obvious gaps, they are very significant in the sense that they provide an 
effort to examine terrorism from a political perspective. Nevertheless, the political approach does not 
automatically lead to political solution. Especially in the US, terrorism is tantamount to crime and 
war 83 , while there is an absence of any political solution. 
Finally, the FBI defines terrorism as 'the unlawful use of violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof, in furtherance of 
political or social objectives' 84. What is particularly interesting in that definition *is the reference to the 
objectives of the terrorist activity Thus, the FBI's definition is one of the few codified definitions that 
is cited and employed as a standard reference point. It should be mentioned, however, that the U. S. 
Goverment cannot agree on a single definition and every institution interprets and defines the 
phenomenon in its own way and for its own particular purposeS85. Most governmental entities simply 
adopt a working definition that justifies and supports their organizational charter (defines mission, 
dictates organizational framework, authorizes the performance of specific functions, and provides the 
necessary resources). 
Office, (Washington D. C., 1988). 
8" 22 USC § 2656(d). 
83 New York Times, 4 April 1984, p. 13. See also: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress 
(September 1984), in Bossi, M., Terrorism in Greece: national and international dimensions, (Sakkoulas, 2000), 
'in Greekj, p. 179. 
84 The FBI defines both domestic and international terrorism. See: Johnson, P., Feldman, T., Personality types and 
terrorism: self-psychology perspectives, 5 Foreign Reports 1992, p. 293. See also Ricks, B. A., Future of domestic 
and international terrorism-the FBI Perspective, II Terrorism (1988), p. 538. 
85 The USA defines terrorism in various ways that are to be analysed during the course of this thesis. 
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Article I (I) of the UK 2000 Terrorism Act defines terrorism as the use of threat of action where it is 
designed to Mfluence the government or intimidate the public, or for advancing a political, religious or 
ideological cause. It is clear that the definition is rather wide 86 and could include any form of political 
violence. However, it is historically proven that political Violence, due to its extreme and ruthlessly 
destructive methods, is In fact a very special event. For instance, the symbolic selection of the target, 
different than the genume or actual target, is a tactic that differentiates terrorism from other forms of 
violence. For instance, the assassination of a member of the governmental mechanism symbolises the 
whole government, a member of the *industrial status quo represents the whole ruling class. In realitY 
there are two distinct targets: the direct one, who is usually the specific human target which is the 
victim of the most direct physical hann and the indirect, upon whom the message is addressed to. If for 
example, the target is a 'citizen' of a country, then the message is addressed to the 'citizens' of this 
particular country. Moreover, if the attack is against military headquarters the aim is to terrorize the 
military elite of that country. Therefore, the attack is aiming beyond the actual selected victim and 
intends to influence the masses. It is true that many assassinations of major public figures or 
representatives of law and order have a propagandist aim 87 . 
Despite the fact that many forms of 
terrorism could be included within the above-mentioned definitions, there does not exist general 
agreement as to the terrorist acts that are to be defined and thus only few governments have accepted it. 
The UK has traditionally followed a rather strict application of territorial jurisdiction with regard to 
transnational crime 88 . With the demise of the IRA 
89 one would think that the LJK would maintain this 
86 It is expansive enough to include animal rights activists and protestors in certain circumstances. 
87 See: Hen-nan, E., O'Sullivan, G., The Terrorism industry the experts and institutions that shape our view of 
terror, (Pantheon, NYC, 1989). 
88 Gilbert, G., Crimes sans frontieres: jurisdictional problems in English Law, 63 BYIL (1992), p. 415. 
89 The Northern Ireland issue constitutes a unique subject for analysis. It should be noted that the majority of 
existing analysis suggest a rather one-sided view by examining the performance of terrorist acts by the IRA and 
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position, but as we noted in our previous section, much like the majority of the international 
community, it too has expanded the ambit of its jurisdictional competence when confronting terrorism. 
This is evident in the 2000 Terrorism Act, which is not designed for territorial offences but covers 
instead offences committed abroad and against UK nationals9o, recognising, moreover, that terrorist 
operations require a structured organisation 91 
The Israeli position on the matter is rather rigid, as due to the conflict with the Palestinians and violent 
incursions into urban areas, they tend to label 'terrorists' easIl 2. There does not exist much 
information regarding terrorist-related arrests, detentions and tri 1 'als of alleged terrorists, and at the swne 
time the Israeli State has adopted a policy of armed combat against terrorist or other organisations 
without much consideration for legal settlement through the criminal justice system. As a result, it is 
difficult to evaluate whether Israeli normative regulation in this area possesses any legal significance 
for the State itself, or the 'terrorists' to whom it is addressed. This creates more tension in the region 
and provokes extreme reactions from both sides. The political violence or terrorism in Israel is an every 
day phenomenon that has all the basic characteristics of a desperate struggle. There are many instances 
of such violence taking place. For example, on the 6h of July 1989 a young Palestinian on his way to 
Jerusalem took control of a crowed bus. The bus fell into a ditch, killing 16 passengers and injuring 
many more. The perpetrator survived his act, and later admitted that his motive for the act was to take 
neglecting the violence directed against the Irish by the British occupation troops. See: Wilkinson, P., The role of 
the military in combating terrorism in a democratic society, 8 Terrorism and Political Violence 
1996), p. 1. 
90 Sec. ](4). 
91 Sec. 1(5). 
92 Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (Sep. 1948, (No. 33 of 5708-1948), as amended in 1980,1986,1993, (Sec. 
1). The basic compensation law is the Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, No. 5'30-1970, as amended. 
[5798 and 5730 are years in the Hebrew religious calendar. All official documents and newspapers carry both 
Common Era (CE) and Hebrew dates] 
93 See: LeVine, T. V., The logomachy of terrorism: on the political uses and abuses of definition, 7 Terrorism and 
Political Violence (1995), p. 45. 
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revenge for the shooting of his friend by IsraeliteS93 . He was eventually convicted as having perpetrated 
a terrorist crime. This act, as well as attacks against troops by children throwing stones can be difficult 
to characterise as terrorist. Israel's insistence on labelling these acts as terrorist means more tension and 
conflict in the region. 
Violence in this region is becoming more extreme and it seems that there is no hope yet for peace. On 
the other hand, the violence supported by right-wing organizations does not attract the attention of the 
State and thus are not labelled terrorist, nor do they fall within the scope of terrorist legislation 94 . Their 
violence is directed against Palestinian organisations with the aim of placing stumbling blocks to any 
peace process negotiations. The assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin on 4 November 1995 by 
the fanatical Yigil Amir, a Jewish Israeli that was opposed to the peace process and Israel's 
negotiations with the Palestinians, indicates that Israel is facing political violence from two distinct 
fronts. It is also evident that definitions of terrorism, and the distinction between terrorist crimes and 
common crimes, are part of a political agenda that is easily manipulated by States to serve their own 
self-interests. 
The different definitions recorded, such as the ones that view terrorism as politically motivated 
violence 95 , focus on the political element of terrorist activity and thus can very easily create confusion. 
Indeed, a sole political definition instead of a criminal one could include the violence that is carried out 
against civilians by the authorities, rather than by non-State groups. Some state definitions focus on 
the terrorist organisations' mode of operation, while others emphasise the motivations and the modus 
operandi of individual terrorists, etc. while political definitions tend to be more ambiguous in order to 
allow the most politically convenient interpretation of events. Following Security Council resolution, 
94 Cohen-Magor A. R., Combating right-wing political extremism in Israel: critical appraisal, 9 Terrorism and 
Political Violcnce (1997), p. 82. 
9ý Telhami, S., Combating terrorism, what works" what doesn't? Policy Impact Panel, Council of Foreign In 
Relations, Washington D. C. (October 1996). 
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which requires states to crimmalize terrorism in domestic law, many states enacted new laws. 
However, despite the proliferation of new anti-terrorism legislation, the definitions adopted differ 
significantly. For example the LJK Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 extend to persons 
considered to have undefined links with organisations deemed to constitute a terrorist treat. 
Yet the terrorist label is often invoked precisely to connote a degree of gravity, thereby to justify 
measures not otherwise considered acceptable. More specifically resolution 1373 obliged states to 
ensure that terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic law and punished in a 
way that reflects their seriousness. However, the resolution does not give a general definition of 
terrorist acts, and in the absence of a definition at the world level states may apply their own which 
may be too restrictive or too wide96 . In fact none of the Security Council resolutions referring to 
terrorism define it, or refer to sources on which states should rely in formulating a definition. 
Certainly, whereas in the past the State did not see itself threatened by terrorism, but only domestic 
social order and thus dealt with terrorist offences in the same manner as other offences albeit as 
distinct, in the new post-9/1 I era this is not the case. Most States do indeed perceive a direct threat to 
their overall security, and some States perceive a very real threat to their unity (e. g. Saudi Arabia) and 
in some cases an explicit threat to their economic interests, as is the case with animal rights 'terrorism' 
in the UK 97 . It is no wonder, therefore, that the multilateralism explored in this section, in both its 
domestic and mter-State legal dimension is the approach of the modem epoch. 
96 See: Rosand, E., Security Council Resolution 1373, The Counter-Terrorism Committee and the fight against 
terrorism, 97 AJIL (2003), p. 340. 
97 Eaglesham, J., Firn, D., Animal rights 'terrorists' to be targeted by new offence, Financial Times 
(18 Nov. 2004), which explains the LJK's urgent goverrunent plans to introduce a new terrorist offence 
of animal rights activist violence because such violence is detrimental to the pursuit of the British 
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6. IS THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM A MATTER OF 
OPERATIVE CONCERN? 
The fact that no generally accepted definition of terrorism in international law exists give rise to the 
question as to whether there is negative impact on the international legal order. Does the absence 
necessary imply that serious acts of violence are not criminalized in domestic or international law? Or 
does the absence of a generally accepted definition of terrorism block international cooperation""' 
Initially the absence of a definition of terrorism does not mean that serious acts of violence, such as 
those carried out in September II or in Madrid are not criminalized under international (and domestic 
criminal law). As I demonstrated in this and the previous chapter, specific manifestations of terrorism 
are covered by thematic conventions dealing with specific manifestation of terrorism. Indeed there is 
such a broad scope in the conventions that as Dugard suggests: is difficult to imagine a form of 
terrorism which is not covered by the existing anti-terrorism conventions 99 . All those instruments are 
binding upon incorporation into domestic law. Moreover, even if a state has not ratified the treaties, 
acts of international terrorism will be covered by ordinary domestic law, which will prohibit murder, 
attacks on persons and property, which are the main results of a terronst act. 
economy to become the leader in stem cell research and biotechnology. See also: Collins, J. G., 
Terrorism and animal rights, 249 Science (1990), p. 345. 
98 Opposite was the opinion of the League of nations council according to which 'the definition is needed in order 
to enable international cooperation'. See relatively Haffier, G., The definition of the crime of terrorism in Nesi, 
G., 
International cooperation in counter-terrorism, (Ashgate, 2006), p. 35. 
99 See: supra note 43, p. 4 1. 
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Additionally, the lack of a definition of terrorism does not signify a lack of obligations on states to 
refrain from participating or supporting acts of terrorism and to adopt counter-terrorism measures. 
Indeed all the anti-terrorism treaties and resolutions provide clear obligations for states. An indicative 
example is the 1373 LN Security Council resolution, which stresses out that 'states are obliged to adopt 
a wide ranging measures including crimmalization, freezing of assets and denial of safe heavens'. 
Chapter five of the thesis will discuss in details these obligations. 
For the purposes of cooperation between states there is a strong body of international conventions 
which confer obligations to states regarding international co-operation, from investigation to the 
prosecution of the offences prescribed therein. In such, the focus on terrorism terminology may obscure 
to the extent to which resort to terrorist tactics is already regulated by other international norms. While 
the generic definition in a global convention may serve the interest of legal certainty and the efficiency 
of inter-state co-operation that is clear is that its absence does not mean a legal gap or paralysis of the 
international legal system suppressing terrorism'00. The main problem thus remains not with the 
absence of a definition of terrorism in international law but with the poor enforcement of the existing 
nonns. 
Thus, despite the obvious benefits of formulating a generally acceptable definition-political 
considerations- the international legal order can fiinction fine without a definition. Law enforcement 
may be possible, perhaps less effective in terms of cooperation and co-ordination, yet possible, without 
a definition of terrorism. This does not imply that terrorism, as a term does not have strong political 
significance. This is the case because states act directly in reaction to terrorism. They act immediately 
on the basis of someone being considered a terrorist or something being considered terrorism. The 
100 Supra note 43. p. 42. 
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Security Council even requires them to do so by calling all states to prevent and suppress the financing 
of terrorist acts, deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts'01 
Moreover, the term 'terrorism' involves enormous power to change the cooperation of states at an 
international level. A state that is accused of being involved in terrorism may find itself politically 
isolated as well as for example economically damaged. As a matter of fact, it is precisely the absence 
of a legal definition that makes it possible to the hegemonic power and its followers to determine the 
international public enemy on a case-by-case basis. A legal definition of terrorism would serve as a 
limitation to this discretional power. Obviously by defining terrorism, it is possible to structure and 
control the use of a term that, historically, has been politically and ideologically abused. Rather than 
remaining an ambiguous term justifying all manner of repressive responses, legal definition would 
confine the term within known limits. An internationally agreed legal definition would of course not 
assure that state interests no longer influence states' decision to act or refrain from acting in reaction to 
terrorism. However, it would limit states' ability to pursue other purposes in the name of fighting 
terrorism. 
101 2000 Terrorist Financing Convention. 
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CONCLUSION 
The statement which Rosalyn Higgins and Maurice Flory wrote in their book entitled 'Terrorism and 
Intemational Law' is still applicable: 'Everyone has his own idea of the notion of terrorism. The idea 
conjures up to the threat or use of violence outside of wartime and most usually against non-military 
targets, for the achievement of political end'. The situation has not changed, even since 2001. 
Terrorism is a politically divisive subject and in the existing situation it may never be possible to arrive 
at a definition that will enjoy the approval of all the international community. According to Wilkinson, 
one of the central problems in defining terrorism lies with the subjective nature of terror' 02 . We all have 
different thresholds of fear and our personal and cultural backgrounds make certain images and ideas 
more terrifying to each of us than to others. The whole problematique related to a definition of 
terrorism is its differentiation from closely related concepts involving acts of violence, such as political 
violence. Political violence may be discerned from terrorism to the extent that It does not aim in the 
creation of a state of terror. 
Despite the recent Security Council Resolutions, which oblige States to disregard motive and other 
ideological considerations, especially 1373 (2001), such Resolutions are binding on account of their 
nature as Council resolutions and thus we cannot assess what the reactions of States really are103. in 
contrast, both the 1998 Terrorist Bombings and the 1999 Terrorist Financing Conventions are ratified 
by less than half the States in the world and this is perhaps an indication that the determinations found 
102 Wilkinson, P., Terrorism versus democrac .- the liberal state response, 
(Frank Cass Publishers, 200 1). y 
103 S. C. Res. 1566 (8 Oct. 2004), sponsored by Russia, following the incident at the Beslan school in October 
2004, adopted a definition of terrorism as follows: '... criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with 
the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of 
terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, and all other acts which 
constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to 
terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, 
ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to 
ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their gave nature'. 
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in recent Security Council resolutions are not shared among the members of the international 
community. Any definition contained in a binding instrument could not therefore include any of the 
contentious issues I have previously identified. 
In fact the international community has found it very hard in the past to come up with a consensus on 
what exactly is meant by 'terrorism' due to ideological clashes between states. Amnesty International 
raised the definitim issue in its comments on the draft Council of Europe Convention on the prevention 
of terrorism' 04 . As adopted on 3 May 2005 
105 
, the Convention requires states parties to crimmallse 
provocation of and recruitment and training for terrorism. It does not however, include a precise 
definition of terrorism for the purpose of the treaty, thus effectively creating subsidiary offences while 
the primary offence of terrorism remains undefined. 
Given the differences of view in key elements it is difficult to sustain that international terrorism is per 
se a discrete and identifiable international legal norm. However, the absence of a generally accepted 
definition does not leave a gap in the international legal order. Terrorism is now prohibited by other 
international legal normsIrrespective of the existence of a definition. The major problem With the lack 
of definition lies with the poor enforcement of existing norms, rather than with the lack of a generic 
definition of terrorism 
106 
Until a definition is formulated and this Will take long time, international law is capable of providing 
guidance on the definition of terrorism but as it the case so often with international law states must be 
willing to follow. States however, adopt vague and ambiguous definitions purposely in order to justify 
104 Council of Europe: Amnesty International's Preliminary Observations on the December 2004 Draft European 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, AI Index IOR 061/002/2005. 
105 http: //conventions. coe. int/Treaty/Commun/ 
106 
supra note 100. 
o-. O) 
measures not considered acceptable under different circumstances' 07 . The importance of labelling 
someone as terrorist and the ability of states to selectively use the term-in accordance with their own 
interests- along with their freedom to define the term in accordance with their interests in domestic law 
triggers questions as to whether terrorism should be addressed by reference to other international 
norms. Following the events of September II the international community witnessed the emergence of 
a new counter-terrorism model which equates terrorism with an 'armed attack'. The extent to which the 
events of September II and the responses that followed altered our traditional understanding of 
terrorism as a criminal activity is the subject matter of the following chapter. 
107 UN Doc CCPR/CO/76 EGY, 2002, UN Doc CCPR/CO/75/NZL, 2002. 
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CHAPTER 3 
USE OF FORCE AGAINST TERRORISM: UNILATERAL 
EXTERNAL MODEL 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 11,2001, Al Qaeda terrorists attacked the World Trade Center in New York and the 
Pentagon in Washington D. C. using hijacked airliners. The attack of II September exceeded in its 
scale and effects any single act of terrorism that has been carried out to date. Indeed the effects of the 
attack in terms of both human casualties and material damage were horrendous and were easily 
comparable to a very substantial armed attack by conventional means. In the past acts of terrorism were 
often seen as involving relatively sporadic and small scale violence which fell short of the threshold 
necessary for the use of force in the context of self-defence, and were better left to be dealt With in the 
context of international criminal law. However, the events of September II challenged the predominant 
view that non-state terrorist attacks should be dealt within the framework of pre-September counter- 
terrorism models, i. e. domestic and international mechanisms that I had identified in chapter one of my 
thesisi. 
Shortly after the events of September 11 both the United States' and the United Kingdom notified the 
Security Council that they were conducting operations against the Taleban and Al Qaeda 2 pursuant to 
their right of individual and collective self-defence which pennits the use of force in self-defence 
1 For past instances see: Gray, C., lnternational law and the use offorce, (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. p 
117-118. Also: Wedgwood R., Responding to terrorism: the strikes against Bin Laden, 24 Yale Journal of 
International Law (1999), p. 559. 
2 See Alexander, Y., and SNN etnam, M., Usama bin Laden's al-Qaeda: profile of a terrorist network, at I Global 
Terrorism (200 1), p. 105. 
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against an armed attack3. The military intervention 4 against Afghanistan, that took place as part of the 
4war against terror' raised a number of issues regarding the precise parameters of the right to self- 
defence and the nature of its evolution. Additionally the United States National Security Strategy 
challenged the traditionally accepted prohibition of the use of pre-emptive use of force. 
In the present chapter I examine the application of the Jus ad bellum principleS6 in the case of terrorism 
by questioning whether, and if so, in what circumstances, states are entitled to resort to the use of force 
against terrorism under international law. Is there a new unilateral external model on the use of force 
against terrorism? if so, which are the parameters of such an emerging model? 
With regards to the relevance of the Jus ad bellum principles to terrorism, I question whether terrorist 
acts could be seen as an armed attack under the Jus ad bellum so as to trigger the applicability of the 
Jus in bello. Is terrorism in general and terrorism of the scale and effect of September II in particular, 
an armed attack as to trigger the right of use of force under self-defence? Evidence that terrorist acts 
constitute an armed attack has come through Security Council Res. 1368 and has been supported by 
other organizationS7. Security Council Resolution 1368 cited the 'inherent' right to self-defense In the 
specific context of international terrorism. Resolution 1368 however. is an exceptional case reserved 
3 Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United 
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U. N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U. N. Doc. S/2001/946; 
4 For a full discussion of the legality of the post-September II responses, see: O'Connell, M, Lawful self-defence 
to ter-ronsm, 3 UPir Law. Review (2002). Also: Beard, J., Amenca's new war on terror: the case for self-defence 
under international law, 25 HJ L. Public Policy (2002), p. 55. Also: Franck, T., Terrorism and the right of self- 
defence, 95.4JIL (200 1), p. 829. Also: O'Connell, M., Terrorism and self-defence, Jurist, Sept. 18, (2001) (available 
at www. iurist. law. pit. edu/forum); Cassese, A., Terrorism is also disrupting some crucial legal categories of 
international law, 12 EJIL (2001), p. p. 993,995-98. Also: Kelly, J., The man behind the terror, Wash Post, Sept. 
27, (200 1), p. 12, 
Tnited States National Security Strategy, 17 September 2002 available at www. whitehouse. gov/nsc/nss. pd 
6 The legality of the use of force under international law is referred to as the jus ad bellum', the rules governing 
when force can lawfully be used and is distinguished from the 'jus in bello', that encompasses the rules that apply 
once force has been used and a conflict is underway. 
7 NATO and the EU affinned the nght of self-defence. See relatively: Gray, C., Bush Doctrine, p. 441. 
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for exceptional circumstances and if a similar incident took place the 1368 model would be followed 
again. Given the fact that terrorist acts may amount to armed attack, I further question whether 
anticipatory self-defence is applicable in the case of a qualifying terrorist attack and I argue against the 
existence of a pre-emptive use of force against terrorism. In any case though recourse to armed force 
against terrorism within the context of Articles 51 of the UN Charter fall under the suppressionist 
model. This is exemplified by the fact that the majority of States consents to the use of armed force 
against terrorism only where such an act has already taken place, and despite the existence of the US 
pre-emptive doctrine, which has increasingly found itself an Implicit place in the preamble to recent 
Security Council resolutions, State practice in fact strongly demonstrates that pre-emptive strikes are 
not at all supported; instead, the suppression of terrorism is premised - at least In General Assembly 
resolutions and in the framework of bilateral and multilateral agreements - on increased forms of co- 
8 
operation in the security and criminal fields 
In this quest, certain issues remain unanswered within the current use of force literature, and in 
particular, to what extent can the UN Charter framework circumscribe and relate to terrorist attacks, 
since Articles 51 and 42 were premised on inter-State use of armed force. If one is to argue that non- 
State actors are capable of launching an 'armed attack' within the meaning of Article 51 UN Charter, it 
is evident that one must by necessarily rethink foundational concepts, such as: a) what is thereafter the 
meaning of necessity and proportionality in response to the attack'? b) has the requirement of an armed 
attack be attributed to a state been retained and which is the threshold for attribution? c) can a terrorist 
act cross the threshold of severity so as to trigger the application of Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions? 
8 The last chaptcr of the present thesis focus exclusively on recent forins of co-operation. 
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Before turning to a discussion of the post-September use of force, it is useful to highlight several of the 
issues surrounding the use of force and the right of self-defense in international law generally. Thus, I 
have divided my chapter into two main sections. The first examines the traditional understanding of the 
use of force and the right of self-defence in international law, while the second part examines the 
possible evolution of an extended right of self-defence against attacks perpetrated by non-state actors 
(terrorists). Fmally, the last part (part three) of the chapter discusses briefly the residual possibility of 
the application of Protocol 11 of the Geneva Conventions to terrorism. 
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PART ONE 
1. THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW UNDER 
ARTICLE 2(4) OF THE UN CHARTER9 
The starting point for any discussion of the lawful resort to the use of force is the UN Charter and 
customary international law. The most important provision of the UN Charter on the recourse to force 
is Article 2(4) which although applicable only to UN member states, it now firmly represents 
customary law applicable even vis-A-vis third parties' 0. Article 2(6) of the UN Charter further supports 
the above view as it provides that the Organisation shall ensure that states which are not members act 
in accordance with the maintenance of international peace and security 
Article 2(4) provides that 'all member states are obliged to refrain in their international relations from 
the ffireat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations' 12 . It is immediately noticeable that 
Article 2(4) is not concerned merely With war in the technical sense but prohibits the use of force in 
general. The wording of Article 2(4) is unclear as to whether the prohibition applies only to armed 
force, or whether it extends also to other political or economic instances of coercive action". It is 
9 Art. 2(4) was deten-nined as constituting jus cogens, whose breach was an international crime under draft Art. 19 
of the ILC's Draft Rules on State Responsibility, although Art. 19 was deleted in the ILC's last reading in 2000. 
Crawford, J., Bodeau, P., and Peel, J., The ILC's draft articles on state responsibility: toward completion of a 
second reading, 94 AJIL (2000), p. 660. 
10 Nicaragua v. United States, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Merits, lCJ Reports 
(1986), para. 14. See also: Brownie, L, International law, (Oxford University Press, 2000) p. 87. 
11 Article 2(6) of the UN Charter. 
12 For a general discussion on the use of force under article 2(4) of the Charter see: Gray, C., International law and 
the use offorce, (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. p. 25-26. 
13 The Declaration on Principles of International Law 1970 (G. A. Res. 2625) recalled the duty of States to refrain 
from any kind of force, while the same approach was underlined in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States. 
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moreover unclear whether information warfare is encompassed within Article 2(4) UN Charter, and 
may thus constitute an instance of the use of force 14 . As is well known from the travaux preparatoires 
of Article 2(4), force is prohibited under this proVision only where it is 'anned'. Strictly speaking, 
therefore, IW could never violate Article 2(4) because it lacks the possibility of an armed dimension. 
There is agreement, however, in recent literature that cyber war, at least In its form as an all-out attack, 
does indeed violate Article 2(4). There is also some consensus that there do exist certain areas within 
cyber war operations that do not constitute uses of force 15 
The question as to what constitute force 16 may be answered by reference to the preparatory works of 
the Dumbarton Oaks conference, where a Brazilian proposal that would have required states to refrain 
from economic or equivalent force was vehemently rejected by the other delegates 17 . The predominant 
view is therefore that Article 2(4) is limited to all instances of armed force, although there is a dispute 
with regard to the qualification posed by the second part of Article 2(4). Economic coercion may fall 
within the ambit of Article 2(7) or the rule against non-interference in the domestic affairs of other 
States 18 . This was moreover explicitly recognized in General Assembly resolutions 2131 and 2625, 
and was considered at length in the Nicaragua case'9. The sole exception that has been identified in 
this regard was the Arab oil boycott of 1973/74. 
14 See generally: Pottorff, J. P., Information warfare: defining the legal response to an attack, (US Naval War 
College, 1999). 
15 See: Bond, J. N., Peacetime foreign data manipulation as one aspect of offensive information warfare: questions 
of legality under the United Nations Charter article 2(4), (US Naval War College, 1996); Aldrich, R- W., How do 
you know you are at war in the infori-nation age, 22 Houston J Int'l L (2000 
), p. 223. 
16 On the meaning of the terrn force generally see: Akehurst's modern introduction to international law, p. 311. 
17 Arend, J., and Beck, R. J., International law and the use offorce, (Routledge, 1993), p. p. 33-37. 
Goodrich, L., Hambro, E., and Simons, A., Charter of the United Nations, (Columbia University Press, 3d 
edition, 1969), p. 49. 
19 Nicaragua Judgment, paras. 210-220. 
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Article 2(4) prohibits not only the use of armed force per se, but also all threats to employ such 
force 20, whether or not armed violence ultimately ensueS21. Interestingly, in the Nicaragua case 22 , the 
US military manoeuvres near the Nicaraguan borders were held not to constitute a threat of force, 
whereas when in 1994 'Iraqi tanks were deployed in positions pointmig towards and within range of 
Kuwait' the UK representative to the Security Council was stated to be a breach of the provisions of 
the Charter 23 . 
The above cases demonstrate that the threat of force is not always made in overt terms, 
such as Noriega's declaration of war against the United States, and that sometimes threats do exist but 
are difficult to detect. It is evident that Article 2(4) refers only to an immediate threat of force taking 
place in the context of an inter-State dispute, such as when the UK and France gave Egypt an 
ultimatum of some hours to leave the Suez Canal Zone 24 . 
This threat was probably a breach of Article 
25 2(4), but the term 'threat' would not probably cover the so-called U-2 incident of 1960 
It is now widely accepted that the prohibition of the use of force under article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
reflects customary international laW26 , 
despite the fact that state practice has not always been 
consisten t27 with such a CUStOM28 . As it was stated in the Nicaragua case the rule against the use of 
force was a 'conspicuous example of a rule of international law having the character ofjus cogenS ' 29 . 
20 Sadurska, R., Threats of force, 82 AJIL (1988), p. p. 239-268. 
21 In the context of the jus in bello, a declaration of war under common Art. 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
triggers the application of the Conventions. See: Green, L. C., The contemporary lait, of armed conflict, 
(Manchester University Press, 2 nd edition, 2000), p. 73. 
22 Nicaragua Judgment para. 227. 
23 Harris, D. J., Cases and materials on international law, (Sweet and Maxwell, 5h edition, 1998), p. 864. 
2' Broms, B., Suez Canal, 12 EPIL (1990), p. p. 360-365. 
25 Ibid, p. 241. 
26 ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14. 
27 See: Nicaragua case, para, 186. 
28 See: Nicaragua case, para. 190. See also: Akehurst, M, Custom as a source, p. 53. 
29 Nicaragua, para. 10-33-04. See also: Jennings, R., and Watts, A., (eds. ), Oppenheim's international law, (Essex: 
Longman, 1992). Also: Charneý', J., Universal international law, 87AJIL (1999), p. p. 539-541. 
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Thus, the mere fact that states in practice have not always refrained from the use of force this does not 
30 31 
render thejus cogens norm invalid as objectors cannot validly assert objections tojus cogens nonns . 
Although nominally outlawing most uses of force in international relations by Individual States, the UN 
Charter does recognize a right of nations to use force for the purpose of self-defence. Thus the 
prohibition to use force against another state is not absolute in the sense that there are exceptions to the 
rule. The first exception, set forth in article 51 of the UN Charter, permits the use of force in self- 
defence. Under article 51 of the Charter: 'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security'. Thus, States victimized by an armed attack may not only defend themselves, but also receive 
assistance from others in mounting that defence. Moreover, they need not await a Council authorization 
to act, but are required to report actions taken to the Security Council, which may itself determine that 
it needs to respond in some fashion. Permissible self-defense is however, to be distinguished fi7om 
reprisals, which are strictly prohibited under international law 32 . 
The second exception is to be found in article 39, which empowers the Security Council to determine 
the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression and decide what measures 
are necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. By Article 42, the Council may 
turn to military force to resolve these situations in what are generally labelled enforcement operations. 
Therefore any lawful resort to the use of force should fall Within one of the aforementioned categories. 
30 This could constitute an act of aggression. See: UN GA res. 3314, article 1,14 December 
1974. 
31 Duffy, H., The war on terror and theframework of international law, (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. in 
147. 
32 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration. States that 'states have the duty to refrain from acts of reprisals involving 
the use of force. See: GA Res. 2625 'declaration on principles of international law concerning 
friendly relations 
and co-operation among states in accordance with the charter of the United Nations 24 October 1970. 
See also: 
Bowett, D., Reprisals involving recourse to armed force, 66 AJIL (1972), p. p. 6-8. 
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An understanding of both those two exceptions is essential in order to assess not only the lawfulness of 
the military responses to the terrorist attack of September II but also the general application of article 
2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter to terrorism. 
2. USE OF FORCE IN SELF-DEFENCE33 
Article 51 of the UN Charter makes reference to the 'inherent' right of self-defence. The reference to 
the 'inherent' right of self-defence indicates that the nature of the right cannot be impaired by post- 
Charter developments and it is thus reflects customary international IaW34 . Thus, article 51 of the UN 
Charter and customary international law with regards to the use of force co-exist and customary 
international law supplements article 5 1. 
A literal interpretation of article 51 provides in conjunction with Article 2(4) that resort to force in the 
exercise of individual or collective 35 self-defence may only be lawfully undertaken if an anned attack 
occurs against a member state of the United Nations. Thus, 'states do not have a right of armed 
response to acts which do not constitute an anned attack 36 
Although many attempts have taken place in order to define the factual circumstances in which a state 
may resort to force in self-defence, the UN Charter fails to provide a definition on armed attack. The 
question was examined in detail by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, where the Court by relying on the 
1974 Resolution on Aggression (Article 3), stated that an armed attack could include not merely action 
by regular armed forces, but also 'the sending by or on behalf of a state of anned bands, groups, 
33 Schachter, 0., The right of state to use an-ned force, 82 Michigan Law Review (1984). 
34 See: supra note 32, p. 150. 
3i The issue is relevant to situations were the use of force is employed by states which are not the direct Victims of 
the attack. The Nicaragua case held that a state even if it is not the direct victim of the attack it can still act in self- 
defence provided that the direct \ictim requires assistance. See: Nicaragua case, para. 104-105. 
36 
Quotation from the Nicaragua case, para. 110. 
irregulars or mercenaries which carry out acts of armed force against another State 137 . The decisive 
factor in determining whether the military action of a sponsored force could amount to an armed attack 
perpetrated by the sending State was found to rest on a 'scale and effects' test 38 . Therefore, it is the 
scale and effect of the activities of armed bands listed in the definition as 'acts of aggression' that will 
qualify them as armed attacks within the meaning of Article 5 1. The Court held that financing and 
equipping foreign paramilitaries does not constitute an arined attack, although the UK Judge Sir Robert 
Jennings and the US Judge, Stephen Schwebel vehemently objected from the majority on this poine9. 
Only the most grave uses of force 40 will qualify as 'armed attacks' and thus trigger a victim state's right 
to respond with force in self-defense 41 - This finding that an 'anned attack' is required to trigger a 
state's right of self-defense was recently re-affirmed by the ICJ in Case Concerning Oil Plaýforms 42 
and in its advisory opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territo), Y43. Specifically, in the Oil Plaffiorms case, the World Court confirmed the criteria 
37 Nicaragua Judgment, para. 195. 
38 lbid, para. 194. 
39 The ICTY Appeals Chamber in its Judgment in the Tadic case rebuffed the 'effective control' test propounded 
by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, which held that organised private individuals whose action is co-ordinated or 
supervised by a foreign State and to whom specific instructions are issued are considered de facto organs of the 
controlling State. The ICTY Appeals Chamber held that the ICJ's 'effective control' test was at variance with both 
judicial and State practice, and could only apply with regard to individuals or unorganised groups of individuals 
acting on behalf of third States, but was generally inapplicable to military or paramilitary groups. The ICTY's 
departure from the stringent 'effective control' test was duly replaced with an 'overall test' which simply requires 
co-ordinating or helping in a group's general military planning, besides equipping or possibly financing the group, 
in order to establish a relationship of agency between the group and the aiding State. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals 
Judgment (15 July 1999), para. 109,114. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Note that the ICJ went on to say that where a state is the victim of an attack which is not serious enough to 
amount to an 'armed attack', it is entitled to respond with 'proportionate countermeasures'. While the Court did not 
specify whether such counten-neasures could involve the use of force, the better view is that they are limited to 
non-forcible measures. See: Crawford, J., The International Law Commission's articles on state responsibility: 
introduction, text and commentaries (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 283. 
41 
- Case Concerning Oil Platforrns (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Merits) [6 November 
2003] ICJ <http: //www. ici-cii. org/icjwwwýidocket/iop/iopframe. htm> at 20 July 2004. 
43 For a discussion of this decision see: Garwood-Gowers, A., Case concerning Oil Platforins (Islamic Republic of 
Iran ý, United States of America): did the ICJ miss the boat on the law on the use of force? '5 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law (2004), p. 241. Also: Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
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for the use of force in self-defence - namely that an armed attack is a prerequisite, and that force used 
in self-defence must be necessary and proportionate 44. More significantly, in determining whether the 
US had suffered an armed attack the Court applied the high threshold test from the Nicaragua Case. 
This test limits the notion of 'armed attack' to 'the most grave forms of the use of force'. In other 
words, not all uses of force are serious enough to constitute an armed attack triggering a state's right of 
self-defence. This was precisely the situation in the Oil Platfonns Case, where the attacks on the Sea 
Isle City and the Samuel B Roberts were not considered sufficiently grave to amount to armed attacks 
against the US. As a result, the US did not have the right to respond with force in self-defence. The 
Court's confirmation of the test in the Nicaragua Case for an armed attack is significant because it 
maintains the high threshold at which a state's right of self-defence is triggered. Such a confinnation 
limits the freedom of states to claim that even minor incidents could amount to an armed attack 
triggering the right of self-defence. 
The aforementioned high threshold of violence makes it particularly difficult for states to characterize 
terrorist acts as armed attacks. There are two major difficulties in doing so. The first concerns the 
gravity threshold for an 'armed attack', while the second relates to the attribution requirement. Prior to 
9/11, few individual terrorist attacks were serious enough to meet the lCYs high threshold for an 
'armed attack ý45 . The majority of international terrorist acts consisted of relatively minor attacks on 
nationals abroad, rather than large-scale attacks on the actual territory of the victim state. It was 
therefore difficult to equate terrorist acts committed by non-state actors with conventional attacks by a 
Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [9 July 2004] ICJ available at: //www. lcj- 
iij. org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/iinwpframe. htm 
44 ibid. 
45 For a detailed discussion of various views on how serious a terrorist attack needs to be in order to qualify as an 
'anned attack', see: Arend, A., and Beck, R., International law and the use oj'force. - beyond the UN Charter 
paradigm, (Routledge, 1993), p. p. 159-62. in 
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state. As such, it was rare for an individual act of terrorism to qualify as an 'armed attack' triggering a 
victim state's right of self-defence. 
Despite the fact that it is quite straightforward that the attacks of September II met the scale and effect 
threshold, due to the amount of victims and destruction caused by terroriSt46, not every instance of the 
use of force against a state is deemed to be an armed attack under Article 5 1. The several thousand 
people killed in the case of the terrorist acts of September 11, suggest that the actions could be deemed 
an armed attack under Article 5 147. On the other hand, isolated or minor terrorist attacks should 
948 continue to be considered criminal acts, rather than 'armed attacks . In such circumstances, a victim 
state is limited to responding through law enforcement procedures, criminal justice mechanisms and 
other non-forcible measureS49 . Allowing the use of force in response to minor terrorist attacks would 
amount to the 'militarization of crime' and would severely undermine international law's general 
prohibition on the use of force 50. Thus, the right of self-defence against terrorism remains subject to the 
gravity requirement. 
One of the most controversial issues with regards to the right of self-defence relates to anticipatory 
self-defence. Is anticipatory self -defence is permitted and if so to what extent? Moreover, can the use 
of force by non-state actors trigger the lawful exercise of the right of self-defence by the victim state? 
46 Nearly 3,000 innocents died in the attacks, which caused financial losses measured in the billions of dollars. See: 
United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, available at 
www. state. gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/200 I/pdf/ (Global Terrorism). 
47 Delbriick, J., The fight against global terrorism: self-defence or collective security as international police action? 
Some comments on the international legal implications of the 'war against terTorism', 44 German Yearbook of 
International Law (200 1), p. p. 9-24. 
4'ý Ulfstein, G., Terrorism and the use of force, 34 Security Dialogue (2003), p. 163. 
49N ote that some authors have argued that there is an emerging customary international law right of self-defense 
that pen-nits states to use force in response to attacks that fall short of an 'an-ned attack'. See: Meessen, K., 
Unilateral recourse to military force against terrorist attacks, 28 Yale Journal of International Law (2003), p. p. 
341,353. 
ýO Garwood-Gowers, A., Self-defence against terrorism in the post 9/11 world, 4 QUT Law and Justice Journal, 
(2004). 
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2.1. ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENCE 
The major area of controversy surrounding the use of self-defence concerns so-called anticipatory self- 
defence, which is the use of force lawfully employed before an armed attack has occurred or to pre\'ent 
a future attack 51 . No international tribunal has yet considered the matter and *in the Nicaragua case the 
ICJ noted that the issue had not been raised and therefore declined from discussing 1t52. 
According to the wording of article 51 of the UN Charter an armed attack must have taken place 
already for the right of self-defence to be triggered. Unlike article 2(4), which makes reference to 
threats of violence, article 51 contains no threats of violence. There are currently two opposing schools 
of thought with regards to the right of anticipatory self-defence 13 . The 
legitimacy of anticipatory self- 
defence has been maintained by those who contend that Article 51 safeguards rather than restricts the 
customary right of self-defence 54 , while the opposite camp supports a restrictionist approach 
55 
. Thus, 
those that argue in favour of the right of anticipatory self-defence suggest that the right of anticipatory 
self-defence under customary international law goes far beyond the UN charter. The main question is 
whether the customary right of self-defence, which appears to include a limited right of anticipatory 
self-defence 56 survived the introduction of article 5 1, which is clearly worded to the contrary. 
51 See: Bothe, M., Terrorism and the legality of pre-emptive force, 14 EJIL (2003), p. 228. 
52 Nicaragua Judgment, para. 195. 
53 See: Mýger, E., and White, N., The twin towers attack: an unlimited right to self-defence, 7 Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law (2002), p. 5. 
54 See relatively: Bowett, D. W., Self-defence in international law, (Manchester University Press, 1958). See also: 
Travalio, G. M., Terrorism, international law and the use of military force, 18 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
(2000), p. 149. 
55 Brownlie, I., in Casscsse, A., (ed), The current legal regulation of the use offorce, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), p. p. 
498-499. 
56 Caroline case. 
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Despite the wordmg of Article 51 to the contrary, some argue that customary law contains no such 
armed attack requirement57 and that anticipatory self-defence against an imminent ffireat is permissible. 
The language of the Caroline case 58 has been widely quoted as establishing, and at the same time 
strictly limiting, those circumstances in which the use of self-defence in anticipation of an attack might 
be permissible. According to US Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, In the Caroline case in 1841, 
force is permissible 'only where it can be shown that there exists a necessity of self-defence, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation' and 'the action taken must 
not be unreasonable or excessive and it must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it'. 
The Caroline principles of necessity and proportionality were further enunciated in the Nicaragua 
case 59. The Carolme case distinguishes between a real and immediate threats of anned attack and a 
potential or speculative risk thereof, while the immediate threat and not a speculative one. It follows 
thus, that the capacity to inflict harm however grave is insufficient, unless it is clear that there are 
indications of real and imminent threat to carry out an armed attack. Following such an observation it is 
arguable that the sole existence of weapons of mass destruction is not per se sufficient to justify the use 
of force under self-defence, since in itself it does not pose an imminent threat. 
There is no sufficient state practice since the introduction of the UN Charter to suggest that there is 
indeed a customary norm as in reality, States avoid invoking anticipatory self-defence as the sole 
justification of armed violence 60 , although Israel 
did exactly that after it had bombed an Iraqi nuclear 
plant in 198 161 . 
However, the Security Council unanimously condemned Israel's actions 62. Whether 
57 Ibid. Also: supra note 54, Travalio, G., p. 145. 
58 See relatively: Higgins R., Problems and process: international law and how wc use it, (Oxford University 
Press, 1994), p. 242. 
59 Nicaragua Judgment, para. 176. 
60 See relatively: Gray, C., International law, (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 112. Also: Pausta, J., 
Legal 
responses to international terrorism, 22 Houston Journal of International Lail' (1999), p. 17. 
6 'ibid. 
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one agrees with the application of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence, there have been cases, such 
as the mass movement of Iraqi troops along the Kuwaiti border in 1990 and information available to 
the UK of an imminent Argentinean invasion of the Falklands, where the victim State refrained from 
pre-empting the initial attack 63 . It can be said that the majority of states are reluctant to accept the right 
of anticipatory self-defence 64 . At the same time, in a nuclear age where it cannot be required for a State 
to passively accept its fate before it can defend itself, the wide interpretation of the contemporary right 
of self-defence seems to be a pragmatic choice that is bound to be reasserted in the future. Numerous 
commentators assert that in certain circumstances it is illogical or unreasonable to require states to wait 
until an 'armed attack' has occurred to defend themselves 65 . State practice and existing norms of 
international law points towards the conclusion that 'anticipatory self-defence is normally unlawful but 
it is not necessarily unlawful in all circumstanceS66 . 
The continuous existence of customary 
international IaW67 along with article 51 of the UN Charter suggests that the right of anticipatory self- 
defence exists but is limited by the requirements of a real and iminediate threat (Caroline case). Thus 
the applicable test in a particular situation is the indication of a real and imminent threat (as opposed to 
potential threat) to carry out an armed attack. Suffice it to say that even if one accepts the legality of 
anticipatory self-defense within the strict limits of Caroline, this would preclude action against States 
62 SC Res. 487 (1981) 19 June 198 1, UN Doc. S/Res/487,198 1. 
63 Arendt and Beck, supra note 17, p. 45. 
64 Greenwood, C., International law and the pre-emptive use of force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda and Iraq, 7 San 
Diego International Law Journal (2003). Also: Myjet, E., and White, N., The twin towers attack: an unlimited 
right to self-defence? 7 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2002), p. 5. 
65 See: Schachter, 0., The right of states, 16 Michigan Law Review, (1984). See also: Warriner, F., The unilateral 
use of coercion under international law: a legal analysis of the United States raid on Libya on April 14,1986,37 
Naval Law Review (1988), P. 58. Also: Franck, T., When, if ever, may states deploy military force without prior 
Security Council authorization? 5 Wash. Univ. JL. and Poly (2003) p. p. 59-60, who notes in this respect that it 
may be necessary to respond to 'challenging transformations' such as increased weapons capability. 
" Oppenheim's intemational law, p. 421. 
67 See: supra note 59, p. 242. 
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which posed potential threats, even if this involved the development of a strategic capability of 
weapons of mass destruction, unless it could be credibly shown that an attack was immment. 
2.2. USE OF FORCE BY NON-STATE 
ACTORS PRE-SEPTEMBER 11 
The fact that international law is traditionally perceived as regulating the relations between states rather 
than individuals as opposes to national laws which regulate the relationships between individuals and 
the state, poses another further controversy with regards to the scope and application of article 51 of the 
UN Charter. Does a state need to be responsible for the attack for the right of self-defence to be 
triggered or does the right of self-defence arise even where a non-state actors is responsible for the 
attacO8? 
The UN Charter was constructed around the immediate post-WW 11 security notion that only States 
were capable of employing force against other States. Thus anything else was seen as an internal affair 
that could be handled through the medium of domestic criminal law, or, where it possessed a 
transnational element, through inter-State criminal cooperation. Terrorism, an immature and unformed 
concept at the time, fitted that mould. 
Although Article 51 does not explicitly state that an 'armed attack' must be committed by a state, the 
Charter framework was intended to govern relations between states and hence, the traditional 
assumption was that such attacks had to emanate from a state. However, this has never meant that an 
68 See: Murphy, S. D., Contemporary practice of the is relating the international law contemporary practice, 96 
AJIL (2002), p. 237. 
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6 armed attack' could only be carried out by the regular armed forces of a state. Even before the Charter, 
the Caroline case of 1837, which set down the customary law of self-defence, indicated that the law 
acknowledges the right of self-defence in response to force employed by non-state actorS69. 
Before the September 11 the predominant View was that self-defence in order to be justified, acts of 
individuals or groups must be attributed to the state. The ICJ further suggested that 'the nature of the 
acts which can be treated as armed attack covers both action by regular military armed forces but also 
the sending by or on behalf of the state of armed groups, bands etC70 . Thus, the ICJ judgment in 
71 Nicaragua , appear to assume that a state must 
be involved in the armed attack. Consistent with this, 
numerous writers specifically assert that state involvement is necessary 72 , and that, 
for self- defence to 
be justified, acts of individuals or groups must be imputed to the state, in accordance with state 
responsibility. Following from this, it has been suggested that coercive action directed against a state 
without any responsibility for an existing or imminent attack could constitute an international wrong 
against that state. The attacks of September 11, which were perpetrated by a terrorist organization and 
the military responses that followed, indicated a different view of the law as accepting that the self- 
defence is triggered by attacks of non-state actorS73 . Despite such reference to the right of self-defence 
the ICJ in the Palestinian Wall case, reaffirmed the view that article 51 of the Charter requires state 
involvement in the attack in order for the right of self-defence to be triggered. Judge Higgins opposed 
69 See: Reisman, M., International legal responses to terrorism, 22 Houston Journal of International Law (1999), p. 
46. 
70 Para. 195. 
71 The ICJ appeared to assume state involvement in the armed attack when it found there to be broad agreement 
that the 'nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting armed attacks' covers both 'action by regular 
military armed forces but also 'the sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups' Nicaragua, para. 
195. 
72 See, for example, Antonio Cassese who notes that unless the attack is imputable to the State and becomes a 
'state act' then 'there can be no question of a forcible response to it. ' 
73 See relatively Jinks, D., State responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law, 84 Chicago 
Journal of International Law (2002), p. 83. 
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the approach of the court suggesting that article 51 of the UN Charter does not limit the exercise of the 
right of self-defence to attacks originating from the state". The court's approach still provokes 
reflections on whether international law recognises the right of self-defence only if the attack originates 
from the state 75 . If we accept that as the law stands requires some state mvolvement M the attack 
76 
, the 
question posed is when a non-state actor becomes attributed to the state? 
Prior to 9/11, the test for attribution required a high degree of co-operation between a state and a non- 
state actor 77 . According to the 'effective control' test applied by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case, the 
conduct of a non-state actor is only attributable to a state if the state has 'effective control' over the 
specific conduct of that non-state actor. A general relationship of control and dependence involving the 
provision of weapons or logistical support for non-state actors is not sufficient78. Although a less 
strmgent test - that of 'overall control- was applied by the Appeals Chamber of the Intemational 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Prosecutor i, Tadic, that case concerned 
individual criminal responsibility and the application of international humanitarian law, rather than 
state responsibihty'9. Given that Article 8 of the Articles on Responsibility of Statesfor Internationally 
Wrongful Acts incorporates an approach that is similar to the 'effective control' test, it is suggested that 
this higher threshold continued to be the applicable standard prior to 9/11. 
74 See: Separate opinion of Judge Higgins, para. 33-34. See also: the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israel security 
Fence and the limits of self-defence, 99 AJIL (2005), p. p. 57-59. Also: Murphy, Self-defence and the Israeli Wall 
Advisory Opinion: an Ipse Dixit from the ICJ? 99 ARL (2005), p. p. 62-76. 
'7 ý See: Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 
July 2004, para. 139. 
76 Judge Higgins, para. 33. 
77 For a detailed study of this question see generally: Jinks, D., State responsibility for the acts of private anned 
groups, 4 Chicago Journal of International Law (2003), p. 83. 
-7sý On state responsibility and terrorist activity see generally: Condorelli, L., The imputability to states of acts of 
international terrorism, 19 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1989), p. 233. 
79 Supra note 52. 
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A state is not usually considered responsible for acts performed by individuals who are not in the 
service of that state. Nevertheless, there may be instances in which a state ought to be Identified with 
actions carried out by certain groups, even when the latter are not formally affiliated to the state 
concerned. The question here is what type and level of control over such individuals or groups must a 
state have in order for them to be deemed to represent that state, with the result that the state is held 
responsible for their actions under international law. In Article 8 of its draft provisions relating to state 
responsibility (3 August 2001), the UN International Law Commission (ILC) proposed that the 
condition for state responsibility for the acts of groups of persons is that these groups are acting under 
the 'instruction', 'direction' or 'control' of the state in carrying out the acts concerned 80 . 
The military intervention in Afghanistan seems to challenge the traditional views on state 
responsibility. In part two of the chapter I will discuss the post-September use of force in order to 
demonstrate the paradigmatic shift of the international community's views with regards to the issue of 
state responsibility. 
3. NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY IN THE USE OF 
FORCE 
The Caroline case standard requirements of legitimate self-defence8' have now matured into the 
principles of necessity and proportionallty82 Necessity requires that the resort to force occur only 
80 International Law Commission, 2001 p. 104. For the principles of attribution see International Law 
Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 53d sess, UN Doc A/5-5110, 
,2 ns I (2001) at iittp. -Ilwww. un. orzllawlilcltextsIState responsibility1res o ibility articles ae. p4dtSeeNicaragua Case 
1986] lCJ Rep 14 [109]-[1101, [115]. A similar test is included in Article 8 of the International Law Commission, 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 53 rd sess, UN Doc A/55/10 (2001): The 
conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person 
or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in 
carrying out the conduct. 
81 See: Dinstein, Y., War, aggression and se4f-defence, (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 205. 
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when no reasonable other options remain to terminate continuation of the armed attaC03 . As the 
Caroline case shows, necessity may imply a degree of immediacy. While an immediate response may 
not be an effective response, the longer the time lapse, the more tenuous the argument becomes as to 
the urgent necessity of unilateral action. 
Proportionality requires that defensive responses be limited to those actions necessary to defeat the 
armed attack 84 - Therefore the right of self-defence is limited by the requirement that the force used not 
exceed the necessary to viably repel the attack and defeat the aggressor. It follows from the necessity 
(and proportionality) test, that self-defence can only be justified where the targets of defensive action 
are clearly identified, such that their contribution to the threat in question can be properly assessed. It is 
unlikely that having achieved these aims, the principle allows the victim State the right to take 
preventive action for the ftiture, as this would justify the perpetual existence of the conflict, would most 
definitely violate territorial sovereignty and would threaten international peace and security85. If we 
accept this latter statement, it logically follows that whereas the size of the response must be 
proportionate to the prior attack, the nature and consequences need not be. This is the only logical 
conclusion one can deduce from the ICJ's Advisory Opinion in the Nuclear Weapons Opinion, where it 
stated that 'the proportionality principle may ... not In itself exclude the use of nuclear weapons III self- 
defence in all circumstances 86 
In conclusion it can be said that the use of force is lawful when it meets the criteria of necessity and 
proportionality and only when the targets have been identified. Thus, the right to use force under self- 
82 Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (6 Aug. 1842), reprinted in 29 BFSP (1840-41), pp. 1129, 
1138. For more on proportionality see: Gardam, J. G., Proportionality as a restraint on the use of force, 20 
. 4ustralian Year Book of 
International Law (1999), p. 161. 
83 Supra note 82, p. 205. 
14 ICJ Nicaragua, para 176. 
85 Supra note 32, p. 162. 
8' Legality of the Threat or Usc of Force of Nuclear Weapons, Ad,. isory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1996), para. 42. 4: 1 
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defence is not automatically justified since an appraisal must be made, in the light of any given 
situation of the necessity and effectiveness of the measures proposed to counter that threat and whether 
the measures proposed are proportionate to such a threat. 
4. THE SCOPE OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF- 
DEFENCE 
The fact that the use of force is justified under international law article 51 of the UN Charter is 
controversial with regards to the scope of collective and individual self-defence 87 . Does the UN Charter 
allows only the collective exercise of individual self-defence or it allows other states whose interest are 
not affected to support the victim state in its exercise of self-defence? The issue is of particular 
relevance to the legitimacy of the use of force by states, which are not affected by the armed attack In 
the sense that they were not the direct victims of the attack 88 
According to the Nicaragua case 'states interests need not be directly affected in order to exercise 
, 89 collective self-defence, provided the injured state requests assistance . Such requests were made by 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to the United States and its allies in august 1990 following the invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait by Iraq9O. The majority of the commentators agree on the fact that collective self- 
defence requires that the state has been requested to intervene by the victim state 91 . As I previously 
mentioned the issue is of particular relevance with regards to the legitimacy of military force employed 
87 Delbruck, Collective self-defence, EPIL, (1992), p. p. 656-659. 
88 See: Evans, M., International Law, (Oxford University Press 2000), p. 605. 
89 See: Nicaragua, para. 104-105. 
90 See: Akerhust, M., Modern introduction to international law, (HarperCollins, 1982), p. 319. 
91 Supra note 6 1, Gray, C, p. 139. 
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by states, which were not the direct victims of the attack. In the military action against Afghanistan the 
US received the assistance of the UK, which was not the direct victim of the attack of September 11. 
The collective nature of the right of self-defence is reflected in various treaties such as the NAT092 and 
the Inter-American treaty of reciprocal assistance 93 , which obliges states to assist the parties attacked, if 
these actions are deemed necessary. Such regional treaties indicate that the right of collective self- 
defence should be exercised if only a request by the state under attack has been made. 
5. USE OF FORCE A UTHORISED BY THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL 
In situations where the use of force in self-defence is not justified the only legitimate use of force is the 
one authorised by the Security Council. Under chapter VII of the UN charter, the Security Council has 
the power to assess a specific situation and take appropriate measures to resolve the situation, including 
the use of force 94 . Under article 42 the Security Council has the ultimate power to authorise the use of 
force, when all other non-coercive measures have been inadequate 95 . Despite such ultimate power to 
authorize coercive measureS96 for the restoration of peace and security, the Council's power is limited 
by the Charter itself Under article 42 of the charter the Security Council can authorize the use of force 
only when it considers that the measures adopted are necessary to maintain the international peace and 
92 See: North Atlantic Treaty, article 5.34 UNTS 243. 
93 See: Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal assistance, Rio de Janeiro, 2 September 1947,21 UNTS 324, Article 
3(l). 
94 For a relevant discussion on the powers of the Security Council see: Santori, V., The UN Security Council 
interpretation of the notion of the threat to peace in counter-terrorism, in Nesi, G., International co-operation in 
counter-terrorism. - the United Nations and regional organisations in thefight against terrorism, (Ashgate, 2006). 
95 Such authorisation took place in Somalia (1992-1993), Rwanda (1994), East Timor (1999). See relatively: 
Chesterman, S., Just war orjust peace. Humanitarian intervention and international laýv, (Oxford University 
Press, 2001), p. 123. 
96 See: SC Res. 841,1993, SC Res. 232,1966, SC Res. 794,1992, SC Res. 713,1991. 
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security. Recently adopted resolutions of the Security Council, such as the 1368 and 1373 which 
condemned terrorist attacks as a threat to international peace and security and resolution 1530 
following the bombing in Madrid suggest that any act of international terrorism amount to a threat to 
peace and security and it falls within the situations where the Security Council may authorize the use of 
force under 41 of the Charter. 
Such threats to the international peace and security do not constitute alone the sole justification for 
coercive measures to be authorized by the Council. It is primarily the role of the Council to assess the 
situation and detennine that non-coercive actions are adequate to resolve the issue. What is important is 
the obligation on states not to give the Council a first opportunity to authorize force, before themselves 
proceed unilaterally, but to refrain from the use of force unless or until such authorization is achieved. 
In order words the Council authorization is a sine qua non for the legitimate use of force other than in 
self-defence. 
As I have mentioned already the Security Council promptly characterized the attacks of September II 
as a ffireat to international peace and security. It also expressed in resolution 1386 its readiness to take 
all necessary measures to address such threats in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter 
of the United Nations. The role however, of the Security Council as an international police was largely 
undermined by the military intervention in Afghanistan, which was unilaterally initiated. The unilateral 
action in the case of Afghanistan illustrates the existing confusion between self-defence and collective 
action under the Charter and it demonstrated the lack of a comprehensive classification of the 




1. SHIFTING OF APPROACHES FOLLOWING 911197 
Prior to 9/11 there had existed no precedent whereby the Security Council had authorised the use of 
force against States that were suspected of directly supporting acts of terrorism". Moreover, with the 
exception of Israel, no other country had employed armed force against non-State actors. This 
statement, however, deserves a notable qualification; M that it was not infi7equent before 9/11 for US 
criminal enforcement authorities to illegally - at least as the principle of territorial sovereignty is 
concerned - abduct persons suspected of having been involved in terrorism, as well as other offences 
99 
. 
In all such instances, a terrorist act had indeed taken place, but it could not be equated to an armed 
attack, and in any event the retaliatory action by the United States was seen as police enforcement, 
rather than action predicated on the inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 UN Charter. 
Similarly, even in the case of State-sponsors of terrorism, the Security Council went only as far as 
adopting sanctions, but these were premised on Article 41 UN Charter (measures falling below the use 
of armed force) and thus did not involve the use of armed force. Hence, it is evident that prior to 9/11 
97 For discussion of this issue see: Byers, M., Terrorism, the use of force and international law after II September, 
51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2002), p. 401, Beard, J. M., Military action against terrorists 
under international law: America's new war on terror , 25 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy (2002), p. 
559; Stahn, C., Terrorist attacks as armed attack: the right to self-defense, article 51(1/2) of the UN Charter, and 
international terrorism, 27(2) Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (2003), p. 35; Arai-Takahashi, Y., Shifting 
boundaries of the right of self-defence - appraising the impact of the September II attacks on Jus Ad Bellum, 36 
International Lai4yer (2002), p. 1081. Also see: Paust, J., Use of armed force against terrorists in Afghanistan, 
Iraq and beyond, 35 Cornell JIL (2002), p. 534. Also: Wedgwood, R., Responding to terrorism: the strikes against 
Bin Laden, 24 Yale JIL (1999), p. 564. 
98 SC Res. 748 (31 March 1992)-, SC Res. 1044 (31 Jan. 1996). 
99 United States v. Yunis, 924 F. 2d 1086 (DC Cir. 1991). 
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we do not possess a model of force against terrorist attacks'00, much in the same way that we lack a 
model of what constitutes terrorist use of force under Article 2(4) UN Charter. 
Following the events of 9/11, the Security Council was prompt in adopting Resolution 1368101. There 
has been some debate on what this resolution actually postulated, but it is clear that all Council 
members viewed the events of 9/11 as a series of acts that are akin to the concept of 'armed attack' 
under Article 51 UN Charter' 02 . This was implicitly affirmed in its preamble affirmation recognising 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. Despite our juxtaposition of the 'clear' view 
of the Council that 9/11 was an act akin to armed attack and the implicitness in its affinnation; this is 
not atypical of Security Council resolution language. For the first time, a Council resolution affirms 
that terrorist acts, although of considerable scale in this case, 'is a threat to international peace and 
security', the corollary of which is the further confirination of the 'inherent right of individual self- 
defence'. Both the affirmation and the confirmation in the last sentence employ language that has been 
lifted verbatim from Article 51 and Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This seemingly innocuous use of 
terminology is revolutionary at best, because it signals the fall of the pre-9/11 model that I discussed in 
my previous sections, whereby I demonstrated that the UN Charter framework was designed not to 
encompass terrorist force, but also that the practical implications of such a venture (had it been fitted in 
the Charter) were impracticable. 
However, the fact that resolution 1368 is a context specific instrument - i. e. adopted in relation to 9/11 
alone - we can ascertain that although the link between the UN Charter's use of force provisions and 
terrorism is a new and real approach (as linked in Resolution 1368), it is wholly unclear whether other 
100 Israel and USA have since the early 1980's argued that terrorist attacks justify the use of force for defensive 
purposes. See Israeli claim of pre-emptive self-defence regarding the interception of a Libyan civil aircraft in 
1986, UN Doc. S, "PV2655/Corr. I (18 Feb. 1986), and US Presidential Directives 62 (22 May 1998) and 63 (22 
May 1998). 
101 SC Res. 1368 (12 Sep. 2001), UN Doc. S/RES/1369,2001, Para. 1. 
102 Murphy, supra note 26. 
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terrorist acts can ever be quantified as constituting armed attacks. Moreover, if on the basis of 
Resolution 1368 the terrorist force employed in the events of 9/11 amounts to a benchmark of armed 
force that is tantamount to an armed attack, we are in the dark as regards the following issues: a) 
whether the benchmark is in fact too high and could thus cover terrorist attacks of a lower intensity, 
and; b) what is the appropriate action under both Articles 51 and 42 UN Charter. We should, therefore, 
be cautious about the long-term effects of this resolution and must by necessity wait for a similar one in 
order to assess what kind of precedent has been created. 
If Resolution 1368 is to become a precedent model, despite its vagueness and uncertainty, one must 
fiimish evidence that there exists significant international support granting the right to individual and 
collective self-defence in other future cases where a terrorist act is imminent or has taken place. It must 
also be noted that Resolutions 1368 and 1373 have so far been the only resolutions asserting the right to 
self-defence in response to terrorist activities. On all other more recent occasions (e. g. the attacks in 
Ball, Madrid or Beslan), the Council has vigorously condemned the terrorist attacks, describing them as 
threats to international peace and security, yet remaining silent on the possible invocation of the right to 
self-defence, despite the fact that many of these attacks were undoubtedly of sufficient gravity in order 
to amount to 'armed attacks'. Therefore, the present author contend that Resolutions 1368 and 1373 
should not be read as a blank authorization for an all-out war on international terrorism. 
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2. STA TE PRA CTICE POS T-SEPTEMBER 11 
Following 9/11 the US President formally proclaimed a national emergency' 03 and Congress passed a 
joint resolution that authorised the President to 'use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organisations or persons he determines planned, authorised, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September H, 2001, or harboured such organisations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
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organisations orpersons' . 
Moreover, the President described the attacks as 'an act of war against the 
US 9 105. In notifying the Security Council that it was acting in individual and collective self-defence, the 
US asserted that 'it had clear and compelling information that Al-Qaeda organisation, which is 
supported by the Taleban regime in Afghanistan, had a central role in the attacks' and that there was an 
4ongoing threat' made possible 'by the decision of the Taleban regime to allow the parts of Afghanistan 
that it controls to by used by [Al-Qaeda] as a base of operations' 06 
On 7 October 2001 and shortly after the US government declared a 'war agamst terror', the US and its 
allies undertook military action against Afghanistan, as a response to the events of September 11 107 and 
in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence'. The objective of the 
campaign against Afghanistan was to attack the base of Al-Qaeda and to compel the Taleban regime to 
108 hand over members of the terrorist organization, which was responsible for the atrocities of 9/11 . Al 
103 Proclamation No. 7463,66 Federal Register 48,199 (18 Sep. 200 1). 
104 Authorisation for Use of Military Force, Public Law No. 107-40,115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
105 Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 
September 11, in 37 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 1347,1347 (20 Sep. 2001). 
106 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the USA to the United Nations, Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, UN Doc. S/2001/946 (7 Oct. 2001), available at: http: //www. un. int/usa/s-2001-946. htm 
107 See: www. un. int. usa/s-2001-946. htrn. 
'()ý See: www. Operations. mod. uk/%, eritas/faq/objectives. htm. The UK expressed the same views in its Letter to the 
Security Council following its alliance with the USA in the Afghan conflict. See: Letter from the Charge d' 
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Qaeda is an organization that had allegedly been involved in many previous operations such as the 
1993 World Trade centre bombing, the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania 
and had also claimed responsibility for the 1993 attack on US special forces in Somalia, as well as 
three separate 1992 bombings intended to kill US military personnel in Yemen' 09 . Evidence suggests 
that the military action pursued by the USA received consensus across the globe. Moreover, NATO's 
North Atlantic Council announced that if the attacks originated from outside the United States, they 
would be 'regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty" 10. Article 5, based on 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, provides for collective self-defence if any of the member States suffers 
an armed attack. Upon finding that the attacks were perpetrated by foreign terrorists, and thereby 
invoking Article 5 of the NATO Treaty"', NATO made no mention as to who would be the target of 
self-defence. No doubt, such an omission provided significant latitude in attacking both a non-State and 
a State entity, but it is devoid of stable normative content, since it is premised on vague and ad hoc 
considerations. Nonetheless, it demonstrates significant support for military action following a high- 
intensity terrorist attack. Similarly, the Organisation of American States (OAS) invoked the self- 
defence provisions of the Rio Treaty' 12 , having first ascertained that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were 
attacks against all American States" 3. Likewise, Australia invoked Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty in 
Affaires of the Permanent Mission of the UK to the United Nations, Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council (7 October 2001), available at: 
http: //www. ukun. org/articles_show. asp? SarticleType=17&Article - 
ID=328. 
109 See relatively: Gus, M., Understanding terrorism: challenges, perspectives and issues, (Sage Publications, 
2003), p. p. 194-195. 
110 Statement by the North Atlantic Council, NATO Press Release No. 124/2001 (12 Sep. 2001), available at: 
ht! p: //www. nato. int/docu/pr/2001/pOl-124e. htm. See also: Daley, S, For first time, NATO invokes joint defence 
pact with US, New York Times, 13 September 200 1. p. 17. 
1 11 Statement by the NATO Secretary-General, Lord Robertson (2 Oct. 2001), available at: 
http: //\vww. nato. int/docu/speech/2001/sO] 1002a. htm 
112 1947 Inter-Arnerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Art. 3(l), 21 UNTS 77. See: Ratner, S. R., Jus ad Bellum 
th 
and Jus in Bello after September 11 96.4JIL(2002), p. p. 905-921. Also: Reisman, W. M., Assessing claims to 
revise the laws of war, 97.4JIL (2000), p. p. 82-90. 
113 Terrorist Threats to the Americas, Resolution 1,24 th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
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agreeing to take part in the Afghan campaign on the side of US-led coalition' 14 . Despite the fact that 
the military intervention was initiated by the US and the UK, the international community 
demonstrated its condemnation of the attacks by supporting the campaign by offering logistic 
assistance. For example Russia, China and India agreed to share intelligence, others offered logistics 
support, while twenty-seven nations granted over-flight and landing rights and 46 multilateral 
declarations of support were obtained' 15 . The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia broke off 
diplomatic relations with the Taleban, and Pakistan agreed to cooperate fully with the United States 
campaign' 16 . Twenty-seven nations granted over fli and landing rights and 46 multilateral 
17 declarations of support were obtained' , while Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, 
18 Italy, Japan' , the Netherlands, New Zealand, Turkey and the United Kingdom offered ground 
troops'19. Even states like Malaysia, which opposed the use of military force on political grounds, 
recognised that such force was 'a legitimate course of action as an act of self-defence' 120 . The 
unanimous international support of the use of force 121 in the case of Afghanistan is relevant to the 
Acting as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 
OEA/Ser. F/11.24, RC. 24/RES. 1/01 (21 Sep. 2001). 
114 Prime Minister John Howard, Government Invokes ANZUS Treaty - Press Conference (14 Sep. 2001), 
available at: http: //australianpolitics. com. au/foreign/anzus/01-09-14anzus-invoked. shtml 
115 Schmitt, M. N, Counter- Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law, George Marshall European 
Centre for Security Studies Paper No. 5 (2002), p. 10; see also, Murphy, S. D, Contemporary Practice of the 
United States Relating to International Law, 96 AJIL 2002, p. 237. 
116 White House Website, News Releases fo r September 2001 (2001) 
<http: //www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2001/09/> at 20 July 2004. 
117 Murphy, S. D., Terrorism and the concept of armed attack. In Article 51 of the UN Charter 43 Harvard 
International Law Journal (2002), p. 41. Also: Murphy, S. D., Contemporary practice of the United States relating 




121 See 56 UN SCOR, 4414th mtg, UN Doc S/PV. 4414 (2001). Iran, Iraq and Malaysia were among the small 
number of states that opposed the use of force in Afghanistan. 
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extent that it can influence responses to similar future situations. Despite the fact that one incident 
alone cannot change the legal regime regardMg the lawful use of force, the events that took place may 
have an impact in the future on the way states address and respond to terrorism. 
3. USE OF FORCE BY NON-S TA TE A CTORS POS T- 
SEPTEMBER 11 
As I already indicated in previous sections self-defence is justified in case there is an attack by a state 
against another state. However, the attacks of September II were perpetrated by a non -state actor. 
This triggers the question as to whether a non-state actor and in particular a terrorist organization once 
responsible fior an attack can be the subject against whom use of force in self-defence might by 
employed. And if so, who is going to be the subject of such an attack? The military intervention of 
Afghanistan revealed the confusion regarding the issues of state responsibility. From a practical point 
of view, it is unlikely that a terrorist organization may be based on the territory of a particular country 
without the connivance of the latter, except where it may be shown that the terrorist organization has 
forcefully occupied part of the country's territory without its consent, and a struggle is being waged to 
fi7ee that territory. Few examples spring to mind, but they are poignant: the first is that of Abu Sayaf, a 
branch of Al-Qaeda based in remote Muslim majority islands in the Philippine archipelago, and 
secondly Al-Qaeda cells and major operatives in lawless Somalia. Whereas M the case of Al- 
Qaeda/Afghanistan- type terrorist attacks against a State, the acts of the terrorist group can be directly, 
negligently or through tacit acquiescence attributed to the State wherein the terrorists are harboured, 122 
in situations such as Abu SayaflPhilippmes the State concerned cannot said to have any involvement. 
Thus in the former case, Article 51 becomes applicable, but in the latter scenario no such assumption 
122 See SC Res. 1378 (14 Nov. 2001), preamble. 
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can be made a priori, because the drafters of the UN Charter did not envisage its application vis-a-vis 
non-State entities, for the sole reason that his would be used as a pretence to employ force and would 
jeopardize State sovereignty and thus international peace and security. 
Despite the many allegations In relation to the relationship between Al-Qaeda and the Taleban 
123 
regime , it has never been proven that the Taleban was responsible for the attacks of September II 
nor that the Taleban had the authority and control over Al-Qaeda required in respect of private entities 
to be legally attributed to it. The evidence released to date regarding Taleban ties to Al Qaeda does not 
suggest that Al Qaeda was under the direction or control of the Taleban in conducting the 9/11 attacks 
or any other acts of international terrorism' 24 . Despite the absence of any concrete evidence the 
majority of states assumed that that the Afghanistan was responsible under the state responsibility 
125 
principle which is a pre-requisite of the law of self-defence . On the other hand others argue that state 
responsibility is not a pre-requisite of the law of self-defence. Such arguments are based on the 
widespread support of the international community of the Afghanistan intervention and suggest that 
there is a paradigmatic shift m the law. 
It is clear from 9/11 and the war in Afghanistan that the 'effective control test for attribution did not 
apply to international terrorist acts in the context of the right of self-defence. It is questionable 
however, whether the threshold for attribution may have been lowered, such that any level of support, 
or even merely hosting or tolerating non-state terrorist groups, is now sufficient to make a state 
responsible for the conduct of those groups or whether the attribution requirement has been removed 
123 United Kingdom Press Release, 10 Downing Street Newsroom, Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the 
United States, Oct. 4,2001, at paras. 21.22 (visited June 18,2002) 
<http: //www. number. I O. gov. uk/news. asp? Newsld=2686>. As to US confin-nation of the facts, see David E. 
Sanger, White House Approved Data Blair Released, N. Y TIVES, Oct. 6,200 1, at B6. 
124 Supra note 3 1, p. 189. 
'25 See: Greenwood, C., International law and the war on terror, 2 International Affairs (2 002), p. 32 1. . 
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altogether, thus pennitting the conduct of non-state groups to qualify as an 'armed attack' even where 
there is no connection at all with a state. The better view is that the attribution requirement remains part 
of the concept of 'armed attack', but the threshold for attribution seems to be lowering. This conclusion 
is supported by two main factors. First, it accords With the legal arguments made by the United States 
in the aftermath of 9/11. Several hours after the attacks the United States asserted that 'it would make 
no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them. This was an 
attempt by the United States to engage the responsibility of the Taleban, and thus of the state of 
Afghanistan, for the terrorist conduct of Al-Qaeda. Moreover, the Wall case reaffirmed the view that 
self-defence arises in response to an attack by or on behalf of a state. 
4. THE PROBLEM OF NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 
IN THE USE OF FORCE A GAINS T TERRORISM 
Where the response to a terrorist attack is of the Taleban/Afghanistan type (i. e. the State that is 
identified with the terrorists), the normal application of the proportionality principle is evident enough. 
Where, however, the attack has originated from the Abu Sayaj7Philippines type (i. e. no relation 
between the State and the terrorists), the situation becomes problematic, since it would defy all logic 
and the foundations of international law and relations to respond with armed force against the entire 
country in which the terrorists are based. On what legal basis would, for example, a victim State of 
Jumma Islamiya, use force against the Philippines, and how much? Lets imagine a scenario where Al- 
Qaeda commits a 9/11 type terrorist attack against country A, but immediately following the attack 
moves all its personnel and headquarters from Afghanistan to country B, which is not friendly to Al- 
Qaeda. In this manner Al-Qaeda transports itself within 10 countries. Against which country will the 
victim-State employ armed force? It is evident from this example that Article 51 UN Charter was 
designed to accommodate only situations where the aggressor possesses a permanent territory, and 
where force is to be employed only in respect of that territory and no other. Countries that argue in 
favour of the war on terrorism and support their claims on the basis of the UN Charter, as has also done 
the Security Council in resolutions that we have already examined, are obviously oblivious to the fact 
that even if they could encompass terrorism Within Article 5 1, it certainly could not be used as a legal 
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basis for attacking terrorists in the territory of the countries where the terrorist group is situated - 
unless of course they are one and the same. 
Therefore, if Article 51 is inapplicable, it follows that the principle of proportionality under such 
circumstances is inapplicable. Save in cases of invitation, the aggrieved State must seek the consent of 
the territorial State, unless the latter is completely incapable of taking charge of the situation, either 
because the terrorists have out-powered the legitimate State, or because it is materially incapacitated 
from taking any action. In such a case, it is presumed that the terrorist group occupies that State, and 
from that poMt onwards the terrorists become a legitimate object of self-defence in the territory that 
they effectively occupy. Therefore, save in the case of the last example, although the magnitude of the 
terrorist attack may be tantamount to an armed attack, the possibility of self-defence is a fiction. Armed 
force may only be employed after consent has been granted, re-confirmIng thus the primacy of the 
suppressionist-cooperation model. 
5. THE PROHIBITION OF PRE-EMPTIVE SELF-DEFENCE126 
Pre-emption 127 is a much broader and therefore much more dangerous doctrine than anticipatory self- 
defence since it is not preconditioned on overwhelming evidence of a horrific attack. Pre-emption 
refers to the 'initiation of military action in anticipation of harmful actions that are neither presently 
126 For a further discussion on preemptive and preventive, see: Greenwood, C., friternational law and the pre- 
emptive use of force. Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda, and Iraq, 9 San Diego International Law Journal (2003), p. 9; 
Walter, B., Force, pre-emption, and legitimacy, 45 Survival, (2003), p. p. 117-130; Freedman, L., Prevention, not 
pre-emption, 26 The Washington Quarterly (2003), p. p. 105-114, at: http: //www. twq. com/ 
127 Sapiro, M., Iraq: the shifting sands of pre-emptive self-defence 97 ARL (2003), p. 600. Also: Taft, W., and 
Buchwald, T., Pre-emption, Iraq and international law, 97 ARL (2003), p. 557. On anticipatory self-defence and 
pre-emptive self-defence see: Garwood-Gowers, A., Pre-Emptive self-defence: a necessary development or the 
road to international anarchy? 23 Australian Year Book of International Law (2004), p. 5 1; Also supra note 126, 
Greenwood, p. 7. 
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occurring nor imminent' . The 2000 
U. S. National Security Strategy explicitly seeks to eliminate the 
requirement of necessity noting that '[w]e must adapt the concept of imminent ffireat to the capabilities 
and objectives of today's adversaries"'. Thus, unlike anticipatory self-defence, which has a tenuous 
justification under a broad construction of the right to self-defence, pre-emption does not have any 
basis whatsoever in international law. Despite such absolute prohibition States like the United States 
that favour pre-emption now advocate changing rules of international law to accommodate their right 
to act pre-emptively against gathering threats and to take defensive action on the basis of their o'"m 
perception of national interest and capabilities. 
5.1 ARGUING AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF A 
PRE-EMPTIVE USE OF FORCE APPROACH 
Whereas in inter-State affairs, and despite the disparity of opinion between a part of US academia, in 
favour of a pre-emptive use of armed force, and European academic thought which generally rejects 
this position, the former is a vocal, albeit a minority view. Even more reason, therefore, that in the 
muddled legal landscape of the relationship between terrorism and the use of force provisions of the 
UN Charter, the possibility of entertaining a pre-emptive position would be untenable' 30 . Nonetheless, 
from a practical point of view, it seems far easier to Investigate and detect possible terrorist activity and 
take speedy action, than would be the case for pre-emptive inter-State use of force. In light of this 
observation and the events following 9/11 the USA has recently articulated its Global War on 
128 Buchanan, A., and Keohane, R., The preventive use of force: a cosmopolitan institutional perspective, at: 
<http: //www. poli. duke. edu/people'facuIty/docs/Preventive`/`20Force. pdf>. 
129 Tlic National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D. C.: The White House, 2002), 
online: <http: //www. whitehouse-gov/nsc/nss. pdf> [National Security Strategy] at 19. 
130 For an opposing view, see: supra note 126, Greenwood, p. 7. zn 
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Terrorism (GWOT) strategy, whereby it views pre-emptive strikes as a necessary component of its 
anti-teiTorist campaign' 31 
Despite some academic support for the official US View that the Security Council and the General 
Assembly have fully recognised the right of self-defence against terrorism in both its pre-emptive and 
32 
reactive dimension' , this is a 
fallacy. Subsequent Council resolutions have only endorsed the 
particular situation of the Afghan campaign' 33 and have in no way consented to the formation of a 
general rule on the matter. What is evident, however, is the tension between the agenda pursued by the 
Council and its inability to find support in other fora, including the General Assembly. Starting with 
Resolution 1526 in 2004 134 the Council clearly intended to solidify its assertion that terrorist attacks 
constitute a threat to international peace and security. The resolution reaffirmed the need to 'combat by 
all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, threats to 
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts'. The new elements here are the 'all means' 
phraseology, which is reminiscent of all Chapter VII resolutions authorising the use of force, such as 
Council Resolution 678 (1991), as is reference to the UN Charter and international law. The former 
must certainly aim at strengthening the right of self-defence under Article 5 1, while the latter seems to 
be an attempt to make something out of regional alliance treaties, but most probably to interpret 
customary international law in such a way as to justify a developing approach outside the Charter 
framework. Since the language employed in Council resolutions is carefully chosen, the use of 'threats' 
to international peace and security, instead of 'breach' must signify some attempt to pursue a pre- 
emptive agenda. 
131 See: United States National Security Strategy (Sep. 2002), available at: http: //www. whitehouse. gov/nsc/nss. html 
132 Beard, J. M., America's new war on terror: the case for self-defence under international law, 25 Harvard JL& 
Public Policy (2002), p. p. 589-90. 
133 SC Res. 1373 (28 Sep. 2001); SC Res. 1378 (14 Nov. 2001). 
134 SC Res. 1526 (30 Jan. 2004). 
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This agenda has further been refined in subsequent Council resolutions. Resolution 1535 reaffirmed the 
Council's determination to combat all forms of terrorism 'in accordance with its responsibilities under 
the Charter of the United Nations' 135 . This clear reference to the Council's Chapter VII powers, while 
still being premised within the context of the anti-Al-Qaeda global effort, is nonetheless a statement of 
authority and intent (agenda) by at least a portion of the Council's permanent members. This agenda is 
predicated on a four-prong determination that did not exist prior to 9/11, and on the basis of which 
armed force would be justified by the Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This is as follows: 
a) general acceptance that terrorism is a threat to international peace and security; b) perpetration of a 
terrorist act or threat thereof by a non-State actor justifies a forceful response akin to inter-State 'armed 
attacks'; c) formulation of 'threat' to encompass the possession of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), since all other cases of preparatory acts of terrorism would unlikely be characterised as falling 
within the ambit of 'armed attack', and; d) where these criteria were found to have been satisfied, 
armed force would be legitimate, irrespective of the vagueness of the direct addressee of the response. 
In this light, Council Resolution 1540136 has attempted to invent the third (c) element of the four-prong 
test we identified above, in order to formulate a pre-emptive approach. After affirmMg that the 
proliferation and delivery of WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, a matter 
which falls within its primary responsibility, it makes note of its grave concern 'by the threat of 
terrorism and the risk that non-State actors ... may acquire, 
develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapons and their means of delivery'. Subsequently, and still in the preamble, the 
Resolution reaffirms to combat terrorism through 'all means'. Interestingly, the proliferation and 
delivery of WMD involves action preparatory of a terrorist attack, facilitating thus the Council's pre- 
emptive agenda. Moreover, since all terrorist groups are in one form or another interested in getting 
135 SC Res. 1535 (26 March 2004). 
136 SC Res. 1540 (28 April 2004). 
120 
their hands on WMD, the Council would not have a hard time justifying the authorisation of force in a 
particular case where it to raise the potentiality of WMD. This prelude to pre-emptive force seems now 
to have become a permanent feature of Council resolutions dealing with terrorism' 37 
Despite my observations, as noted above, regarding a Security Council prelude to the JustIficatIon of 
pre-emptive force to counter and prevent terrorism, such practice is in no way endorsed by the 
international community at large. As this is by definition a negative statement (i. e. that pre-emptive 
force is not permitted), from a methodological point of view, it is unlikely that any one State, or a 
group thereof, would set out to confirm this negation. Indeed, the rejection of such a pre-emptive 
principle would arise in practice where the principle itself is raised before an international body, or 
where its exercise was claimed vis-A-vis a particular State. In both instances, the negating State would 
have to raise its objections, and therefore make its reffisal known to the whole international community, 
lest the principle of acquiescence be attributed to it in the future with regard to the particular principle. 
A series of General Assembly resolutions adopted between 2003 and 2004 138 clearly demonstrate a 
concrete emphasis on inter-State cooperation, avoidance of misinformation and certainly provide no 
basis for pre-emptive action. Indeed, since the emphasis is on co-operation, which is further reinforced 
by the Assembly's work on strengthening the international legal framework with new conventions 
whose primary foundation is the element of co-operation (terrorist financing, terrorist bombings and 
the forthcoming nuclear terrorism convention), it is self-evident, and given the antithesis of the vast 
majority of States to unilateral action in times of a divided Security Council, that the only favoured 
action in the prevention of terrorism is that entailing co-operation. 
137 SC Res. 1566 (8 Oct. 2004). 
'38 GA Res. 57/83 (9 Jan. 2003); GA Res. 58/48 (8 Jan. 2004); GA Res. 58/81 (8 Jan. 2004). 
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5.2 UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF A 
REJECTION OF PRE-EMPTIVE USE OF FORCE 
The president of the United States presented his National Security Strategy in September 2002 by 
which the US will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, but will not 
hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise the right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively' 39 
The US National Security Strategy refers to 'preventing our enemies from threatening us With weapons 
of mass destruction' and thus it clearly refers to the exercise of the right of self-defence pre-emptively, 
which appears to depart radically from the standard of self-defence established in international law as it 
premises self-defence not on the existing attack, nor indeed an imminent attack. The focus is on threats 
represented by terrorist and tyrants but that threats need not necessarily exist, as the US national 
security strategy supports military action against such emergIng threats before they are fully formed, 
with an emphasis to prevention and pre-emption. Such a policy of pre-emption covers situations where 
uncertainly remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. It is unclear how speculative the 
threat might be in order to justify the pre-emptive use of self-defence. In the absence of the attack, 
questions arise not only relating to the evidence of a threat giving rise to self-defence, but also as to 
how proportionally measures can be checked. If the revolutionary view of the US strategy were to be 
accepted, the implications for the law of the use of force and its application in similar situations would 
be very serious. However, it is difficult to accept that such a strategy mark a shift in interriational law, 
since it has been rejected totally by the international community of states. Such general rejection may 
139 See: National Security Strategy. 
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indicate the will of the international community to uphold the collective security system and reject the 
unilateral action as this was advocated by the US. The events of 9/11 and the subsequent war M 
Afghanistan do not provide any basis for the use of force against potential threats posed by terrorist 
groups and their host states, although the United States did make such a claim in its National Security 
Strategy of 2002. Rejection of that claim by most of the international community confirms that, for 
now at least, the right to use force against terrorism is limited to responding to actual 'armed attacks'. 
Whilst there may be exceptional circumstances in which it is justifiable for a state to take anticipatory 
action where a terrorist attack is truly immMent, such action would not fall within the expanded right of 
self-defence that has crystalliZed since 9/11 and the Afghanistan war. 
As it became obvious from the present chapter the terrorist attacks of September 11, and the subsequent 
military responses have led the international community to discuss many issues related to the 
application of the Jus ad bellum in the context of terrorism. I have put forward a nw-nber of reasons 
why the right of self-defense was applicable in relation to attack of 11 September. If one accepts such 
reasoning, it would seem to follow that a situation of armed conflict, if not a "war" in the technical 
sense, exists and has existed since that attack and that consequently the humanitarian law of armed 
conflict is applicable to the conduct of hostilities and the relationship between the adversaries. This 
assessment is correct up to a point, but only up to a point. The fact that the events of the 11 th of 
September can be seen as an armed attack does not automatically signify that the law of armed conflict 
became immediately applicable, or that it would apply to all aspects of the 'war agamst terrorism'. The 
following section addresses briefly the question of whether terrorism can cross the threshold of severity 
so as to trigger the application of Protocol 11 to the Geneva Convention. 
The terrorist attacks against the United States set in motion the events leading to the international 
armed conflict between the US and U. K. against Afghanistan--which is unquestionably covered by the 
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law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law 140 . Although that much is clear, is not yet clear 
whether terrorism cross the threshold of violence to be regarded as armed conflict that triggers the 
applicability of the law of armed conflict 14 1,? Can there be an armed conflict against terrorist 
organisations such as Al-Qaeda? More specifically does the global 'war on terrorism' constitute an 
armed conflict in a legal sense, so as to trigger the application of the Geneva conventions 142'ý These are 
the questions addressed by means of the following section. Such questions become even more 
complicated by the ambiguous statement of the US declaration of the 'war on terrorism 143 . The 
answers to all those questions have direct implication on all aspects of the counter-terrorism measures 
taken post September 11. Indeed if the 'war on terror' is an armed conflict in the legal sense, then all 
140 Note that the question of use of force in self-defence is different from the question of application of 
international humanitarian law to terrorism. See: Kritsiosis, D, On the Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello of Operation 
Enduring Freedom, 96 American Society of International Law Proceedings 35 (2002), referring to the distinct 
spheres, histories, methodological traditions, stages of development, and circumstances of application of these two 
legal regimes: 'As represented in the UN Charter, the laws of the jus ad bellum proceed from the general 
prohibition of the threat or use of force by member States of the United Nations 'in their international relations' 
(Article 2(4)), while the jus in bello of the (GCs and APs) applies to such use of force. Thus, the Preamble to AP I 
declares that 'the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and of this protocol must be fully applied in all 
circumstances to all persons who are protected by those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the 
nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conflict. First 
note that there is no clear relation between the 'armed attack' requirement of the Charter and the 'armed conflict' 
threshold in the Conventions. Indeed, some circumstances (even in the inter-state context) would clearly trigger the 
application of the Conventions without necessarily satisfying the 'armed attack' requirement. See relatively: Jinks, 
D, The applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the 'global war on terrorism', 2 Virginia Journal of 
International Law, 2006. 
141 Some commentators provide a straightforward opinion with regards to the relationship between war and 
terrorism. For example Paul Wilkinson suggests that there can be no doubt that terrorism is a lesser evil than 
modern war, as more people died in the Lebanese civil war than were killed of international terrorism between 
1975-1985. See: Wilkinson, P, Terrorism versus democracy: the liberal state response, (Frank Cass, 2002), p. 219. 
142 In general, there are two circumstances in which at least some provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply- 
an-ned conflicts and occupations. The concept of an 'occupation' within the meaning of Geneva law, though 
important and more complex than might be thought at first, is not analyzed in this Article. Simply put, the concept 
is not central to the analysis of whether any aspects of GWOT are governed by the Conventions. 
1"13 'Although the 'war on terrorism' is not a traditional war', 
Scc: www. whitehouse.,, ox,, iiews/releases/2002/11/20021105-2. html#3 
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aspects of the counter-terrorist measures taken post-September 11 should be govern by the rules of 
international humanitarian law 144 
I have already mentioned in previous chapters that the contemporary terrorist activity appears to be 
employed by non-state actors, transnational organisations, which are dispersed and decentrallsed. The 
ial quest' 1 rise of globally diffuse terronst networks poses controversi ions as to whether terror*sm should 
be conceptuallsed as an armed conflict. On what basis can we differentiate between those acts of 
violence that are best conceptualized as 'crimes' (subject to criminal law), and those acts of violence 
best conceptualized as 'armed conflicts' (subject to the law of armed conflict)? Although the Geneva 
Conventions and its Additional Protocols do not provide an obvious answer to this question, they take 
it for granted that not every act of violence should be perceived as part of an armed conflict. Article 
1(2) of Additional Protocol II states that the Protocol 'shall not apply to situations of internal 
disturbances, and tensions such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a 
similar nature, as not being armed conflicts'. If terrorist attacks are clearly not armed conflicts, the 
implication is that the law of armed conflict is not triggered, and that states should deal with such 
threats through their own domestic criminal law, supplemented if necessary by bilateral and 
multilateral international cooperation agreements. Since 'Isolated and sporadic acts of violence' are 
not armed conflicts, there can be no combatant immunity for the perpetrators, who are therefore subject 
to subsequent trial and punishment for their conduct. 
144 Once an armed conflict begins, international humanitarian law comes into play automatically and it continues to 
apply until the end of the military operations. In both international and non-International armed conflicts, the 
Geneva Conventions, in general, govern the conduct of hostilities for the duration of the 'armed confllct'. Under 
the Geneva Conventions, the general rule is that international humanitarian law applies until the 'general close of 
military operations. It applies in the whole territory of the warring states in case of international an-ned conflict 
and in the case of non-international armed conflict the whole territory under the control of a party. See: See: 
Greenwood, A, Scope of application of international humanitarian law, p. 51. 
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PARTTHREE 
1. TERRORISM AND NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED 
CONFLICT 
The core provision of treaty law applicable to non-international armed conflict is Common article 3 of 
the Geneva conventions. Although Common Article 3 does not define what constitutes an 'armed 
conflict not of an international character' the authoritative ICRC commentary, besides suggesting a 
145 high threshold of violence, a 'enuMe armed conflict' , provides tools to assess whether the threshold 
has been reached 146 . These criteria identify four kinds of circumstances that constitute 'armed conflicts' 
within the meaning of Common Article 3. Therefore, they provide a useful, if not indispensable, 
general framework for evaluating the applicability of Common Article 3 to any given situation. 
Among the methods offered to help lawyers to determine the legal nature of a conflict are to check if 
the 'Government is obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces against insurgents organised 
as military and in possession of a part of the national territory'or if the 'government has recognised the 
insurgents as belligerents. ' Sporadical acts committed by terrorist groups do not really fulfil the 
requirements set in Common article 3. 
Common article 3 is further supplemented by the additional protocol 1I of 1977, which is applicable to 
armed conflicts between forces of a High Contracting Party and other armed forces that are 'under 
145 Pictet, J., Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: 1 Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, International Committee of 
the Red Cross, Geneva, 1952, P. '7,0. 
'-'6 lbid, p. p. 49-50. 
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responsible command, [and] exercise such control over a part of its territory 147 as to enable them to 
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol'. The scope of 
Protocol 11 is ftirther clarified in Article 1(2), which provides that the Protocol 'shall 148 not apply to 
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and 
other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts. ' All are agreed that the negative definition 
in Article 1(2) is a valid definition of what falls below the threshold of armed conflict. 
Protocol 11, arguably represent important contributions to the definition of 'armed conflict. ' First, the 
definition arguably implies that an 'armed conflict' exists only if the armed group exercises control 
over a portion of the state's territory. Thus the threshold of application is too high and excludes small 
scattered groups acting independently or lacking the central command. Thus, a group of people who are 
terrorist in the eyes of the government carries out an attack on the territory of the State where they 
come from and where they have their headquarters. History is replete with such examples, the most 
known being probably the IRA in Northern Ireland, the ETA in France and Spain, the Red Faction 
Army in Germany, etc. Most of these situations were and still are considered as sporadic internal 
disturbances that are falling below the threshold of applicability of international humanitarian law. In 
other words, these attacks do not usually amount to an armed conflict and fall within the domestic 
jurisdiction of States and are, thus, impervious to international legal regulation, barring the exception of 
the applicability of human rights law. 
In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the ICTY the definition arguably classifies internal hostilities as an 'armed 
conflict' only if the armed violence is 'protracted. ' The 'protracted' armed violence requirement, 
properly understood, does not restrict the application of hunianitarian law in any appreciable way, but 
147 With regards to the actual determination of whether there is actual control -the state in whose territory the 
conflict takes place can decide on whether the conditions mentioned in article 1,1, are fulfilled. See relatively: 
Deter, 1, The law of war, p. 206. 
148 Article 1(2) of additional protocol 1. 
127 
is merely a restatement of the general rule excluding 'Isolated and sporadic acts of violence' 
(disorganized and short-lived) from the scope of humanitarian law. The International Criminal Court 
(ICC) Statute also provides a more elaborate definition of internal 'armed conflict' than Common 
Article 3. The ICC Statute identifies several acts as war crimes when committed in internal armed 
conflict. Specifically, the Statute criminalizes 'serious violations of Common Article 3' committed in 
4armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to situations of internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar 
nature 149. 'Several aspects of the ICC Statute's approach should be emphasized. First, the Statute adopts 
the general framework of the Geneva Conventions in that it offers no affirmative definition of 'armed 
conflict. ' Second, the Statute codifies the ICRC Commentary's view that internal 'armed conflicts' 
within the meaning of Common Article 3 do not include 'situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence. ' Third, the Statute adopts the ICTY's 
'protracted armed violence' formulation but does not apply this requirement to Common Article 3 
conflicts. 
All the aforementioned point to the conclusion that a non-Mternational armed conflict is determined 
after a factual assessment of the intensity, nature and duration of violence. Furthermore, depending on 
the intensity of the non-international armed conflict, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions or 
Additional Protocol II could be applicable. 
The parties to non-international armed conflict may be governmental authorities and armed groups or 
two or more armed groups 150 . 
The non-state groups that may constitute parties to the conflict must be 
capable of identification as a party to the conflict and have attained a certain degree of internal 
149 ICC Statute, art. 8 (2)(d). 
150 See: ICC statute, article 8.1. ( f) 
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organisation"'. While they must be capable of observing the rules of international humanitarian law, 
compliance with the rules is not itself a criterion. Nor it control of territory a requirement to constitute a 
party to a non international armed conflict 152 . Non -international armed conflict generally arises as the 
ICTY noted within a state, although the conflict need not unfold within one state's geographical 
borders' 53 
Could the Al-Qaeda attacks be characterised as a non-mternational armed conflict within the meaning 
of Protocol Il of the Geneva Convention or under common article 3? As I have said in the previous 
sections article 2 of the Additional Protocol 11 proVides for 'conflicts which take place in the territory 
of a high contracting party between its armed forces and dissident armed groups or other organised 
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to 
enable them to carry out sustained and concerned military operations and to implement this protocol'. 
In this case, there was no control over territory by Al-Qaeda and certainly no willingness to implement 
the protocol. Al-Qaeda may function under an organised and responsible command, but it is not a 
command structure of a type contemplated by the protocol. In any event, Article 4(2)(d) of Protocol 11 
explicitly prohibits acts of terrorism during non-international armed conflicts. 
Similarly common Article provides no definition of a non-interriational armed conflict. It simply states 
that it applies in 'case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of 
one of the High Contracting Parties. ' The U. S. is a High Contracting Party to the four Geneva 
Conventions, and the attack occurred on its territory. While precisely because common Article 3 is so 
vague, and because it is the residual provision, it is interpreted to apply to all situations that can be 
151 See: ICRC Report on international Humanitarian Law and Contemporary Armed Conflict, p. 19. 
152 Although it is ajurisdictional threshold for the application of additional protocol 11. 
153 See: Duffy, H., The war on terror and theftamework of international law, (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
p. 222. 
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considered as constituting armed conflicts. Can the Al-Qaeda attacks be considered as an act of war 
committed during a common Article 3 conflict? The ICRC Commentary on common Article 3 notes 
that the question of what constitutes an armed conflict not of an international character: 'was the 
burning question which arose again and again at the Diplomatic Conference. The expression was so 
general, so vague, that many of the delegates feared that it might be taken to cover any act committed 
by force of arms-any act of anarchy, rebellion, or even plain banditry. ' While the delegates shied 
away from defining conflict, they did discuss certain criteria that could be considered as relevant' 54 
These are set out in the Commentary, and as it notes, they 'are useful as a means of distinguishing 
genuine armed conflict from a mere act of banditry or an unorganised and short-lived insurrection. ' 
However, the Commentary goes on to state that: 'it must be recognized that the conflicts referred to in 
Article 3 are armed conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities-conflicts, in 
short, which are in many respects similar to an international war, but take place within the confines of a 
single country. In many cases, each of the Parties is in possession of a portion of the national 
territory 155 , and there is often some sort of front. ' It is obvious that by no stretch of the imagination can 
one construe the Al-Qaeda attacks of September 11 as an armed conflict within the meaning set out in 
the Commentary to common Article 3. Perhaps if we reach the point where Al Qaeda has actually 
formed militia or organised armed forces (combatants) within U. S. territory, and engages the U. S. 
armed forces in military battle, then we can speak of a non-international armed conflict between Al 
Qaeda and the U. S. But in that case, Al-Qaeda would also have to satisfy at least some of the other 
154 Commentary IV Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, Geneva, 
International Committee of the Red Cross 1958) p. 35, para. 1, p. 36. 
155 While CA 3 does not require territorial control by the non-state party, the conflict must still occur "in the 
territory" of a High Contracting Party. Some analysts construe this requirement to mean that the conflict must be 
limited to the territory of a High Contracting Party. 28 For this element alone, terrorist attacks on civilian targets in 
New York may suffice. 
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criteria set out in the Commentary for distinguishing genuine armed conflict from banditry, or 
terrorism, for that matter. 
According to the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, as well as under the definitions of the newly established permanent International Criminal 
Court, hostile acts must be 'protracted' in order for the situation to qualify as an 'armed conflict. ' In 
fact, the Yugoslavia Tribunal has specifically stated that the reason for this requirement is to exclude 
the application of humanitarian law to acts of terrorism. ' On the other hand, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights says that intense violence of brief duration will suffice. Likewise, it 
remains to be seen whether the mere gravity of damage resulting from the September 11 attacks will, In 
retrospect, become a 'decisive point of reference for the shift from the mechanisms of criminal justice 
to the instruments of the use of force'. Whether or not the conflict needs be protracted, and whether or 
not intensity can take the place of duration, the beginning and end must be identifiable to know when 
humanitarian law is triggered, and when it ceases to apply. 
Traditionally, acts of international terrorism were not viewed as crossing the threshold of intensity 
required to trigger application of the laws of armed conflict. Some authority to the contrary is 
suggested by historical precedents involving the use of military force against extraterritorial non-state 
actors as indicative of 'war. ' But these examples still fall to make the case that use of such force 
necessarily triggers the law of armed conflict. With regards to a non-international armed conflict, the 
use of force employed must cross a certain threshold of intensity and be distinguished from sporadic 
and isolated acts of Violence. Arguably the resort to violence witnessed on September 11 reached that 
threshold. It is however, the second part of the test that is the critical one: can an entity such as Al- 
Queda possess the characteristics of an armed group as understood by international humanitarian law, 
such that it can be a party to a non-intemational armed conflict? The key question is whether they have 
sufficient identifiable scope and membership, suffioient organization and structure and a capacity to 
observe the rules on international humanitarian law. In the case of AI-Queda the element of identifiable 
scope and membership is problematic since Al-Queda consists of loosely connected cells. Although 
some suggest otherwise, it is widely considered, even post 9/11 that terrorist organizations lack the 
characteristics of armed groups and that international humanitarian law is not the most appropriate 
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legal framework to govern the relationship between persons associated with terrorist activities and 
those states executmg the 'war on terror' 56ý 
In fact, the 'war on terror' is clearly not an armed conflict at all. It consists of a multi-faceted counter- 
terrorism campaign, some aspects of which involve the use of military force, most of it carried out in 
States where there is no armed conflict, although aspects of the counter- terron sin campaign assume the 
characteristics of anued conflict where the US attacks a State considered to be harbouring or assisting 
Al Qaeda, as it did in Afghanistan. In this case, it would be an intemational anned conflict against the 
attacked State, rather than Al-Qaeda, since Al-Qaeda is not a State. Otherwise, the so-called 'war on 
terror' which the US is waging against Al Qaeda does not satisfy the conditions of the Geneva 
Conventions to be considered as an armed conflict. The view that armed conflict may arise between 
states and organizations such as Al-Qaeda has relatively little support, even in the post September II 
era. As one commentator argues 'until now the law of armed conflict has always been considered to be 
a matter between states, but the law has been moving towards recognizing as quasi-states dissident 
armed factions and authorities representing liberation movements. It might be possible to argue that a 
state can be involved in armed conflict against an organization' 57 . However, as the law stands at the 
present moment such an argument does not reflect the contemporary legal reality of international 
humanitarian law'. 
While asserting that an armed conflict can be waged with an entity such as Al-Qaeda may not be an 
accurate assessment of the laws as it stood at the time of the attacks, the current debate highlights this 
as an era deserving further analysis and where future development will take place. There are however, 
156 Supra note 1 -53. 
157 Rogers, A., Terrorism and the laws of war. - September II and its aftermath, (21 September 200 1), found at: 
ww\N,. Crii-nesofwar. org. 
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some conclusions that we can draw at this stage for the relationship between terrorism and international 
humanitarian law. 
The most important conclusion that we can draw with regards to the aforementioned relationship is the 
fact that there are clear criteria for assessing the existence of an armed conflict, which trigger the 
applicability of international humanitarian law. Therefore, the mere fact that a state may characterise a 
group as terrorist group does not in itself have any legal significance. 
Perhaps the critical question for determining whether the laws of armed conflict apply here is whether 
the terrorist attacks were a sufficiently organized and systematic set of violent actions that they crossed 
a sufficient level of intensity to be considered 'armed conflict'. There can be no doubt that, whatever 
the 'level of intensity' required to create an armed conflict, the gravity and scale of the violence 
inflicted on the United States on September 11 crossed that threshold. However, given the importance 
of the legal qualification of armed conflict and of related violence for the content of the applicable law, 
evaluation is necessary to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a particular situation crosses the 
threshold of violence to be considered as an armed conflict. Moreover, central element of the notion of 
armed conflict is the existence of 'parties' to the conflict. The parties to an international armed conflict 
are two or more states (or states and national liberation movements), whereas in non-intemational 
armed conflict the parties may be either states or armed groups - for example, rebel forces- or just 
armed groups. In either case, a party to an armed conflict has a military-like formation with a certain 
level of organization and command structure and, therefore, the ability to respect and ensure respect for 
IHL. However, much of the ongoing violence taking place in other parts of the world that is usually 
described as 'terrorist' is perpetrated by loosely organized groups (networks), or individuals that, at 
best, share a common ideology. On the basis of currently available factual evidence it is doubtful 
whether these groups and networks can be characterised as a 'party' to a conflict within the meaning of 
IHL 
Having ascertained in the present chapter that the 'war model' is not applicable in the struggle against 
terrorism, I will proceed in the following chapter to a discussion of law enforcement measures and how 
they are implemented and mfluenced by the war on terrorism doctrine. Antonio Cassese has pointed 
out that '[w]hile it is obvious that in this case 'war is a misnomer', 'the use of the term 'war' has a huge 
psychological impact on public opinion. It is intended to emphasize both that the attack is so serious 
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that it can be equated in its evil effects with a state aggression, and also that the necessary response 
exacts reliance on all resources and energies, as if In a state of war" 58. On the other hand, President 
Bush and others speaking on behalf of the U. S. administration have clearly suggested that some aspects 
of the War on Terror will not involve armed conflict, permitting us to conclude that In their view, those 
aspects, at least, will not be covered by humanitarian law. On September 20,2001, President Bush said 
in an Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 'The war will be fought not just 
by soldiers, but by police and intelligence forces, as well as in financial institutions' 59ý . These different 
battlefields will be discussed in the following chapter. 
CONCLUSION 
My analysis thus far has concentrated on whether a terrorist act can be assimilated to the concept of an 
6armed attack' in order for self-defence to be justified. I have shown this to be possible, albeit under 
very strict and limited circumstances, certainly not on pro-active basis, and within the ambit of the UN 
Charter. A community consensus now appears to exist that armed attacks may be conducted by non- 
state actors, i. e. terrorist organizations. Looking at the reaction of States and international organizations 
to the events of 9/11 and the military action against both the Taleban and al-Qaeda, I concluded that 
there is a perceptible shift in the international community's understanding of the law of self-defence. 
However, I have argued m this chapter that the UN Charter is problematic in determining whether or 
not anything equivalent to an arined attack could have taken place against a State by a non-State entity. 
The only real and tested model at present is that of Security Council Resolution 1368, following the 
events of 9/11, which recognised in that narrow particular context a right of self-defence in accordance 
158Cassesse, A, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law, 12 European 
Journal of International Law (200 1), p. 993 
159 <http: //wxNw. whitehouse. gov/newsreleases/2001/09/20010920-8. 
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with the UN Charter. Interestingly, however, at the same time that Resolution 1368 was adopted the 
General Assembly made no reference in its own resolution to that right. Despite the attempts of the 
USA and UK to ensure a Council resolution prior to the 2003 Iraqi conflict - although strictly speaking 
the Iraq campaign did not concern terrorism directly - no such resolution authorising the use of armed 
force was forthcoming, thus confirming our hypothesis that the vast majority of States is unsupportive 
of the pre-emptive approach of countermg terrorism, thus clearly favourmg the suppressionist 
approach, albeit M the following ways: a) through inter-State cooperation in the criminal justice field; 
b) use of armed force on the basis of the 9/1 1-type Security Council resolutions, and; c) use of force 
under Article 51 UN Charter where the terrorist organisation is deemed to be an agent of the State 
wherein it has taken refuge. This is true notwithstanding the fact that subsequent to the events of 9/11 
the Security Council has adopted a series of resolutions whereby it has characterised terrorism as a 
threat to international peace and security and has thus attempted to bring about language that would 
justify future pre-emptive action against non-State entities. 
Despite the fact that states appeared to accept the application of article 51 to the military actions in 
Afghanistan, the military intervention of Iraq and the National Security Strategy came to place more 
emphasis on the collective security system of the UN. Indeed the pre-emptive use of force doctrine has 
been totally rejected. Thus, to a limited degree a state may 'anticipate' self-defence in the sense 
described by Sir Humphrey Waldock: 'where there is convincing evidence not merely of threats and 
potential danger but of an attack being actually mounted, then an armed attack may be said to have 
begun to occur, though it has not passed the fi7ontier" 60 . The Security Council action after September 
II can be cited to support anticipatory self-defence in cases where an anned attack has occurred and 
convincing evidence exists that more attacks are planned, though not yet underway. 
160 Waldock, G, 
(1996 
), p. 498. 
The regulation of the use of force by individual states in international law, 81 Haque Recueil 
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By accepting the legality of using force in self-defence against the Taleban and Al-Qaeda following 
9/11, the international community recognized the existence of an expanded right of self-defence that 
permits the use of military force against states that host or harbour non-state terrorist groups that have 
already committed serious attacks. This new right still requires the actions of non-state terrorist 
organizations to be attributable to a state, but the threshold for attribution is now significantly lower. 
Whether this expanded right of self-defence will ultimately prove to be a necessary and desirable 
development in response to new threats in the international system remains to be seen. However, it is 
clear that the current notion of self-defence is now a broader, more uncertain concept that it was 
previously. While the development of an expanded right of self-defence against terrorism is less 
troubling than the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence proposed by the United States In 2002, it carries 
a similar risk of abuse by states. Military force alone will not defeat terrorism, but where such force is 
clearly necessary it is preferable for military action to be taken by way of Security Council 
authorization. Thus, the right to take unilateral action in self-defence against terrorism should be relied 
on only in exceptional circumstances. The post-9/1 I right to use force in self-defence against states that 
host or harbour terrorist organizations that have already committed serious terrorist attacks raises three 
main concerns. The first relates to the range of targets that may be the subject of force in self-defence. 
Given that transnational terrorist organisations may have cells M many different states, the post-9/1 I 
right to use force against states that host or harbour such groups could potentially allow each of these 
states to be targeted by military action. At present, the doctrine of harbouring or hosting appears to 
make no distinction between a state that hosts or harbours one terrorist who poses little ongoing threat, 
and another state that hosts an entire terrorist network which continues to commit acts of violence. To 
avoid the uncertainty of having multiple targets it is necessary to refine this doctrine, so that it provides 
a more concrete basis for identifying those states whose assistance or acquiescence in terrorist activity 
makes it truly necessary to use military force in self-defence. Unless this is done, there will remain a 
danger that states may use the new right of self-defence against terrorism as means of removing 
unfriendly govermnents or pursuing their own strategic interests. 
The third and most significant concern about the extended right of self-defence against terrorism relates 
to evidence provision and the authority of states to make unilateral decisions to respond with force. 
Unless states are required to present clear and convincing evidence of the need to use military force in 
self-defence against a state that harbours or hosts terrorist groups, there is a danger that this new right 
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of self-defence may be abused. Establishing a Security Council-based mechanism of this nature is vital 
to ensuring the legitimacy of ffirther military responses to terrorism. While the right of a victim state to 
act in self-defence does not require prior approval from the Security Council, it is clearly preferable for 
military action against terrorism to be conducted under the umbrella of Security Council authorisation. 
The doctrine of pre-emptive strikes formulated in the recent US National Security Strategy proposes to 
adapt this concept to new perceived threats in a way that would constitute an unacceptable expansion of 
the right of anticipatory self-defence. What it is clear though is that terrorism does not constitute a free- 
standing aspect of jus ad bellum and the response to it is justified only to the extent that accords With 
the otherwise applicable framework of the law of self-defence. 
I argue that although the 'war on terror' may include the military action in Afghanistan, it is not per se 
an armed conflict M the legal sense. There can be no humanitarian law conflict without identifiable 
parties. 'Terror' or 'terrorism' as a phenomenon cannot be a party to the conflict. As a result, a 'war on 
terror' cannot be a humanitarian law event. Likewise, terrorism in general and the September II attacks 
along with the subsequent fight against terrorism is not an armed conflict. Is one of these situations 
when it is said that a war is declared when this expression is used as a euphemism for saying that there 
are severe differences and considerable hostility between the parties 161 . Thus, the attacks can be 
considered as a breach of various international conventions against terrorism, as a crime against 
humanity but not as war crimes. The classification of the September 11 attacks as war crimes depends 
on them constituting the initiation of, or taking place in the context of an armed conflict. If they do, the 
rules of international humanitarian law apply to those acts-which has consequences for rules on 
permissible targeting and detention of persons in connection with an armed conflict and serious 
violations of these rules may be prosecuted as war crimes. However, the September II attacks cannot 
161 Similar declaration of war made by US Senator, Mr. Jesse Helms who stated: the Serbs declared war on the 
world. See relatively: Wall Street Journal, 8 June 1995. 
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THE CHANGING PATTERN OF INTER-STATE 
COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTION 
INTRODUCTION 
The events of 9/11 have had enormous repercussions in terms of the awareness of states as to the 
danger posed by terrorist groups. This is evidenced by the adoption of new security doctrines, such as 
the American National Security Strategy', the European Security Strategy", the Report of the UN High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 3. All of these documents acknowledge the dangers 
posed by transnational terrorism especially in combination with the presence of 'falling states' and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The recent activities of transnational terrorist groups led 
to the US 'war on terror' doctrine, which by itself elevates the status of terrorists from crimMals to 
enemies. However, as I have demonstrated in my previous chapter terrorist activity in general cannot 
be characterized as an armed conflict. Thus, the traditional view according to which terrorists were held 
responsible for their unlawful acts under domestic law remains valid. The characteristics of 
contemporary terrorist activity however, indicates the need for the development of more central 
mechanisms beyond national states to effectively deal With the problem. 
In the first chapter of the thesis I considered the counter-terrorism models deriving from the various 
counter-terrorism conventions adopted by the UN General Assembly. It became evident that the 
1 Available at: http: //www. whitehouse. Rov/nsc/nss. pdf 
IA Secure Europe in a Better World -A European Security Strategy, adopted by the European Council on 12 
December 2003. Available at <http: //ue. eu. int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367. pdf>. 
3 Annan, K., In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, 21 March 2005. at: 
http: /ýý%, xN, x%,. un. org/largerfreedom. 
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terrorist bombing convention establishes an inter-state co-operation model. It is obvious that all these 
conventions require contracting states to introduce appropriate national legislations in their own 
jurisdiction in order to punish the specific crimes mentioned by each convention. Regrettably, 
implementation of these conventions has not been easy and, more importantly, no operational 
mechanism has been established to evaluate measures undertaken by the states parties. However, by 
way of resolution 1373 of 28 September 200 1, it was decided by the UN Security Council that member 
states are under obligation to prevent the financing of terrorism and the sheltering of the performers of 
terrorist acts. Under paragraph 6 of this resolution, it was decided that member states were obliged to 
report the concrete measures taken to implement their obligations within 90 days to a committee set up 
for this purpose. Thus, at the global level the United Nations Security Council assumed a central roleý 
in the fight against terrorism by created mechanisms and subsidiary bodies such as the Counter- 
terrorism Committee, which monitors state practice and obliges states to promote international 
cooperation in the suppression of terrorism. Similarly regional bodies put the struggle against terrorism 
at the core of their activities. Likewise there have been terrorism specific developments within the EU 
and the Council of Europe. More notably the introduction of the European Arrest warrant in 2002 
which provides for the extradition procedure in Europe was particularly welcome because it removed 
the previously existing limits to extradition such as the political offence exception. The multiplication 
of efforts to develop a coordinated response to terrorism both at the global and regional levels gave to 
the counter-terrorism approach a more centrallsed dimension. 
My aim in the present chapter is to examine the approach that emanated from the co-operative and 
compulsory mechanisms under relevant Security Council instruments and ascertain to what degree they 
leave any room for the adoption of unilateral action, Mter-State co-operative model, or whether the 
4 As the Chairman of the CTC noted: counter-terrorism has gone global with the United Nations at the centre. See: 
4734d' meetin- of the Security Council, 4 April 2003, p. 3. S/PV. 4752. 
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Council has assumed a centralised decision-making authority. As it will become evident the atrocities 
of September 11 have generated an international consensus to effective collective enforcement. 
However, to what an extent this collective enforcement model leaves room for a selective application 
of procedures that undermine rather than safeguard international cooperation is an open matter for 
discussion. 
In the aftermath of II September, terrorism was elevated to the status of a threat to international peace 
and security, and a comprehensive framework of legal measures was established aiming at preventing 
and eliminating it. Resolution 1368 of 12 September 2001 expressed the readiness of the Security 
Council to take all necessary steps to respond to the attacks, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in 
accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter. The Resolution unequivocally condemned the 
attacks, and recognized the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the 
Charter. Furthermore, the Resolution stressed the accountability of the perpetrators, organizers and 
sponsors of the attacks, and of those responsible for aiding, supporting or harboring them. 
Two weeks later, on 28 September, Security Council Resolution 1373 laid down a legal framework in 
which specified measures must be taken by states in order to eliminate terrorism. This resolution falls 
within the scope of enforcement action by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
However, it does not envisage the use of force as an exclusive, or regular, means of dealing with 
terrorism. Rather, it deploys a wide range of measures, with co-operation between states and the 
establishment of a standing committee to monitor implementation forming the center-piece. It also 
recalled an earlier resolution, Resolution 1189 of 1998, which affinned the duty of every state to 
refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another state, or 
acquiescing In organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts. 
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1. RESIDUAL FORMS OF INTER-STATE CO-OPERATION 
POST- SEPTEMBER 11 
In the aftermath of the Bali bombing attack, the Security Council remmded member States of their 
obligation to cooperate among themselves and the Council itself on the basis of Resolution 1373 5. The 
same was repeated in verbatim language in subsequent resolutionS6. In all these resolutions, the 
Council inserted a preambular phrase that deserves particular mention. Thus, Resolution 1438 notes 
that the Council is 'determined to combat terrorism in accordance with its responsibilities under the UN 
Charter'. Since, in the words of the Council, even domestic terrorist bombings are a threat to 
international peace and security, the Council views its potential role as encompassing both domestic 
and international teiTorism. 
The significant difference between the cooperation provisions of the 1998 Bombing Convention and 
those contained in Resolution 1373 is that the former establishes an inter-State approach, whereas the 
latter creates two new regimes: a) inter-State co-operation between particular States that would under 
other circumstances be unwilling to exchange information or succumb to each other's demands for 
mutual legal assistance, and; b) co-operation between a State and the Council itself The first of these 
regimes may be problematic in practice, but it was certainly intended as the creation of an obligation 
towards countries that would otherwise not become parties to the 1998 Terrorist Bombings Convention 
and which would never enter into bilateral relations with countries allied to the USA. Although from a 
practical point of view it is very difficult to monitor their efforts in exchangMg information and other 
intelligence - it also defeats the purpose of the obligation - it may be invoked against such unwilling 
countries in the future as constituting a material breach of an obligation. 
5 S. C. Res. 1438 (15 Oct. 2002). 
S. C. Res. 1440 (24 Oct. 2002); S. C. Res. 1465 (13 Feb. 2003); S. C. Res. 1530 (11 March 2003). 
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The adoption of Resolution 1373 7, which is in effect a mini convention on terrorist financing and 
terrorist bombings, changed the international legal landscape. All States are now under a strict and 
monitored obligation to prevent terrorist attacks, including by early warning systems and exchange of 
information cooperation; afford greater assistance to each other; find ways of accelerating and 
intensifying exchange of information regarding explosives and sensitive materials, including weapons 
of mass destruction. If this was not enough, Resolution 1373 called on States to become parties to the 
1998 Bombing Convention. An examination of recent Security Council resolutions dealing With the 
issue of terrorist bombings suggests a divergence from the 1998 Bombing Convention. Whereas the 
Convention is inapplicable where there does not exist an international element, in the cases of the 2002 
Chechen hostage crisis in MOSCOW8, the February 2003 Bogotd bombing blast9 and the Madrid train 
bombing incidentlo, the Council relying on its prior Resolution 137311, characterised these incidents as 
threats to international peace and security and urged States to adhere to their obligations to cooperate 
on the basis of Resolution 1373 12 . All these incidents took place within one country and were 
committed by groups indigenous to these countries and would not normally have come under the scope 
of the Convention. Since Resolution 1373 is binding on all States on account of Article 25 UN Charter, 
the jurisdictional and co-operative obligations established under the Resolution take precedence over 
obligations stemming from the 1998 Convention. This again is defendable on the basis of Article 103 
7 See: Second Progress Report on terrorism and human rights, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/2002/35 of 17 July 2002, 
para. 25-29. 
8 S. C. Res. 1440 (24 Oct. 2002). 
9 S. C. Res. 1465 (13 Feb. 2003). 
10 S. C. Res. 1530 (11 March 2004). Although it later transpired that Al-Qaeda was responsible for the attack, the 
Council relied on the statements of the Spanish government and named ETA as being the culprit. 
" Rosand, E., Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the fight against terrorism, 
97,4JIL (2003), p. 333. 
12 From a practical point of view, what S. C. Res. 1373 cannot do is dictate the various procedures that are 
customarily attuned on the basis of bilateral or multilateral agreements, such as extradition (including the aut 
dedere principle) and mutual legal assistance, but it can demand for the lifting of bank secrecy as this has not 4! 1 
traditionally been left to inter-State settlement. 
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of the UN Charter, whereby obligations accruing from the UN Charter supersede all other obligations 
that a State may have assumed. This observation, moreover, reinforces the unilateral internal model and 
brings it closer to a form of universal jurisdiction. It also seems to unilaterally dispel the inhibitions 
inherent in the 1998 Convention whereby States preferred to deal on their own with internal bombings. 
Obligations under Article 103 UN Charter, however, should not be in conflict with established human 
rights norms. In considering the UK's periodic report in December 2001, the UN Human Rights 
Committee was concerned that legislative measures adopted by the government could have 'far- 
reaching effects' requiring derogations from human rights obligations. During questioning the UK 
argued that it was fulfilling its obligation under Resolution 1373, since according to Article 103 UN 
Charter its obligations under the Charter take precedence over those owed to the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) 13 . The HRC responded that States parties must ensure that measures taken pursuant 
to Resolution 1373 must be in full compliance with the lCCPR 14 . As a result of such problems the 
Council adopted Resolution 1456 drawing attention to human rights obligations Within the fight against 
terrorism' 5. As I shall show in the proceeding section, some countries have transposed their obligations 
under Resolution 1373 into domestic law in such a way as to hinder the pursuit of legitimate rightS16 
and expedite extraditions to countries that consistently violate fundamental human rights. 
13 Human Rights Committee (HRC), Consideration of Reports Submitted under Art. 40 ICCPR: Concluding 
Observations on the UK (6 Dec. 2001), UN Doc. CCPR/CO/73/UK; UN Doc. CCPR/CO/73/UKOT. 
14 Ibid, para. 6. A similar position was taken by Sweden before the UN Committee against Torture. However, the 
Committee did not address Sweden's justifications under Resolution 1373 because the applicant failed to justify 
violation of Article 3 of the 1984 Torture Convention. Case No. 199/2001, Attia v Sweden (5 Dec. 2003), UN 
Press Release available at: 
http: //www. unhchr. ch/huricane. nsf/O/IOB4B4B92B5D3AA93DC1256DF3005BAACE? opendocument. See, 
Swedish Response to the Committee Against Torture in Attia v Sweden, CAT Doc. CAT/C/31/d/199/2002 (24 
Nov. 2003), para. 4.4. 
1ý S. C. Res 1456 (20 Jan. 2003). This was given panegyric character through the formulation of a Declaration 
annexed to the body of the Resolution. 
16 New Zealand's response to S. C. Res. 1373 was a series of legislative changes and other practices involving the 
expulsion of asylum seekers suspected of terrorist activities back to their country of origin. The UN HRC 
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2. THE CENTRALISED SECURITY COUNCIL MODEL 
THROUGH RESOLUTION 1373 
As already said the work of the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies that have particularly since 
1996 augmented the international anti-terrorist legal arsenal, the events of 9/11 eliminated many 
17 
political differences in the Security Council and gave to it a protagonist role . Shortly after 9/11, the 
Security Council quickly framed Resolution 1373, compelling all States within the UN system to work 
together against the aiding, supporting, and sponsoring terrorism. This has had a cataclysmic effect 
within other regional organisations and other inter-State bodies18, although such bodies are not bound 
by Security Council resolutions, in accordance with Article 103 UN Charter. 
Before the events of 9/11, the Security Council had adopted several resolutions that addressed the 
problem of international terrorism and the role of States III supporting it and had imposed some 
economic sanctions. Specifically, Resolution 1214 recalled that the Council was deeply disturbed that 
Afghan territory was being used to shelter and train terrorists and plan terrorist acts19. This was 
followed by Resolution 1267, according to which the failure of the Taleban authorities to comply with 
Resolution 1214 was unacceptable and as a result the Security Council had decided under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter to take all measures to secure that Osama Bin Laden was handed over to any 
concluded that despite assurances by New Zealand that rights would be respected, withou monitoring mechanisms 
these practices could pose a serious risks to exposed persons. See HRC Concluding Observations on New Zealand 
(7 Aug. 2002), UN Doc. CCPR/CO/75/NZL, and UN Committee Against Torture (CAT) Conclusion and 
Recommendations on New Zealand, CAT Doc. CAT/C/CR/32/4 (19 May 2004), available at: 
http: //www. unhchr. ch/html/menu2/6/cat/cobs/32-nz. doc. 
17 For a discussion of the UN's work against terrorism, see: Rostow, N., Before and After: The Changed UN 
Responses to Terrorism since September 11,35 Cornell ILJ (2002), p. 475. 
18 In February 2002, the G7 heads of State met in Ottawa and agreed on a new programme that would involve the 
coordination of national computer systems in order to identify terrorists. This is believed to involve closer co- 
operation between national authorities regarding the disclosure of certain types of information. 
19 S. C. Res. 1214 (8 Dec. 1998). 
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national authority which had indicted him. Resolution 1269 encouraged States to co-operate and 
Resolution 1333 authorized economic sanctions against the Taleban and was the first resolution to 
require States to impose asset freezes without delay against the funds and assets of Osama Bin Laden 
and those connected with him. The attacks against the United States led the Security Council to take 
further steps against international terrorism by adopting two resolutions that require States to co- 
operate on a global level by taking active measures to implement counter-terrorism measures. 
However, whereas pre-9/11 Council resolutions imposed obligations on States with regard to terrorist 
financing, these were limited to the Taleban and Al-Qaeda. Moreover, the possibility of further or 
supplementary unilateral action was possible, while States were free to undertaken bilateral and 
multilateral obligations concerning cooperation in their dealings with private financial institutions. 
Thus, there was a narrowly defined, centrallsed Council model, but this existed the inter-State model. 
This situation was radically altered with the adoption of Council Resolution 1373 20 , which requires all 
UN member States to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and to refrain from providing 
any type of support for terrorist and to deny safe heaven to those who either finance or participate in 
terrorist operations. More specifically, Article I (b) requires States to 'create an offence for persons 
who provide, directly or indirectly funds with the knowledge that such funds Will be used to carry out 
terrorist activities'. 
The general character of the Resolution has ultimately abrogated the possibility of independent 
unilateral action, as well as bilateral or other forms of multilateral cooperative models. This is not true 
with regard to terrorist bombings, where unilateral action is permissible and bilateral or multilateral 
cooperation remains the norm. It seems that the centralisation of terrorist bombing enforcement by the 
Security Council has been deemed as practically impossible, as has been the recognition that the matter 
20 Szasz, P., The Security Council starts legislating, 96 AJIL (2002), p. 90 1. 
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also entails a domestic political sensitivity which is best dealt with at the domestic level. In the field of 
terrorist financing, it must seem to the Council and the USA/UK axis that centrallsed enforcement is 
not only desirable, but is indeed practically viable, even if not fully effective in its first years of 
operation. A reason for this could be the uniformity in the operation of financial systems around the 
world and the blacklisting of those States by FATF that harbour laws favourmg non-transparent 
financial institutions. Furthermore, Resolution 1373 addresses the issue of implementation by 
establishing a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)2 1 as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, to 
monitor implementation of the resolution. 
3. THE ROLE OF THE COUNTER- TERRORISM COMMITTEE 
The principal organ dictating the process of cooperation between UN member States and the Security 
Council is the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), established under Resolution 1373 22 . 'flie CTC 
monitors the implementation of the terms of Resolution 1373, which calls on States to report to the 
CTC within a particular spatial framework on the measures they have taken to implement it. The CTC 
seeks information from States on all steps taken to implement the above-mentioned measures, 
identifies the needs of those countries that have difficulties and tries to find the proper assistance 
available either on a bilateral or multilateral basis, or through international organizations. The CTC 
makes sure that channels of cooperation remain open and demands that States keep it informed of all 
legal and enforcement Mcidents taking place on their territory. Where States have failed to provide a 
report, or have provided inadequate or late responses in the view of the CTC, it has written directly to 
21 The Committee was established in accordance with Rule 28 of the Security Council's Rules of Procedure, which 
states that the council may appoint a committee in order to deal with a specific questions. 
22 Following a Report by the CTC itself, UN Doc. S/2004/70 (14 Nov. 2003), the Council adopted S. C. Res. 1535 
(26 March 2004), by which it strengthened the CTC's role and mandate and gave it a sern I Term anent status. 
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the Council for further action 23. The same role is played by the Terrorist Sanctions Committee 
established by the Security Council through Resolution 1269 in 199924. Initially set up to monitor the 
sanctions against the Taleban regime in Afghanistan it now survives with a broader mandate with a 
25 focus no longer exclusive to Afghanistan . 
The Committee's overall role is to require member states to take counter-terrorism measures that they 
may not otherwise take without an obligation under a treaty. States are required to submit reports 
regarding the legal and enforcement measures that they have taken to criminalize terrorist activity and 
to interdict terrorist financing 26 . Indeed, the vast majority of States seem to comply with Resolution 
1373 and the CTC has received numerous and encouraging reports from the majority of UN members 
related to the legal and regulatory framework that has been created to prevent the financing of terrorism 
and freeze accounts linked to terrorist organisations. It has not only been the chief protagonists and 
sponsors of the Resolution that have been forthcoming with relevant information. Other, less developed 
countries have shown equal enthusiasm in adapting their legislation to the exigencies prescribed by 
Resolution 1363 and the CTC guidelines 27 . The government of Belarus, for example, in its fourth 
report addressed to the Committee has developed a legal mechanism for the effective prevention of the 
financing of terrorism by amending and supplementing the Act of the Republic of Belarus on 
'Measures to prevent the legalization of funds obtained by illegal means' of 19 July 2000. Moreover, it 
is taking further steps to expand cooperation with international, regional and sub-regional organisations 
23 Letter dated 7 May 2004, UN Doc. S/2004/361 (10 May 2004); Letter dated 31 October 2003, UN Doc. 
S/2003/1056 (31 Oct. 2003); Letter dated 31 March 2003, UN Doc. S/2003/404 (3 April 2003). 
24 S. C. Res. 1267 (15 Oct. 1999). 
25 As modified on the basis of S. C Res. 1455 (17 Jan. 2003). 
26 For information on the co-operation received from States, see Security Council 58 th Session, 4792'd meeting ,i (23 July 2003), UN Doc. S/PV. 4792 and Security Council , 58h 
Session, 4734th meeting , UN Doc. 
S/PV. 4734 
and UN Doc S, 'PV. 4618, S/PV. 4618. 
27 Stomseth, J. E., The Security Council's counter-terrorism role: continuity and innovation, 97 Proceedings of the 
. 4merican 
Sociqi, of International Law (2003), p. 41. Also: Rosand, E., Security Council resolution 1373, the 
Counter-terrorism Committee and the fight against terrorism, 97 AJIL (2003), p. 333. 
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in order to strengthen customs and border controj28. Similarly, the government of Halt, has taken 
measures to amend the Haitian Penal Code and a Counter-Terrorism Bill is reportedly being drafted 29 
Many States have reported that the aforementioned requirement is covered by existing national anti- 
money laundering legislation 30 . The Committee 
has taken the view that although money laundering and 
terrorism are inter-related crimes they are not completely identical. This is because money laundering 
can be defined to mean 'the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin'. By 
contrast the financing of terrorism often involves money that is not necessarily delivered from illegal 
sources, but which is nevertheless used to fund terrorist activities. For instance, assets acquired by 
legitimate means, and even declared to tax authorities, can be used to finance terrorist activities. 
Based on the information provided in the reports, the Committee seeks to address the following 
questions: a) ascertain what measures States have adopted for criminalizing terrorist financing; b) what 
measures States have taken to freeze funds, financial or other assets of persons suspected of being 
involved in terrorist operations 31 , and; c) what preventive controls 
States are employing to ensure that 
funds intended for the financIng of terrorism are not transferred through charitable or religious 
organisations. It is indeed remarkable how a large number of States have been revising their laws in an 
effort to comply with resolution 1373 and the pace at which States now become parties to the existing 
international conventions 32 . Moreover, partly as a result of the 
CTC's outreach to more than 60 
28 See generally: UN Doc. S/2004/255 (29 March 2004) 
29 UN Doc. S/2003/789 (31 July 2003); see also: UN Doc. S/2004/226 (29 March 2004), UN Doc. S/2004/684( 25 
Aug. 2004), UN Doc. S/2004/854 (26 Oct. 2004) and UN Doc. S/2003/1173 (15 Dec. 2003). 
30 See: Gehr, W., Recurrent Issues, (April 4 2002). 
31 Over 150 UN mernbers had reported by mid-2004 to the UN Counter Terrorism Committee on the measures that 
they have taken to implement S. C. Res. 1373. 
32 Prior to 9 11, only Botswana and the United Kingdom were parties to all the UN terrorism conventions. Since 
then, an additional 39 States have become parties to all of them. The Terrorist Bombings Convention has seen a 
71 % increase and the Terrorist Financing Convention has seen a 94% increase in their respective ratification and 
accession rates since 2001. See: Statement of the CTC's Chain-nan. UN Doc. S/PV. 4792 (2001), p. p. 2-3. 
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organisations, a broad range of international mstitutions and regional organisations have adopted 
counter-terrorism programmes 33. Thus, the Committee has become the focal point of a global long- 
term effort to combat terrorism. Such a global mechanism did not exist prior to September 2001. Some 
observers have commented that the Committee's work is rapidly emerging into 'minimum international 
standards for counter-terrorism IaW34 . However, the most significant challenge for the counter- 
terrorism committee is its ability to help built the capacity of states to protect and safeguard human 
rights which combating terroriSM35 . The ability of the counter-terrorism committee to monitor the 
implementation of resolution 1373 may be improved by the resolution 1535, which set up the Counter- 
Terrorism Executive Directorate. 
Despite the prominent role of the CTC it should be not be forgotten that is only an instrument to 
monitor the implementation of resolution 1373. It is not a sanctions committee and does not have a list 
of terrorist organizations or individuals. It is not empowered to sanction noncompliant countries. The 
main sources of information for CTC are the state reports, with no effective mechanism to generate 
alternative information. 
-13 The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) ended its 10th Ministerial conference by 
adopting a resolution and Charter on preventing and combating terrorism and agreeing guidelines to meet new 
challenges to security (7 Dec. 2002), available at: http: //www. osce. org/docs/english/1990- 
l999/mcs/l0porto02e. pdf See also, OSCE Decision No. 617 on Further Measures to Suppress Terrorist Financing, 
OSCE Doc. PC. DEC/617 (I July 2004). 
'4 Zagaris, B., The inerging of international terrorist and money laundering policy, International Enforcement Law 
Report, (April 2002), p. 39. 
35 The UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights has exchanged views with the committee With regards 
to the issue of respect for human rights. See relatively: www. un. org/docs/sc/committees/ 1373/ 
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4. JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS REGARDING THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF RESOLUTION 1373: CONFLICTING 
UNILA TERA L IN TERNA L MODEL S 
Although the CTC's co-ordination of the implementation of international sanctions has had significant 
impact in exposing and restricting various aspects of terrorist financing, having moreover fostered a 
degree of co-operation among States In addressing terrorism, the ultimate effectiveness of such 
sanctions will depend on the ability of national authorities to enforce them. Indeed, national authorities 
must ensure that ecomonic sanctions and Know Your Client (KYC) requirements - addressed to 
financial institutions - are not evaded by multi-national holding companies composed of shell 
corporations. Moreover, although each member State is permitted to implement and enforce sanctions 
according to its own legal principles, there does not exist a fair degree of commonality M how 
authorities define civil and criminal liability for breaching sanctions laws. 
When the question turns, however, to abstract legal entities, States will necessarily be worried that an 
uncontrolled and centraliZed sanctions regime might have an impact on their economy. Targeted 
entities should, therefore, be endowed with basic protections against having their assets frozen without 
due process of law. When one country's legal authorities violate such protections, other national 
authorities often become reluctant to coordinate transnational enforcement efforts. Moreover, issues of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and third party liability may take on different dimensions in different legal 
systems, thus preventing the efficient implementation of international sanctions. It is, thus, evident that 
there is some space for the unilateral internal approach on two grounds: a) the first is de jure. 
Resolution 1373 proVides States with the freedom to implement the anti-terrorist financing terms of the 
Resolution in their domestic order, while; b) the de facto dimension of the Resolution suggests that 
States will be reluctant to implement the wishes of other States urging for particular sanctions where 
the requested State has reason to doubt the accuracy of the accusation. In both cases, the unilateral 
internal approach possesses a particular inherent dynamic, in that where there exists a conflict with the 
request of another jurisdiction, the requested State has a legitimate authority to refuse compliance - 
unless of course the request comes from the Security Council, or any of its subsidiary bodies. This, 
however, may become very problematic since the Council has not issued resolutions every time a legal 
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entity has been accused of terrorist financMg, but has instead: a) either relied on e-vidence brought to it 
by member States, which was then passed over to its subsidiary bodies for further circulation to 
member States, or; b) relied on the inter-State co-operation provision contained in Resolution 1373, on 
the basis of which States are under an obligation to cooperate in the enforcement of terrorist financing. 
While the former has a binding dimension because of the grounding of the relevant obligation in the 
UN Charter, the obligation to co-operate in Resolution 1373 does not envisage that any and all requests 
to freeze must be religiously adhered by all other States. This inter-State co-operation approach 
contained in Resolution 1373, therefore, requires good faith and reciprocity and does not therefore have 
the force of bilateral or multilateral co-operation treaties, despite its insertion in a Security Council 
resolution. 
As already mentioned, Resolution 1373 requires member States to freeze all the assets of designated 
terrorist groups and entities supporting them. Because the method of designating terrorist groups varies 
from State to State and the legal principles by which financial sanctions are imposed varies 
accordingly, differences arise concerning the extent that financial sanctions are to be imposed. The 
system of designating terrorist groups varies between States and Is often based on Intelligence derived 
from covert operations, which ordinarily cannot be divulged in judicial or tribunal proceedings. As a 
consequence, the CTC has failed to apply uniform standards In these areas, and because it has required 
States to recognize the freeze orders of other States directed at particular individuals, dispute has arisen 
among member States with respect to whether such orders should be given mutual respect if issued 
without adherence to basic human rights or due process of law. The Swedish and French governments 
raised these issues with the Security Council in January 2002 in a case mivolving whether they were 
obliged to recognise certain freeze orders originating from the US Government Office of 
Foreign 
Assets Control (OFAC), with respect to three Somali-born Swedish citizens whom the US had 
designated as terrorists after the events of 9/11. The US had transmitted its list of terrorist 
financiers to 
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the Security Council, which later required that member States freeze the assets of the alleged terrorists. 
The Swedish government froze the accounts of the suspected terrorists who were claiming that they 
were transferring money to their families in Somalia. Both the Swedish and the French governments 
intervened by urging the Security Council to review its sanctions IiSt36. We can only speculate that 
similar incidents have been settled at a diplomatic level, because Judicial proceedings with respect to 
such matters would only focus on the legality of freeze order and the nature of the assets, but not 
whether the requested goverment was under an obligation to adhere to the cooperation provision of 
Resolution 1373. 
In this context, it is interesting to see how the United States itself has made use of the authority granted 
under Resolution 1373 to employ the unilateral internal approach. Prior to 9/11 the USA had not 
ratified the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention. Nonetheless, US reaction was such that the 
government provided criminal and civil enforcement with all necessary power to investigate terrorism 
beyond regular legal confines 37 . This policy commitment was 
later translated into legal action and 
entails two principal initiatives, both of which have significant implications outside of the United 
States. Executive Order 13224 of 24 September 2001, entitled 'Blocking Property and Prohibiting 
Transactions with Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit or Support Terrorism' and 'The Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act' 2001 (the Patriot Act). 
36 The US government has opposed the Swedish and the French government request. See relatively: Schmemann, 
S., Swedes take up the cause on the US terror list, New York Times (26 Jan. 2002), p. AT 
37 See: President George W. Bush, State of the Union Speech' January 29,2002, available at: 
http: '/www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-1 I. html, stating, 'We will ... 
bring terrorists to 
justicc'; Alexander, K., United States financial sanctions and international terrorism, 17 Journal of International 
Banking and Financial Law( 2002), p. 80. 
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The significance of the initiatives contained in the Patriot ACt38 is that they have an extra-territorial 
impact. The Patriot Act authorises the imposition of special measures against foreign jurisdictions and 
foreign financial institutions that are considered to pose a money laundering risk. These measures 
include: additional record keeping and reporting of financial transactions, identification of foreign 
owners of accounts at US financial institutions, requiring foreign banks to identify those customers 
who transfer funds through an account at a US financial institution and requiring foreign banks to 
identify those customers who use correspondent accounts opened by foreign banks at US banks9'. 'llie 
overall effect of these measures is to require foreign banks doing business in the United States (and US 
banks with branches in other countries) to collect and disclose customer information to US authorities. 
If businesses outside the United States do not have effective systems and procedures in place to 
investigate money transfers and the verification of customer details, US institutions are prohibited by 
the Act from doing business with them. The Patriot Act also requires US authorities to encourage 
foreign governments to require the disclosure of information by their financial institutions to US 
authorities and to encourage foreign governments to adopt more effective financial regulation and 
supervision aimed at anti-money laundering. Since 9/11, the US government appealed to almost every 
government in the world asking for support in the 'war against tcrror', with particular reference to 
financial institutions. 
38USA Patriot Act 2001, title 111, signed into law 26 October 2001, Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
Convention Irnplementation Act of 2002, Public Law 107-197, Title 11, §202(a), June 25,2002,116 Stat. 724, 
amended by Public Law 107-273, Div. B, Title IV, § 4006, November 2,2002,116 Stat. 1813 (18 U. 
S. C. 
§2339C). Other, for example, legislative acts that have passed in the United States include: The Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, H. R. 2883,107th Cong. (enacted 2001); Air Transportation Safety and 
System Stabilization Act, H. R. 2926,107th Cong. (enacted 2001 and Aviation and Transportation Security Act, S. 
1447,107th Cong. (enacted 2001); See Rause, A., USA Patriot Act: anti-money laundering and terrorist financing 
legislation in the U. S. and Europe since September 11,11 ICLQ (2003), p. 173. 
39 Alexander, supra note 36, at p. 83. 
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On 24 September 2001, in the aftermath of 9/11, President Bush issued Executive Order 13224 40 , 
which expanded US power to target the support structure of terrorist organizations. By recognisMg that 
the most significant weapon in any terrorist operation is money, it increased law enforcement's ability 
to freeze US-based assets, as well as block the US transactions of terrorists and those that support 
theM41 . Additionally, it heightened US ability to 
block US-based assets of foreign banks. It also 
enabled the United States to deny foreign banks access to US markets if they refuse to cooperate with 
American authorities by identifying and freezing terrorist resources abroad. This laid the groundwork 
for the international actions that followed to block and freeze terrorist assets globally. The order is a 
significant extension of extra-territorial third party liability for foreign banks, companies and 
individuals who conduct, or assist transactions involving US designated terrorist organisationS42 
These efforts have met with considerable succesS43. Working bilaterally and multilaterally, the United 
States has succeeded in freezing terrorist assets in over 165 countries. By late 2002, more than $112 
million in terrorist assets had been frozen worldwide in over 500 accounts and more than $34 million 
of these assets were frozen in the United States, while over $78 million were frozen overseaS44 
Other countries have adapted their domestic legislation and have frozen foreign assets on their territory 
where they found good cause to do S045 , but with the exception of the UK they did not impose the 
40 US Dept of the Treasury, Terrorism: What You Need to Know About US Sanctions (6/6/2003) - available at: http: / www. rbnz. govt. nz/researcli/bulletiri/ 2002_2006/2003sep66_3matthews. pdf 
" Sec. I (b), (c). 
'2 Executive order 13224, preamble (24 September 200 1) 
43 As of November 2002,251 individual organizations had been designated under Executive Order 13224 as 
financial supporters of terrorism. See: Treasury Department, Contributions by the Department of the Treasury to 
the Financial War on terrorism-Fact Sheet, September 2002, available at: http': 
www. house. p, ov/12ombo/91 I factsheetsFfNAL. 
44 Ibid. 
45 For example, France in implementing the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention formulated new procedures for 
lifting bank secrecy and freezing funds. See, UN Doc. S, '2001/1274 (16 Nov. 2001) at p. 18. See also, UN Doc. 
S/2001/1270 (2001); Human Rights Watch (HRW) Report, Indian Prevention of TerrOnsm Ordinance. On October 
16,2001 the Indian cabinet approved the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance. The new Law enacts a broad 
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findings of their law enforcement agencies upon other countries in the same manner as the USA. The 
UK has swiftly enacted anti-terrorist financing legislation following the events of q/ 1146 and through 
the 2000 Act, which deals exclusively with offences committed abroad and recognises that terrorist 
operations cannot be carried out by a single individual, the LTK had by late 2002 frozen the assets of 
over 100 organisations and over 200 MdividualS47. It is true, however, that despite extra-territorial 
action by the UK, this has not translated in the form of explicit pressure imposed by the United States 
on a unilateral basis. There is certainly an uneasy tension in the application of the unilateral internal 
approach from the part of the United States and as far as this concerns forceful co-operation. Although 
most developed countries have voiced their concerns over such unilateral action, the vast majority of 
developing countries have accepted the US position and there is no evidence of dissention or 
accusation in their reports to the CTC. Nonetheless, the French reaction noted above indicates that most 
developed countries are weary of such forms of intrusion against their sovereignty and it is unlikely in 
the near future for the Security Council to adopt resolutions condemning particular organisations or 
individuals where there does not exist consensus among the five permanent members on the liability of 
listed persons and organisations. 
definition of terrorism that includes acts of violence or disruption of essential services carried out with 'intent to 
threaten the unity and integrity of India or to strike terror in any part of the people'. It also criminalizes failure to 
provide authorities with 'infortnation relating to any terrorist activity'. [Prevention of Terrorism Bill 2000 [draft; 
Law Commission of India Report, April 2000]; similarly, Cyprus: A Law to Ratify the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, including supplementary provisions for the immediate 
implementation of the Convention, No. 29 (111) of 2001. Finally, Canada: Anti-terrorism Act, Statutes of Canada 
2001, Chp. 41; Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act Statutes of Canada 2000, Chp. 
17. 
46 This revoked the earlier Afghanistan (United Nations Sanctions) Order 2001, which had implemented S. C. Res. 
1267 (Taleban) and 1333 (Bin Laden and the Taleban). See also: Katselli, E., and Shah, S., September II and the 
UK response, 52 ICLQ (2003), p. 245. See also: Britain's Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, 
available at: http: //www. legislation. hmso. gov. uk/acts/2001. For commentary, see: Henning, V., Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001: has the United Kingdom made a valid derogation from the European Convention on 
Human Rights? 17 American Unii, ersity International Law Review (2002), p. 1263. 
Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2001 and the Al Qaeda and Tallban (Unit 47 1 ed Nations Measures) 
Order 2002. 
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5. THE EXTRADITIONIUNLA WFUL RENDIVON MODEL 
Article II of the Terrorist Bombings Convention obliges member States to sever the link between the 
offences described in Article 2 of the Convention from whatever ideological justifications, thus 
removing any obstacles stemming from extradition or mutual legal assistance (MLA) requests. The 
same is true with regard to all post-9/11 Security Council resolutions. Article 9 of the Convention 
further obliges parties to treat said offences as extraditable and describe them as such in bilateral 
extradition treaties. Extradition treaties deal with extraditable offences in one of two ways. The first 
approach, which may be referred to as the 'enumerative method', is to list specifically in the treaty 
those offences for which extradition may be granted as between the parties theret048 . This method 
became the standard international form in the late 19th century and is still employed in many existing 
treaties. Thus, for example the 1972 Extradition Treaty between the United States and Argentina lists 
approximately 30 substantive offences, which are extraditable within the meaning of that instrument as 
long as they are punishable by the laws of each party by imprisonment of at least one year49. With 
respect to such treaties, this provision has the effect of adding the offence of terrorist bombing to the 
specifically listed offences. It Is with respect to this type of treaty that this provision is of most 
relevance. The second and most modern approach5o, which may be referred to as the 'eliminative 
method' is for the treaty to define extraditable offences as all offences which are punishable by both 
parties on the basis of a particular penalty i. e. imprisonment. Thus, this type of treaty dispenses with 
the need for a specific list of offences. For example, Article 2 of the 1982 Extradition Treaty between 
48 Bassiouni, C. M., International extradition: United States law andpractice (Oceana, 1996); Bantekas and Nash, 
supra note 36, p. p. 179-185. 
49 Art. 2,1972 US-Argentina Extradition Treaty, TIAS 75 10. The enumerative method has been predominent in US 
practice. See: Whiteman, M., Digest of international law, (vol. 6, Government Printing Office, 1968), p. p. 772-73. 
However, this apprears to have been changing from the late 1970's. See: Stanbrook, I., and Stanbrook, C., The law 
and practice of extradition, (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 8-9. 
50 See: US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Report on the extradition treaty with Italy, 98th Cong, 2'd 
session, reprinted in 24 ILM (1985), 153 1. 
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the USA and Italy states that any offence shall be deemed extraditable only if it is punishable under the 
laws of both contacting parties". Similarly, the 1957 European Convention on Extradition provides III 
Article 2 that extraditable offences are those which are punishable under the laws of the requested and 
the requesting State by deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of at least one year or a more 
2 
severe penalty' . 
Since the attacks of 9/11 the traditional approach whereby extradition was regulated at the mter-State 
level with a plethora of safeguards for the accused seems to have changed 53 . Increased use of 
diplomatic assurances has been employed to justify extradition to countries that are known to 
systematically engage in torture. Requested States rely more and more on verbal assurances and very 
occasionally agree on a monitoring mechanism, usually involving visits by diplomatic 
representatives 54 . In the KK Mohamed case, the South African Constitutional Court found that 
Mohamed's transfer to the USA without assurance regarding the infliction of the death penalty and 
other cruel treatment violated his pertinent nghtS5 
5. Mohamed was indicted for his alleged involvement 
in the terrorist bombing of the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salam in 1998. He was a 
Tanzanian national who later fled to RSA shortly after the bombing where he sought asylum. He was 
arrested after interrogation by RSA authorities on the basis of a warrant issued by Federal District 
Court of New York and flown to the USA. Although it is unclear whether Mohamed's transfer was a 
51 1983 USA - Italy Extradition Treaty, TIAS 10,837. 
52 359 UNTS 276. 
53 Extradition as a tool to counter-terrorism is discussed also in chapter one of the present thesis. However, the 
issue is further explored within the present chapter in order to demonstrate how the events of September II 
challenged the traditional approach to extradition. 
54 Human Rights Watch (HRW) Report, Empty Promises: Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard against Torture 
(April 2004), vol. 16, No. 4(D), available at: http: //www. hrw. org/reports/2004/unO4O4/diplomatlcO4O4. pdf 
55 Mohamed and A-nother v President of RSA and Others, (3) SA 893 (2001) (CC). 
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deportation or disguised extradition, the RSA Supreme Court criticised and concerned itself with the 
lack of assurances, citing similar procedural failures on the part of Germany during the same period" 
Thus, recent extradition practice with regard to alleged terrorist bombers suggests that the human rights 
provisions in the 1998 Convention, particularly Article 14, are weighed against the perceived terrorist 
threat. T'his is significant since the human rights component of extradition signifies the flexibility of 
States as regards the unilateral domestic and the inter-State suppressionist model. Where States are 
under pressure, political or other-wise, to extradite absent human rights assurances, the aforementioned 
models may be deemed to depend less on unilateral State freedom of action. This trend is exemplified 
in other recent cases and concerns to a large degree the wilful neglect of the discrimination clause 
found in Article 12 of the 1998 Convention 57 . An appeal is currently pending before the Grand 
Chamber of the ECHR in Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, regarding the extradition of Uzbek 
nationals from Turkey to Uzbekistan on suspicion of involvement in terrorist bombingS58 . The 
ECHR's First Chamber initially supported the extradition having relied on diplomatic assurances that 
the accused would not be subjected to torture or the death penalty, notwithstanding well-documented 
56 Redress Report, Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Torture (July 2004), p. 32. 
57 The discrimination clause is widely found in other instruments, such as Art. 3(2), 1957 European Convention on 
Extradition; Art. 4(5), 1981 Inter-American Convention on Extradtion; Art. 5,1977 European Convention for the 
Suppression of Terronsm. Moreover, discrimination clauses, while not as widespread as the political offence 
exception, can be found in various forms in the domestic laws of most States, such as the 1967 Netherlands 
Extradition Act and the 1957 Swedish Extradition Act. It is also encountered in numerous bilateral extradition 
treaties, such as the 1976 UK-Finland Extradition Treaty, 23 UKTS (1977), as modified in 1985. Reprinted in 24 
ILM (1985), 1257. In its early form, the discnmination clause seems to have been concemed only with 'disguised' 
requests for extradition, i. e. those requests which were formulated in terms of a common crime but which were, in 
fact, designed to obtain custody of the alleged offender and prosecute him for a political crime or purpose. As 
drafted in this and other more recent instruments, however, such clauses seek to protect those persons whose 
positions would be prejudiced because of political or ideological reasons. 
58 ECtHR Appeal Nos. 46827,99 and 4695/99. 
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evidence that Uzbekistan systematically subjected Muslims and members of the Erk political party, as 
59 
were the accused, to torture 
In November 2001, the Court of Appeal in Vienna ordered the extradition to Egypt of Mohamed Bilasi- 
Ashri, who had been sentenced in absentia in Egypt for alleged involvement in an Islamic extremist 
group 60 . Although the Vienna Court considered the accused's plea that he risked torture and 111- 
treatment upon his return, it surprisingly concluded that 'Egypt was not a country where serious large 
scale violations of human rights could be considered an institutionallsed every day practice', thus 
finding no obstacle to his extradition 61 . The interesting element in this case is the involvement of the 
Austrian government - in particular the Austrian Federal Mmilster of Justi its acceptance of ice - through i 
diplomatic assurances by the Egyptian authorities that the accused's conviction in absentia would be 
nullified, that he would be tried before civilian courts and that he would suffer no adverse 
discrimination, notwithstanding reports of 'widespread evidence of torture by the [Egyptian] State 
62 Security Investigation Department' 
. Although the accused was released 
because the Egyptian 
authorities finally rejected the conditions laid out in the extradition order, the Austrian goverment's 
disregard of these reports regarding torture in Egypt is instructive of the way the inter-State model has 
eroded domestic human rights concerns in the field of terrorism. 
In some cases, however, the courts take a more proactive stance and serve to deter liberal government 
63 
attitudes to extradition . In a recent case, Bow Street Magistrate's court in the UK rejected a request 
59Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, Mission to Uzbekistan, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/2003/68/Add. 2 (3 Feb. 
2003). 
60 Redress, supra note 54, at pp. 33-34. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Committee Against Torture (CAT) Conclusions and Recommendations: Egypt (23 Dec. 2002), CAT Doc. 
CAI, CýCR, 1229/4, para. 5; see also, Concluding Observations: Egypt (17 May 1999), CAT Doc. A/54/44, para. 4. 
63 Rasid v. Bush and At-Odah v. United States, 542 US (2004) delivered by the US Supreme Court on 28 June 
2004, on the basis of which US courts have jurisdiction to examine habeas corpus petitions of foreign nationals 
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from Russia to extradite two men suspected of having committed crimes in Chechnya. Despite 
diplomatic assurances that the men would not be tortured, the court was not convinced 64. S imilarly, a 
German court refused extradition to Turkey in the case Metin Kaplan, the leader of a banned Islamist 
fandamentalist group 65 . The USA itself has adopted equivalent measures for its own citizens, without 
however extraditing them to other countries. It has labelled them as enemy combatants not entitled to 
the traditional protections of the US Constitution 66 . One of these US citizens, Jose Padilla, was alleged 
to have been involved in a plot to detonate a radiological device in the United StateS67 
I shall conclude this section with a more detailed examination of the post-9/1 1 practice of unlawful 
rendition. The notion of 'renditions' involves the transfer of persons inter-State through unlawful 
means, such as forceful transfers not involving extradition, expulsion or deportation procedureS68. 
Whereas the official practice of the majority of States until the late 1980's outlawed unlawful 
renditions, the situation was reversed in the early 1990's by actions of the executive 69 as well as the 
judiciaryýo. The trend is particularly evident in the practice of the USA and whereas it was formerly 
captured abroad. See also A (FC) and Others (FQ v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 
56, where the House of Lords held that indefinite imprisonment without trial or charge violated fundamental 
human rights. 
64 Government of the Russian Federation v Akhmed Zakaev, Bow Street Magistrate's Court, Decision of 13 Nov. 
2003 (Hon. T. Workman). 
65 Kaplan 4 Aus (a) 308/02-147.203-204.03111 (27 May 2003). 
66 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 316 F. 3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003); Padilla ex rel. Newman v Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 
(S. D. N. Y. 2002). 
67 Padilla case, ibid, at p. p. 572-73. 
68 Fitzpatrick, J., Rendition and transfer in the war against terrorism: Guantanamo and beyond, 25 Loy. LA Int'l & 
Comp. L. Rev (2003), p. 457. 
69 'Extraterritorial Apprehension by the FBI', 4B, Op. Off Legal Counsel (US Dept. Justice) 543 (1980). This 
noted that such renditions violated customary international law because they involved violation of another 
country's sox, creignty. This Opinion was repudiated in 1989. See: 'Override International Law in Extraterritorial 
Law Activities', 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel (US Dept. Justice) 163 (1989). 
70 United States v. Alvarez Machain, 504 US 655,657 (1992). 
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confined to transnational crime 71 it is now employed in the war against terror. Recent reports Indicate 
that since the events of 9/11 over 3,000 individuals have been subjected to forceful inter-State transfers 
to detention facilities in known or undisclosed locations, with the method of transfer involving 
unlawful meanS72. Persons who had no involvement in the war in Afghanistan but were caught M the 
greater global war against terrorism and suspected for their involvement in terrorist acts have been 
detained to undisclosed locations or sent to States with a dubious human rights record. Those falling 
within this group have been transferred under a policy described as 'renditions' or 'extraordinary 
renditions 973 . Following 9/11 the practice of renditions has become much more widespread and 
individuals have been rendered to countries such as Egypt and Jordan where the sending authorities are 
well informed that the receiving State will employ torture to exact information from alleged terroriStS74 
A recent example of such practice concerns the case of Maher Arar, a dual Canadian/Syrian national 
who was detained at JFK airport in New York while on transit to Canada. He was held incommunicado 
in the USA for a period of two weeks and then flown to Syria and Jordan where he spent ten months in 
detention and allegedly tortured. The US government claims to have relied on assurances by Syria, but 
the fact remains that he was not charged with any offence at the time of rendition, nor was he subject to 
any legal process in the USA or elsewhere 75 . Following 
his release, Mr. Arar filed a complaint in the 
New York District Court alleging that US authorities handed him over to Syria because the torture 
employed against him in Syria would have been unlawful in the USA - citing, for example, that 
71 Choo, A., International kidnapping, disguised extradition and abuse of process, 57 MLR (1994), p. 626; 
Warbrick, C., Judicial jurisdiction and abuse of process, 49 ICLQ (2000), p. 489. 
72 President Bush, State of the Union Address 2003, available at: 
http: //www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19. html. 
73 Redress Report, supra note 54, at pp. 36-37. 
74 [bid. 
75 Amnesty International Report, USA. - the threat of a bad example - undermining international standards as the 
war on terror detentions continue, (15 Aug. 2003), available at: 
http: //web. amnesty. org/library/indev EngAMR511142003. 
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questions posed to him in both countries were identicaI76. In an interesting twist to the story, for the 
purposes of this thesis, it was discovered that Canadian officials had facilitated Arar's unlawful 
rendition to Syria by providing intelligence to their US counterpartS77. Similarly, In January 2002, five 
Algerians and a Yemeni were apprehended by US forces in Bosnia and flown to a US detention centre 
in Guantanamo Bay in contravention of an injunction by the Bosnian Human Rights Chamber that they 
remain in the country until such time as their cases are determined. The Chamber declared the hand- 
over to the US illegal and in breach of the obligations of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
under the ECHR and the Dayton Peace Agreement78. Numerous other cases have surfaced since 2002, 
involVing unlawful renditions to countries such as Pakistan, Sudan, Malawi, Zimbabwe and otherS79. 
It is evident from my preceding analysis that contemporary extradition law relating to terrorism - and 
thus encompassing terrorist bombings as the most common form of terrorist activity - is premised on 
two levels of regulation: the written normative level, which may be termed 'surface law' and the real- 
life subsurface practice. Although enforcement of the latter is mostly achieved through clandestine 
operations it is generally accepted as official practice, but there is obviously no admission of torture or 
other human rights violations, even if torture constitutes a necessary component of such practice. This 
indicates a shift from the traditional unilateral internal model to a much more liberal inter-State 
suppressionist model that is increasingly distancing itself from human rights considerations by 
reference to international law and in particular pertinent Security Council resolutions. 
76 Arar v Ashcroft et al, Complaint of Maher Arar, US District Court of New York, available at: http: //ccr- 
ny. org/v2/legal/September-I Ith/docs/Ararcomplaint. pdf, at para. 1. 
77 The Canadian government established a Commission to inquire into these allegations. See: Commission of 
Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, available at: 
http: //www. ararcommission. ca/eng/. 
78 Boudellaa and Others v Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (I I Oct. 2002), 
Case Nos. CH/02/8679, CH/02/8689, CH/02/8690, CH/02/8691 .- Bensayah v Bosnia and Herzegovina (4 April 
2003), Case No. CH/02/9499. 
79 See Amnesty Report, supra note 73; Redress Report, supra note 54, pp. 38-39. 
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6. EMERGING EU CO-OPERA TION MODELS 
Although the EU was concentrating in the fight against terrorism long before the September 1180, it 
demonstrated a much more incisive strategy after that date 81 . Among the most recent instruments 
82 adopted to make the fight against terrorism more effective is EU Arrest Warrant , adopted within the 
Council's framework decision in 13 June 2002 83 . The Tampere European Council had called on EU 
member States to make the principle of 'mutual recognition' of criminal judgments the cornerstone of 
EU law enforcement The European Arrest Warrant is a Judicial decision issued by a Member State 
with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the purposes 
of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order. It is designed 
to replace all extradition treaties among EU member States by requiring all national judicial authorities 
to recognize, automatically and without ftirther qualifications, requests for the surrender of a person 
made by another national judicial authority. Unlike the existing extradition treaties, the EU Arrest 
Warrant does not involve any political approval, but renders the matter of extradition a concern for 
judicial authorities alone. Moreover, persons arrested under the Warrant cannot rely either on the 
double criminality or the specialty rule. This inapplicability of the double criminality rule is explicitly 
reserved for the offence of terrorism. Thus, in the EU context, the previous approach established under 
the anti-terrorist conventions and practice, whereby extradition was subject to cumbersome 
considerations such as the existence of double criminality, political offence exception, the nationality 
80 See relatively: Venneman, N., Country report on the European Union, found in Voleky, S., Terrosim as a 
challengefor national and international security versus liberty, (Dpringer, 2004). 
81 Wouters, F., Terrorist offences and extradition deals: an appraisal of the EU main criminal law measures against 
terrorism after September 11,41 Common Market Law Review (2004 
), p. p. 909-932. 
82 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (13 June 2002) on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender 
Procedures between Member States [OJ L 190,18/07/2002]. 
83 See: OJEC L 190,18 July 2002. 
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principle, approval by the executive, and others are now gone. The new approach is based on good 
faith between EU member States and is a true reflection of the belief that serious crime, including 
terrorism, must not be made hostage to domestic concerns and that terrorism should be approached as a 
phenomenon. It is unlikely, however, that this approach will be imitated in other regions, let alone on 
the basis of a global instrument, because of the lack of good faith and uniformity in laws and 
institutions that one generally finds within the EU. 
On a theoretical level, the introduction of a European Arrest Warrant84 instead of traditional extradition 
reflects a genuine shift in legal co-operation between Member States. Traditionally, such co-operation 
is based on the rule that one State does not execute or enforce deci I 's'ons of another State, unless 
otherwise agreed, e. g. in extradition treaties. In contrast, the European Arrest Warrant is based on the 
principle that Member States automatically recognize each other's judicial decisions ordering the arrest 
of a person 
85 
The EU has been particularly active in the fight against terrorism, by adopting legislative mechanisms 
and by expanding its police and judicial co-operation 86 . The main lines of the EU activity were set out 
in the Action Plan adopted by the Extraordinary European Council of 21 September 2001 and in the 
conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council87. Shortly after the events that took place in 
Madrid on 11 March 2004, the EU once again placed the fight against terrorism at the top of its agenda. 
84 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures 
between Member States, O. J. 2002, L 190/1. 
85 Peers, S., Mutual recognition and criminal law in the European Union: has the council got it wrong?, 41 CML 
Rev. (2004), p. p. 5-36. 
86 See generally: Fijnaut, Wouters and Naert (eds. ), Legal instruments in thefight against international terrorism. .4 
transatlantic dialogue, (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden/Boston, 2004); Wouters and Naert, The European Union and 
'September I V, 13 Indiana Int. Comp. L. Rev. (2003), p. p. 719-775; den Boer and Monar, II September and the 
challenge of global terrorism to the EU as a security actor, 40 JCMS (2002), p. p. 11 -28; Peers, S., EU responses to 
terrorism, 52 Int-Comp. L. Q. (2003), p. p. 227-243. 
8- xN-ww. europa. eu. int, coiilm/justice_hoiiie news/terrorism/doc. 
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While a number of new measures were proposed at the extraordinary JHA Council of 19 March 2004 
and at the 25-26 March 2004 European Council, i. e. the appointment of a Counter-terronsm 
Coordinator and the adoption of a declaration on combating terrorism and on solidarity against 
terrorism, and while the 2001 Action Plan is being revised 88 , it has become clear that what is needed 
most in the area of JHA is the implementation of policies and instruments that have been already 
agreed upon. The EU's Terrorism Framework Decision has likewise been exceptionally swift89 . The 
Terrorism Framework Decision approximates the Member States' definitions of terrorism and obliges 
them to criminaliZe terrorist offences thus approximated (Art. 1), including directmg or participating in 
a terrorist group (Art. 2), as well as linked offences (Art. 3) and inciting, aiding and abetting and 
attempting terrorist offences (Art. 4). It obliges the Member States to ensure that legal persons can be 
held liable for these offences (Art. 7) and are subject to 'effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
penalties', of which it gives some examples (Art. 8). Furthermore, it sets standards for the penalties to 
be imposed ('effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties, which may entail extradition'), 
including minimum levels for some maximum penalties (Art. 5). It also establishes jurisdictional rules 
(Art. 9). Finally, it contains rules concerning reduced penalties for terrorists who renounce terrorism 
and cooperate with the authorities to prevent or combat it (Art. 6) and relatmg to protecting and 
assisting victims of terrorist offences (Art. 10). Likewise, the EU has a set of legislative mechanisms 
that facilitate the arrest and handover of terrorists, categorization and penalization aimed at combating 
terrorist crimes and the seizure of terrorist goods and evidence. Although these measures make it 
88 See respectively points 14 and 2 of the Declaration on Combating Terrorism and the Declaration on Solidarity 
against Terrorism adopted by this European Council. 
89 The Commission submitted the proposal for the TFD on 19 September 2001 (COM (2001) 521, O. J. 2001, C 
332/E/300). At its meeting on 6-7 December 2001, the JHA Council reached a provisional political agreement, 
subject to renewed consultation of the European Parliament and to some parliamentary scrutiny reservations (Doc. 
1484511/01 REV 1). The Parliament had, after its first consultation, proposed numerous amendments and had 
called for renewed consultations in the event that substantial changes were envisaged (Legislative Res., 29 Nov. 
2001, O. J. 2002, C 153, E'2175, and the corresponding Report (A5-0397/2001)). After being consulted again, it 
consented with the Council's draft without amendment on 6 February 2002 (Legislative Res., O. J. 15). 
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possible to work towards a common legislative framework they cannot hide the difficulties involved in 




Thus, the fight against terrorism is on a double track: first, there is the internal, counter-terrorist 
dimension within the EU; then there is the external, anti-terrorist dimension in which the EU has begun 
to play a global role. In the first case, the headway mentioned above is complemented by the 
possibilities opened to external border control as established by the Schengen Agreement. The 
elimination of interior borders has created the need for increased control regarding the flow of people 
and goods across the external borders of the EU. This responsibility is in national hands but 
increasingly requires more supranational support and coordination -a need that has led the Commission 
to call for the establishment of a European co-ordination agency. In the second case, co-operation with 
other countries and regional organizations has enhanced the international profile of the EU's internal 
security. Cooperation with third parties is accomplished by including standardized anti-terrorist clauses 
in bilateral agreements, offering technical assistance to countries affected by terrorism and to new 
members joining the EU, and by making joint declarations, agreements on the exchange of information 
and legal assistance9l, as well as by concluding extradition agreements with third parties. 
90 Moreover, there are now agreements between the EU and the US. See relatively: Dubois, S., The attacks of II 
September: EU-US cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, 7 Eur. For. Af Rev. (2002), p. p. 317-33 35. 
91 See especially the Europol-US agreements of II Dec. 2001 (Doc. 13359/0 1) and 20 Dec. 2002 (Doc. 15231/02); 
Mitsilegas, K., The new EU-USA cooperation on extradition, mutual legal assistance and the exchange of police 
data, 8 Eur. For-AfRev. (2003), p. p. 515-523 and Peers, S., Analysis of the supplementary agreement between 
Europol and United States, 15 Statewatch analysis (2002), at; 
http: //www. statewatch. org nexvs/2002/nov/analyl 5. pdf. 
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7. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE COUNTER- 
TERRORISM MEASURES 
Further evidence of the impact of September II and the determination of the European states to 
effectively fight terrorism can be found in the activities of the Council of Europe, which replaced its 
previous sectorial approach with a more comprehensive approach. Among the priorities of the Council 
of Europe counter-terrorism action are the 'multidisciplinary group for international action against 
terrorism, GMT, which drafted the protocol amending the 1977 European convention for the 
suppression of terrorism in 7 November 2002. The major innovations introduced by the Protocol is the 
fact that it establishes a wider list of offences into the scope of the convention, a mechanism for 
monitoring the implementation of the convention, the grounds for refusal of extradition. The list of 
conducts which may be considered as political offences for the purpose of refusing extradition has been 
updated by introducing the ten UN thematic conventions which provide for criminaliZation obligations. 
More importantly article 5 provides that there is no obligation to extradite to countries where a person 
risks being subjected to death penalty, torture, or inhuman treatment, unless the requesting. In 
comparison to the 1977 European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, the 2003 amending 
protocol represents a step forward in facilitating extradition. However, the different legal systems 
between member states of the Council of Europe do not seem to add much in overcoming the discretion 
of member states to improve assistance and cooperation between states. 
The European Council adopted the revised EU plan of action on combating terrorism on 18 June 2004 
clearly setting out the future tasks, and urging member states to fulfil their commitments within the 
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established deadlMeS92. More specifically the European Union called on members to implement the 
framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant. However, the conditions under which a warrant 
may be issued are left to national legislation. Likewise, the warrant might lead to lower standards of 
justice and less protection of fundamental rights. To begin with, the fact that the offences listed are not 
defined has been criticized as well as the principles of non-discrimination only appear in the preamble. 
The safeguards provided by the framework decision are indeed limited. Two safeguards, those 
regarding the procedure leading to the arrest and surrender of the wanted person when executm, g a 
European arrest warrant issued in another member state and those related to a possible violation of the 
wanted person's right in the issuing state. However, despite those safeguards found in article 11,14 and 
17 of the framework decision, failure to respect fundamental rights in the issuing state is not one of the 
substantial reasons for refusal to execute the warrant. Despite the fact that there are guarantees of a 
high level to be found in article 6 of the Treaty of the EU I suggest that in order to eliminate all 
uncertainty more guarantees both procedural and substantial are necessary. 
The launch of institutionalisation process for co-operation throughout Europe involved specific 
changes in the approach to the problem of terrorism. Member states do condemn all acts, methods and 
practices of terrorism as criminal, expressing their determination to fight the phenomenon through 
remforced bilateral and multilateral cooperation. 
7.1. FURTHER REGIONAL MEASURES 
The countries of Western Hemisphere in their effort to combat terrorism at the regional level have 
sought to establish legal regimes. The main forurn for taking counter-terronsm action at the regional 
level has been the organisation of American States. The 2002 OAS convention is a direct result of the 
www. ue. eu. int. 
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attacks of 9/11 against the US. The main points of the convention are the ones dealing with 
international co-operation, the suppression of the financing of terrorism, exchange of information, 
technical co-operation and mutual legal assistance. The convention contains in article 11 a 
depoliticization. proVision. Thus, for the purposes of extradition and mutual legal assistance none of the 
offences under the convention may be regarded as a political offence. This is a remarkable departure 
from previous Inter-American conventions. Similarly the League of Arab States, adopted on 22 April 
1998, maximised the level of co-operation among its members in the field of combating terrorism. An 
important aspect of the convention is the fact that it deals with issues of finance of terrorism and 
transborder control of lethal materials. Article 3 prohibits the finance of terrorism in all its forms. The 
adoption of the convention presents an outstanding example for regional legal co-operation in 
combating terrorism and it demonstrates the will to combat the terrorism phenomenon, 11respectively of 
any ideological or political considerations. 
CONCLUSION 
On 28 September 2001 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, taking unprecedented action to 
crack down on international terrorism. The resolution required every country to freeze the financial 
assets of terrorists and their supporters, deny travel or safe haven for terrorists, prevent terrorist 
recruitment and weapons supply, and co-operate with other countries in information sharing and 
criminal prosecution. 
The procedures established under Resolution 1373 go far beyond what was envisaged under the terms 
of 1998 Bombing Convention. Whereas many States were reluctant to ratify this treaty, all States are 
now subject to rigid obligations. It is clear that the current approach in the context of exchange of 
information and other forms of mutual legal assistance is different from the approach in the field of 
extradition. In the former, the regime established under relevant Security Council resolutions is much 
more externally centrallsed and controlled, whereas in the extradition field it is not. Similarly, in the 
field of MLA States have a lot less control over the treatment of their intelligence and their choice of 
cooperative means and partners. The same could be said for extradition, although from a practical point 
of view, it is extremely burdensome to monitor extradition in the same manner. I have demonstrated, 
however, in what way there has been a shift since 9/11 in the processes employed by many developed 
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States in extraditing suspected terrorists to countries with appalling human rights records. These illegal 
renditions are not isolated phenomena that are reffited by governments, but for many countries form the 
backbone of their practice in their global fight against terrorism. Although reflecti ice, "ve of State practi 
its recent growth precludes us from making a value Judgment regarding its normative content (i. e. 
instant custom). I shall simply say that it is indicative of an emerging model whereby focus on a 
particular obligation to the expense of another, although the two are by no means mutually exclusive. 
This paradigmatic shift is therefore problematic because it recognises the existence of two mutually 
exclusive legal regimes and hence operates on the basis that the global fight against terrorism can be 
effectuated only by abandoning the human rights component (or regime) 93 
With regards to the role of the Counter-terrorism Committee it becomes obvious that it can have a 
direct impact on the fight against terrorism, since it has helped energise states and organisations to pay 
more attention to combating terrorism. As a result of 600 reports it has received from states detailing 
their efforts to implement their obligations under resolution 1373, it is conducting the first worldwide 
audit of states' counter-terrorism capacities and it has also assumed a central role in the facilitation of 
technical assistance to states identified donors and interested states and helping to minimise duplication 
and overlap among potential assistance providers. The Committee has served as a 'switchboard', 
matching countries in need of assistance with those capable of providing such support 94. The 
Committee has operated with unique openness and transparency, and has an extensive website 
reporting on CTC activities and offering assistance and services to member states and regional 
93 See: Judgement concerning the Legality of the General Security Services's Interrogation Methods, Supreme 
Court of Israel, Judgement (6 Sep. 1999), 38 ILM(1999), 1471, which hadto deal, inter alia, with the 'ticking time 
bomb exception', i. e. whether in cases of extreme necessity torture to extract evidence is pen-nissible. The Court 
declared that while the relevant prohibitions were absolute, a 'necessity defence' could be raised in the ticking 
bomb scenario where an act is imminent to prevent danger that is certain to materialise, paras. 34-36. 
ý' Rostow, N., Before and after: the changed UN' response to terrorism since September 11,35 Cornell I. L. J. 
(2002), p. 485. 
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organizations 95. Compliance with CTC reporting requirements has been extraordinary, far greater than 
for any previous Security Council mandate. All 191 UN member states submitted first-round reports to 
96 the CTC explaining their efforts to comply with Resolution 1373 . Most states have also submitted 
second- and third-round reports. This high level of member state response indicates the importance 
many attach to compliance with the UN counter-terrorism program. The reports show that many states 
are taking concrete steps to revise their laws and enhance their enforcement capacity for compliance 
with UN counter-terrorism mandates. 
The major challenge however, for the Counter-Terrorism Committee is to strike a balance between 
efforts to combat terrorism and the protection of human rights. There is the concern that 
implementation of 1373 not be used as an excuse to infi7mge upon human rights. Highlighting this issue 
one commentator has written that resolution 1373 is now preserving opportunistic states with a ready 
formula for trampling upon the rights of political or other opponents III the name of the war on 
terrorism. For example the human rights committee has expressed concern about the negative effect 
that some domestic counter-terrorism measures may be having on asylum seekers and other 
foreignerS97 
. The established 
legal process for co-operation appears to be systematically replaced by 
informal rendition that raises fundamental questions as to whether cooperation since September II is 
undermining international law enforcement. This selective approach raises doubts as to the value of the 
effort dedicated to enchasing the legal framework. 
There is a challenge from the interplay between combating terrorism and the protection of human 
rights. There is the concern that resolution 1373 may be used as an excuse for human rights abuses. 
95 See: UN Counter-Terrorism Committee website, http: //www. un. org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/> 
96 Rosand, E., Current developments: Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and 
the fight against terrorism 97 AJIL (2003), p. 337. 
97 See: Nesi, G., International co-operation in counter-terrorism, (Ashgate, 2006), p. 85. 
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There are however, recent developments that may help mitigate the concerns of some that the CTC is 
not focusing on states' obligations to respect human rights as they implement Security Council counter- 
terrorism measures. The decision of the Security Council to authorise the Counter-terrorism Executive 
Directorate to hire a dedicated human rights expert and the decision of the Commission on Human 
Rights M April 2005 to approve the appointment of the special Rapporteur on human rights and 
terrorism are two steps forward. 
Underlying all this activity-the reporting of states, the categorization of responses, the ratification of 
conventions, and the provision of technical assistance-is a steadily increasing level of international 
cooperation in the counter-terrorism campaign. A majority of UN member states are now working 




My aim when writing this thesis was to examine the various forms of action and co-operation among 
States M their fight against terrorism. This would then lead me to ascertain the formation of co- 
operative or unilateral models and delineate their precise content and spatial duration. While such 
models are, from the part of States, premised on political considerations, they are part of a hypostatic 
union that combines elements of both politics and law. If law was not a necessary ingredient of such 
models, then each paradigmatic shift would be arbitrary and outside any normative framework. I have 
attempted to identify practices that are hailed as paradigmatic but which in reality constitute the action 
of a single State or a minority group. 
Following the close of hostilities after WW II, terrorism was not on the priority of the international 
agenda. Thus, states dealt With the phenomenon at the domestic level and on the basis of domestic 
legislation. There are two facets to the existence of this approach in its formative years besides the 
regulation by states of terrorist acts taking place on their territory. The other facet concerns those states 
that were faced with determining the criminal culpability of an alien accused of terrorist activity in his 
or her country of nationality - such cases usually involved requests for extradition to the country of 
nationality or the territorial state. States faced with such extradition requests had to determine within 
the boundaries of their own domestic legal systems whether the alleged offender was really susceptible 
to prosecution in a foreign jurisdiction. It must be made clear that until the promulgation of the first 
anti-terrorist conventions in the mid-1960's, the only other internationally binding instruments 
available were bilateral extradition treaties, but most of these before the 1960's made no provision for 
terrorist offences. Thus, a unilateral internal model developed with regard to the practice of requested 
States by which the determination of guilt of the accused offender was to be made on common sense 
and legal criteria of the Forum state. To this end, several principles were established, which although 
were applied under the same name across the globe, they were in fact predicated on criteria pertinent to 
each state. Chief among these is the political offence exception to terrorism. During the same time, i. e. 
slightly prior to the mid-1960's, many bilateral extradition treaties are revised to take account of 
terrorism, but in practice the factual determination of the principles contained therein are subject to 
judicial determination and the political offence exception is indeed prevalent. Nonetheless, the 
existence of such bilateral agreements suggests a dispersion of legal obligations fi7om the unilateral 
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mtemal model as the sole model, to the seed of what has become the 'inter-State suppressionist co- 
operative' model. Whereas political violence until the mid 1960's had an international ideological 
basis, it was nonetheless spatially limited, and as such it was dealt with on the basis of the unilateral 
domestic model [i. e. on a purely domestic basis in both its legal and enforcement dimensions]. From 
the 1960's until the early 1970's political violence began manifesting itself beyond international 
frontiers and threatened the security of civil aviation. The introduction of this international element 
alone shifted the counter-terrorism model from a fully unilateral domestic to an inter-state co-operation 
model. 
Through my examination of the evolution of anti-terrorist policy, it became evident from the late 
1950's that the newly launched airline industry was in danger of collapse unless action was taken to 
prevent terrorist action. For the purposes of this thesis, the adoption of the 1963 Tokyo is significant In 
two respects: a) because it marks a normative shift of models, fi7om the unilateral internal to a much 
more inter-State suppressionist, and; b) because it is recognised that no State alone can expect to 
combat terrorism, since in this new era the movement of goods and people across international fi7ontlers 
implicates the cooperation of multiple jurisdictions. Although by this time it became evident that a 
comprehensive convention on terrorism was impossible to achieve, the inter-State suppressionist model 
proliferated through the conclusion of further thematic multilateral anti-terrorist conventions between 
the early to late 1970's. The inter-State model of this period, as reflected in the new multilateral 
conventions, sought to restrict somewhat the freedom of domestic institutions - particularly of courts 
and the decision-making power of justice ministers to pass fate on extradition requests - in challenging 
terrorist acts on the basis of the offender's motive. This initiative was not especially successful, mainly 
because the majority of ideological violence in the 1970's was intemal and deemed to fall within the 
ambit of national liberation, while it should not be forgotten that the recent desaliniZation struggle had 
left a strong imprint across the globe. Particular mention should be made to the fact that during the 
1970's the General Assembly of the United Nations, at a time when the Assembly was dominated by 
developing and newly decolorized States, attempted to address the problem of root causes. These 
discussions and relevant resolutions in the end did not culminate into any particular action on the part 
of the UN, but it is worthy of mention as the only instance of discussion of a truly preventive inter- 
State approach. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War the issue of 
terrorism shifted from the General Assembly and the various specialized agencies of the UN to the 
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Security Council. This was the start of a new model - and parallel to the ones already outlined above - 
which is inter-State in character, but which is much more centralized and less consensus-based than its 
other inter-State counterpart. The adoption of the Bombing convention and the Financing of Terrorism 
conventions represented a more effective rendition of the suppressionist model against terrorism as both 
of them contain an expanded, wide range of obligations on member states. One of the innovative 
elements of the conventions is that they threat the offences prescribed therein as non-political offences 
for the purpose of extradition. The legal effect of this provision is that a normal defence that would be 
available to a fugitive offender to plead that an act was committed under political motivation is denied 
in the case of extradition proceedings relating to a terrorist bombing. The provision recognizes that 
where there is recourse to indiscriminate violence against civilians, then the offender is not entitled to 
the protection provided by the laws governing extradition. We can therefore detect that the main theme 
underlying the Conventions is the abandonment of particular safeguards otherwise granted to the 
accused under domestic law and prior anti-terrorist conventions. Consequently, the legal instruments 
developed by the United Nations and Regional Inter-Governmental Organizations have been ad hoc. 
Each convention deals with a specific subject-matter and almost always as a result of a crisis or a 
spectacular incident of terror-violence. For example, highjackmgs and sabotage of civilian aircraft 
during the 1960s and 1970s prompted the United Nations to adopt four international conventions 
dealing With the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircrafts, unlawful acts committed upon aircraft, 
unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation, and unlawful acts of violence at airports. Similarly, a 
rash of assassinations and kidnapping of diplomats during the 1960s and 1970s brought about the 
adoption of a convention concerning the protection of diplomats. Later, as a result of attacks upon 
United Nations personnel, a convention was adopted to protect United Nations and Associated 
Personnel. The late 1960s and early 1970s also witnessed a rapid increase in the kidnapping of civilian 
hostages for ransom, thus bringing about the adoption of a convention against the taking of 
hostages. 
Conventions concerning terrorist acts against maritime activities followed the 1985 seizure of the 
Italian vessel Achille Lauro on the high seas. More recently, the American 
Embassy bombings in 
Kenya and Tanzania prompted the 1998 adoption of a convention crimmalizMig the 
bombing of 
government facilities. 
Notably all the anti-terronsm conventions adopt a suppressionist approach. Throughout this thesis 
I 




Council resolutions and anti-terrorist treaties the term 'prevention' figures prominently and 
distinguishable from its counterpart 'punish'. For the purposes of this thesis I have taken the view that 
for a particular criminal justice policy to qualify as preventive it must target the root causes of a 
phenomenon, i. e. before it is conceived as a concrete idea in the mind of the perpetrators. Where it is 
conceived as an idea and it is discussed for the purposes of perpetration, the offence is at the planning 
stage and it already constitutes a crmiinal offence. My research of the various legal mstruinents and 
criminal 'ustice policy literature has revealed that the term 'prevent' designates the latter and is not 
employed to tackle root causes. Therefore, I have included the planning stages of terrorist offences - 
even where they take a long time to mature into the ultimate offence - within the suppressionist 
framework. 
The events of September II seem to have changed the prevailing attitude towards terrorism. 
Considerable debates have taken place on whether there has been a paradigmatic shift in the field ofjus 
ad bellum. As regards the right to employ armed force against terrorists, I have ascertained that 
Resolution 13 68 can only be interpreted to encompass the particular context of the 9/11 attacks, i. e. that 
Al-Qaeda was in such close proximity to the Taleban regime, which was the effective govermnent of 
Afghanistan at the time, that the force authorized under Resolution 1368 was against Afghanistan and 
not against a terrorist group as such. This result is confirmed by the reaction of States subsequent to the 
adoption of the Resolution and the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its Advisory 
Opinion in the Palestinian Wall case in 2004. This conclusion is also premised on the principle of non- 
intervention and the respect of the sovereignty of nations, since in those cases where a terrorist group 
has forced itself upon the territory of a State and using part of that territory for terrorist activities, it 
defies the rationale of Article 51 UN Charter to justify recourse to force on the basis of that Article. 
Rather, in such cases it should be the Security Council acting unanimously that should decide when and 
how an-ned force is to be used. I am thus of the opinion that armed force against terrorist attacks may 
be employed only under the strict context-based example of the 9/11 attacks. The magnitude of the 
atrocities committed in September II and the military response against Afghanistan along with the 
support received from the whole international community shows that terrorism may be characterized as 
an armed attack giving rise to self-defence but it must satisfy the scale and effect test before it can be 
characterized as such. The nature of the organization, the atrocities caused by the degree to which they 
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represent a general campaign and the method used will all bear on whether it is deemed to have 
acquired the level of intensity. 
For one thing, we have seen the approach established by Security Council Resolution 1368 - although 
restrictive and by no means of a general character - and referring to the application of the individual or 
collective right of self-defence in cases akin to the events of 9/11 (reactive). Secondly, although the 
Security Council took no parallel (to Resolution 1368) Chapter VII action in relation to the Afghan 
campaign, it has indicated the possibility of doing so in the ftiture should the need arise. Council 
Resolutions 1377 and 1378 have emphasized the Council's determination that terrorism runs contrary 
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and that within this legal framework 
every attempt should be made to root it out'. This statement is very significant because it brings 
terrorism within the legal sphere of the UN Charter, and particularly Articles 2(4), 51 and Chapter VII. 
I should make clear, however, that the approximation of terrorism to the above mentioned UN Charter 
proVisions in the language of Council resolutions does not mean that we can freely substitute the word 
'State' with that of 'terrorist organization'. Rather, at present there exists only a very narrowly defined 
schema for assimilating terrorist attacks to the UN Charter framework; namely, the specific context of 
Council Resolution 1368 and the possibility of relying on Article 51 UN Charter where the harbouring 
State is an agent of the terrorist organization. It should not surprise us that in the light of such 
vagueness and uncertain language, the General Assembly did not speak in the language of self-defence, 
following the events of 9/11, contrary to Council Resolution 1368 
2. Nonetheless, the language 
employed by the Council in Resolutions such as 1377 and 1378 may provide a basic precedent for 
authorising the use of armed force against terrorism in the future, if and when the requisite consensus 
can be secured. But in every case, it is clear that we are referring to a suppressionist model, since we 
1 SC Res. 1377 (12 Nov. 200 1); SC Res. 1378 (14 Nov. 200 1). 
2 See GA Res. 56/1 (18 Sep. 2001). 
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have seen the lack of even the slightest support for a Security Council-backed pre-emptive use of force 
against terrorists. 
In the case where terrorism because of its gravity and degree of violence employed can be qualified as 
armed attack self-defence is always limited by article 51 of the UN Charter and customary international 
law, such as necessity and proportionality. The latter in particular should be interpreted in the sense 
that the use of force in self-defence must be committed with the aim of fendmg off the armed attack. In 
the case where an attack is carried out by means of acts of terrorism, the limit of proportionality implies 
that the victim state may use force in order to target terrorists bases, training grounds etc. but self- 
defence cannot consist in the massive and generallsed use of armed force aimed at defeating the state 
accused of being responsible for the acts of terrorism. 
It is clear that the right is not an open right, which can be applied according to the defender's views. 
Self-defence has to answer to the rules of international law in particular the principles of necessity, 
proportionality and immediacy as well as the restrictions of article 5 1. Although Article 51 addresses 
some of the questions about the use of force, it does not define exactly the circumstances when states 
can, individually or collectively, legitimately use force to counter an attack that they perceive to be 
imminent. Because of the nature of current and pending international security threats, more precision is 
urgently needed to establish a common understanding of legally justifiable action in the face of 
imminent threats, even though specific cases may vary Mi their technical details. Resolving this 
question would not only help reduce tension Within the international community, but it would also help 
the Security Council establish guidelines to make collective decisions on security actions under 
Chapter VIL A cautious approach to anticipatory military action is essential to avoid abuse. Whatever 
solution or guidance the international community undertakes to reach a common understandMg ofjus 
ad bellum on anticipatory military action taken collectively or individually, such action can succeed 
only if it is firmly rooted in a clear international law order. The events of September 11 brought about 
a significant loosening of the legal regime with regards to the use of force. However, time can only tell 
whether those potential loosening is necessary responses to contemporary terrorist threats. 
The unilateralism expressed by the National Security Strategy as evidence of a pre-emptive use of force 
provoked reactions by the whole international community. Such reactions are important to the extent 
that they demonstrate the rejection of unilaterallsm and the support for a collective security system. 
- 180- 
Thus, the pre-emptive model does not constitute a model of any sort. As the Secretary General of the 
UN pointed out in the opening of the 58 th session of the General Assembly this doctrine of pre-emptive 
self-defence clashes with the UN Charter. If the global anti-terrorist struggle (including the 
development of an integrated political and security strategy to combat terrorism) is left to the nation- 
states alone, the world will be confronted with the real danger of uncoordinated action by a multitude 
of sovereign actors. In such a scenario, each actor will define its strategies on the basis of an essentially 
unilateral threat assessment and may eventually carry out pre-empth, e measures according to that 
threat assessment. 
What became clear from this thesis is that terrorist organisations will continue to be defeated by 
detection and prosecution, which falls within the suppressionit model. Although that new standards are 
necessary to fight terrorism at the international level and mechanisms that watch the observance of 
such standards, such as the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the war against terrorism seems to continue 
materialise and revolve around counter- intelligence operations that can deal with the financing of 
terrorism rather that than war in the technical sense of the word. In fact, the 'war on terror' is clearly 
not an armed conflict at all. It consists of a multi-faceted counter-terrorism campaign, some aspects of 
which involve the use of military force, most of it carried out in States where there is no armed conflict. 
My conclusions as to the application of the Jus ad Bello and Jus in Bello in the context of international 
terrorism indicate that the contemporary counter-terrorism model is indeed one based not on military 
action but on inter-state co-operation. The strict regime reinforced by Council resolutions and further 
monitored by a subsidiary Council organ, the Counter-Terrorism Committee is indeed evidence of the 
preferable counter-terrorism approach. In the field of mutual legal assistance and exchange of 
information and intelligence, Resolution 1373 imposes obligations that are not susceptible to unfettered 
unilateral action but come under close Council observance, thus underlying a centralised Security 
Council model. 
However, the implications of Resolution 1373 were felt in all aspects of public life, as well as private, 
because every registered financial institution is now under an obligation to detect suspected funds and 
conform to similar demands made by the Council and other agencies. These obligations go far beyond 
what would have been expected of individual States ratifying the 2000 Terrorist Financing Convention. 
It is evident, therefore, that we no longer have a paradigmatic shift from the pure mter-State 
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suppressionist model to the more centralized Security Council model. However, this is not the 
prevalent model in all aspects of counter-terrorism policy, but mainly in the fields of bombings and 
terrorist financing. As a result, a large number of States have viewed their obligations under Resolution 
1373 as providing an exception to their human rights obligations under international law. In particular, 
model-countries such as Sweden, have not found it problematic to illegally render suspected persons to 
States that are well-known for their atrocious human rights record without even having substantiated 
charges against such accused persons. Similarly, other countries, and particularly the USA, have lost 
little sleep over illegally rendering suspected persons to countries such as Egypt, Syria and Jordan for 
indefinite periods of time with the certain knowledge that such persons will be subjected to torture and 
other cruel and inhurnan treatment. The frightening aspect of this trend is the fact that most of these 
countries now proclaim this to official and not merely clandestine and 'unauthorized' activity, as would 
have been the case prior to 9/11. We are, therefore, witnessing a paradigmatic shift from an inter-State 
cooperation premised on treaty obligations, to an mter-State model based on informal structures - 
officially this is explained on the basis of Resolution 1373 - with a significant effect on human rights. 
This is an extremely dangerous trend that needs to be challenged judicially and politically and it is 
appalling that individual EU countries are part of such abuses. Indeed, the UN Human Rights 
Committee and other domestic courts have made it clear that there does not need to be any conflict 
between the obligations contained in Resolution 1373 and inter-State human rights obligations. As 
Professor Bassiouni notes ' there is no internationally agreed upon methodology for the identification 
and appraisal of what is commonly referred to as terrorism, including causes, strategies, goals and 
outcomes of the conduct in question and those who perpetuate it. There is also no international 
consensus as to the appropriate reactive strategies of states and the international community, their 
values, goals and outcomes. All of this makes it difficult to identify what is sought to be prevented and 
controlled, why and how. As the world is coming to grips with a changed security environment, it is 
clear that the dangers posed by private actors, in particular terrorist groups, are no longer isolated issues 
easily to be dealt with within the national context. In this era of globalization and technological 
j Ity innovation, states indeed have no choice but to 'oin efforts and strive towards a 'new secur 
consensus'. Such a consensus is revealed by the development of the centralized Security Council model 
of inter-state co-operation. 
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In the process of deconstructMg the contemporary counter-terrorism models it became evident that the 
current terrorist threats have urged a number of states to deal with terrorism as a phenomenon 
irrespectively of any ideological or political possible justifications. Among the main tools is the fight 
against terrorism has been international co-operation through judicial co-operation, police operations 
and the implementation of anti-terrorism conventions. It became evident during the course of my 
research that there is now a strong legal framework capable of addressing the modem manifestations of 
terrorism. However, it further became evident that states often selectively apply the law, driven by 
their national interests and by the policy agenda of the moment. In case the law is unclear, such 
uncertainty allows powerful states to act unilaterally and undermine the collective security system. The 
challenge ahead is to enforce the existing international norms. The commitment of the international 
community to clarify and strengthen international law Will play the major factor in fight against 
terrorism. Therefore, what is mostly needed in the fight against terrorism is not the development of new 
norms but the enforcement and consistent application of the existing international norms. 
Where do we go from here? I have identified a number of current counter-terrorism models, such as 
the inter-state cooperation and the Security Council centralised and the unilateral external. Where there 
exists a conflict between any of these the relevant Security Council models will prevail on the basis of 
Article 103 UN Charter, and in the case of conflicts between the other models one can only presume 
that a model can only invalidate another if it has been given the normative capacity to do so by the 
States concerned (i. e. a new treaty cannot invalidate the effects for State A with regard to an older 
treaty, unless State A expressly denounces the older treaty. Obviously, States parties to the old treaty 
will be affected by the denunciation of the old treaty by State A, and State A will have to deal with its 
relationship with these States too). The most significant, and from a legal point of View artificial, 
conflict is that between the recent Security Council model over and above fundamental 
human rights 
concerns. Although such violations of human rights form part of unilateral internal and 
bilateral inter- 
State model they are in fact predicated, for countries other than the USA, on 
Security Council 
resolutions. The real danger is that if this practice becomes endemic and widespread it may receive a 
normative character and thus turn into a model With catastrophic consequences. 
It is hoped that future 
action will avert this doomsday scenario. 
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Certainly the applicable rules in the fight against terrorism both at national and international level need 
to become clearer. There is not evidence however suggesting a major reconstructing of international 
law dealing with terrorism. What is lying ahead is the challenge of effective enforcement of existing 
norms, which needs to be met. And that would in turn help push international law further from the 
concepts and methods of international law of co-existence - which purports to maintain the co- 
existence between antagonistic units, assumed to have contradictory interests- towards the more co- 
operative vision and model of international law of co-operation based on common interests. 
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